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ABSTRACTS: 
 
 This thesis tackles the problem of free will in ancient Egypt having as point of 
departure the Instruction of Ptahhotep. In order to assess the status and conception of 
free will in a given culture one has to grasp the way that very culture understands man 
as an agent. Therefore, in the first chapter five of the elements which constitute human 
nature and which are featured in the Instruction of Ptahhotep were scrutinised; these 
elements are: the moral character, heart, belly, kA, and bA. Of these the most important 
and relevant in the conception of the human agent is the heart. It was concluded that 
these elements have little to do with volition but, nonetheless, play a major role in free 
will: they grant the individual the ability to will freely. 
 Besides the agent conception, it is also important to address the principal 
obstacle to free will, which in the foregoing instruction are the gods. Therefore the 
second chapter was dedicated to the analysis of divine intervention. This was divided 
into “divine determination” and “fate.” In this chapter focus was directed to what one 
may term “negative divine intervention.” In this type of intervention a god not only 
controls the actions of an individual, but, through that control, may also condemn him to 
not be able to access the hereafter and lead a pleasant existence there. 
 But divine intervention was not always believed to be negative. There was also a 
“positive divine intervention.” An example of such intervention is the maintenance of 
the created world by the gods. In a like manner a god could also be beneficial towards 
an individual, usually in a reciprocal relation. 
 At the conclusion it was inferred tha the importance given to moral 
responsibility in the extant written record is determinant to the status of free will; even 
though some may be determined by a god, those who are not have the possibility to will 
freely. 
 
 Esta tese aborda o problema do livre arbítrio no antigo Egipto tendo como ponto 
de partida a Instrução de Ptahhotep. De modo a avaliar o estatuto e concepção do livre 
arbítrio numa dada cultura, é necessário apreender o modo de como essa cultura entende 
o homem como agente. Por conseguinte, no primeiro capítulo são analisados cinco 
elementos constituintes da natureza humana e que figuram na Instrução de Ptahhotep; 
estes elementos são: o carácter moral, o coração, o ventre, o kA, e o bA. Destes, o mais 
importante e relevante na concepção do agente humano é o coração. Foi concluído que 
6 
 
estes elementos têm pouca relação com a volição mas que, no entanto, desempenham 
um papel fundamental no livre arbítrio: garantem ao indivíduo a capacidade de escolher 
livremente. 
 Para além da concepção do agente, é também importante abordar o principal 
obstáculo ao livre arbítrio, que na referida instrução são os deuses. Consequentemente o 
segundo capítulo foi dedicado à análise da intervenção divina. Esta foi dividida em 
“determinação divina” e “destino”. Neste capítulo a atenção foi direccionada para o que 
podemos designar de “intervenção divina negativa”. Neste tipo de intervenção, um deus 
não só controla o indivíduo como, através desse mesmo controlo, pode também 
condená-lo a não poder desfrutar de uma vida agradável no Além. 
 Mas a intervenção divina pode também ser positiva, manifestando-se por vezes 
na relação recíproca entre homem e deus. 
 Na conclusão foi inferido que o relevo dado à responsabilidade moral no registo 
documental chegado até nós é determinante para o estatuto do livre arbítrio; mesmo que 
alguns sejam determinados por um deus, aqueles que não o são têm a possibilidade de 
escolher livremente. 
 
 Esta tese aborda o problema do livre arbítrio no antigo Egipto tendo como ponto 
de partida a Instrução de Ptahhotep. De modo a avaliar o estatuto e concepção do livre 
arbítrio numa dada cultura, é necessário apreender o modo de como essa cultura entende 
o homem como agente. Por conseguinte, no primeiro capítulo são analisados cinco 
elementos constituintes da natureza humana e que figuram na Instrução de Ptahhotep; 
estes elementos são: o carácter moral, o coração, o ventre, o kA, e o bA. Destes, o mais 
importante e relevante na concepção do agente humano é o coração. Por coração 
entendemos aqui ib, uma vez que na referida instrução HA.ty figura apenas uma vez e 
num contexto fora da dimensão intelectiva do humano. Foi argumentado que o ib 
constituía uma causa mental onde pensamentos e emoções tinham origem e eram 
posteriormente concretizados através da acção física ou da verbalização. 
Interessantemente o ventre forma uma relação dialéctica com o ib, e tal é 
particularmente observável na Instrução de Ptahhotep. Talvez por o ib se situar dentro 
do ventre, estes dois elementos partilham várias características, incluindo a causação 
mental. No entanto, em termos axiológicos, o ib tem geralmente predominância sobre o 
ventre. Deste modo, para Ptahhotep ouvir o ventre é “pertencer ao inimigo.” Neste 
capítulo foi concluído que estes elementos têm pouca relação com a volição, que parece 
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estar mais associada com o HA.ty, mas que, no entanto, desempenham um papel 
fundamental no livre arbítrio: garantem ao indivíduo a capacidade de escolher 
livremente. E é de destacar que nas discussões filosóficas sobre o livre arbítrio o 
conceito de capacidade é fundamental; o agente tem de poder concretizar em acção a 
escolha que tomou. 
 Para além da concepção do agente, é também importante abordar o principal 
obstáculo ao livre arbítrio, o determinismo. Em Ptahhotep a determinação está 
sobretudo a cargo dos deuses. Consequentemente o segundo capítulo foi dedicado à 
análise da intervenção divina. Neste capítulo a atenção foi direccionada para o que 
podemos designar de “intervenção divina negativa”. Neste tipo de intervenção, um deus 
não só controla o indivíduo como, através desse mesmo controlo, pode também 
condená-lo a não poder desfrutar de uma vida agradável no Além. É o caso de um filho 
rebelde a quem os deuses implantaram um obstáculo e que, talvez em virtude desse 
mesmo obstáculo, ficou privado de aceder ao Além. Este tipo de intervenção negativa  
foi dividida em “determinação divina” e “destino”. O critério usado para esta divisão foi 
linguístico, uma vez que em Egípcio antigo existem vários termos para designar o 
conjunto de fenómenos que usualmente designamos de destino: SA, Meskhenet, e 
Renenutet. Embora a partir do Império Novo o destino estivesse sobretudo relacionado 
com a preordenação do dia da morte, no Império Médio estava também conectado com 
as acções do indivíduo. Este aspecto está particularmente patente na Narrativa de 
Sinuhe. Neste texto do Império Médio o protagonista procura respostas para a sua fuga 
precipitada do caos instalado na capital após a morte de Amenemhat I. Num processo 
semelhante ao recurso a práticas divinatórias para descobrir a causa de uma aflição, 
Sinuhe identifica deus como a causa do seu infortúnio e como a agência que 
predeterminou a sua fuga. Mas não é apenas em Sinuhe que as acções de um indivíduo 
são preordenadas. Também em Ptahhotep um indivíduo cujo comportamento é 
duvidoso é aparentemente alvo de retribuição divina; no entanto se o comportamento foi 
predeterminado por deus que justificação haveria para ser castigado? Outro caso em que 
um indivíduo aparenta ter sido controlado por deus de forma arbitrária, ou seja sem ter 
cometido uma falta que justificasse retribuição divina, insere-se nesta aporia a que os 
Egípcios não parecem ter dado resposta. 
 Mas a intervenção divina pode também ser positiva, manifestando-se por vezes 
na relação recíproca entre homem e deus. Esta é realçada na Instrução para o Rei 
Merikaré. 
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 Na conclusão foi inferido que o relevo dado à responsabilidade moral no registo 
documental chegado até nós é determinante para o estatuto do livre arbítrio. Segundo a 
fórmula 1130 dos Textos dos Sarcófagos o responsável pelo mal entre os homens não é 
o deus criador, mas sim os corações (ib.w) dos homens. No primeiro capítulo foi 
sugerido que a causa estruturante, ou seja a causa que despoleta a causa mental, do ib 
era o próprio indivíduo e as suas acções – sendo equiparado a um vaso, o coração torna-
se sujeito do investimento do indivíduo; se este se preocupar em aderir às expectativas 
morais em relação a ele, o efeito no seu ib, enquanto produtor de pensamentos e 
emoções, será construtivo; a acção inversa naturalmente que terá o efeito contrário no 
ib. Parte desta causa estruturante é a memória; talvez por esta razão se usassem 
amuletos do coração enquanto exteriorizações do coração destinadas a lembrar o 
indivíduo de que a sua consciência moral não só o estava permanente a observar como 
iria também ser perscrutada no julgamento dos mortos. E é justamente esta 
responsabilização que afirma o livre arbítrio humano; mesmo que alguns indivíduos 
sejam determinados por um deus, aqueles que não o são têm a possibilidade de escolher 
livremente e de serem julgados não perante os deuses mas perante Maat. 
 
Keywords: Moral responsibility; heart; divine intervention; fate. 
 
Palavras-chave: Responsabilidade moral; coração; intervenção divina; destino. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
 A discourse over free will is alien to Egyptian material. And so are discussions 
about art, religion, and philosophy. Nonetheless scholars have engaged themselves with 
identifying these phenomena in the Egyptian culture as they are implicitly manifest. In 
order to study such themes it is often necessary to draw upon epistemological premises 
and knowledge from neighbouring fields, such as Biblical Studies. In a like manner I 
propose to identify a notion of free will in the Egyptian culture of the Old and Middle 
Kingdoms with the Instruction of Ptahhotep as a core source. 
 The prologue of the instruction attributes its authorship to the vizier Ptahhotep of 
the Fifth Dynasty. However, not all Egyptologists who have studied the text agree with 
such an early date of composition. In fact, the earliest extant support containing the 
instruction, the Papyrus Prisse, dates from the Twelfth Dynasty
1
. It would not be 
impossible that this version would be itself a copy from an older manuscript. However, 
some of the concepts and grammatical constructions used in the text are only developed 
in the Middle Kingdom. Examples of these include the writing of the first person suffix 
pronoun =i2 which in Old Egyptian was always omitted, the term, the word biA.t, which 
began to be used from the end of the Old Kingdom onwards
3
, a possible reference to a 
universal judgement of the dead in line 97 – “the end comes, maat endures” –,  the 
reference to the ba of an individual when he is still alive – in the Old Kingdom private 
tomb inscriptions the ba was seldom mentioned; the ba was featured almost exclusively 
in the Pyramid Texts –, and, according to Pascal Vernus4, the lack of the opposition 
between ib and HA.ty which would have been featured in a citation of the instruction in a 
stele of Senusret I
5
. Although one may still feel tempted to suggest that the work was 
adapted from Old to Middle Egyptian it is important to note that 
 
                                                 
1
 See Pascal Vernus, Sagesses de l’Égypte pharaonique, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale Éditions, 2001), 55, 
and Richard B. Parkinson, “Teachings, Discourses, and Tales from the Middle Kingdom,” in Middle 
Kingdom Studies, ed. Stephen Quirke, (New Malden: SIA Publishing, 1991), 106. 
2
 See for example line 7: “sovereign, my lord (ity nb=i)”. 
3
 Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Autobiographies Chiefly of the Middle Kingdom: a study and an 
anthology. Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 84, (Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 1988), 142. 
4
 Sagesses de l’Égypte pharaonique, 71 with n. 35. 
5
 Ibid., 71. For more details see his “L‟intertextualité dans la culture pharaonique: l‟Enseignment de 
Ptahhotep et le grafitto d‟jmny (Ouâdi Hammâmat nº 3042),” GM 147, (1995): 107, quoted in ibid., 115 n. 
35. Note however that the word HA.ty is also absent from two other Middle Kingdom compositions, the 
Tale of the Eloquent Peasant, and the Shipwrecked Sailor. See Alexandre Piankoff, Le “coeur” dans les 
textes Égyptiens: Depuis l'Ancien jusq'à la fin du Nouvel Empire, (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul 
Geuthner, 1930), 18. 
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in the history of the Egyptian language, Old and Middle Egyptian form a unity distinct from that  formed 
by Late Egyptian, Demotic and Coptic. [...] The Ancient Egyptians themselves felt the  necessity of  
translating texts from Middle Egyptian into Late Egyptian (Urkunden VI and Ani),  and from Middle 
Egyptian into Demotic (Pap. Carlsberg I), but never texts from Old into Middle Egyptian.
6
 
 
Despite this factor, Gerhard Fecht argued for an adaptation of an Old Kingdom original 
to the Middle Egyptian version of Papyrus Prisse especially based on the differences of 
metre and language
7
. Richard Parkinson turned the argument round and proposed to 
interpret the Old Kingdom metre used in the Prisse version as an archaism device
8
. In 
sum, scholars are not unanimous about the date of composition of the Instruction of 
Ptahhotep, with proposed dates ranging from the late Old Kingdom to the Middle 
Kingdom.
9
 Notwithstanding, based on the differences above enounced and on Richard 
Parkinson‟s argument for archaism I will consider this instruction a Middle Kingdom 
document. 
 As a Middle Kingdom composition, it indeed shares moral contents with the Old 
Kingdom biographical inscriptions, as surely it was also influenced by the intellectual 
and religious reflections of that period. But in the transition from the Old Kingdom to 
the Middle Kingdom there occurred shifts in royal ideology, afterlife beliefs, scope and 
focus of literature, redefinitions in mythology, and, most certainly, how free will was 
perceived. Therefore, it would be unwise to use Old and Middle Kingdom sources 
interchangeably as, in the evolution from one historical period to another, there are 
bound to be discontinuities along with the continuities. I thus propose to place the 
Instruction of Ptahhotep
10
 at the centre of my discussion and to trace back from it 
beliefs regarding free will both in the Old and Middle Kingdoms. 
                                                 
6
 Éric Doret, The Narrative Verbal System of Old and Middle Egyptian, Cahiers d‟Orientalisme 12, 
(Geneva: Patrick Cramer Editeur, 1986), 14-5. 
7
 “Cruces Interpretum in der Lehre des Ptahhotep (Maximen 7, 9, 13, 14) und das Alter der Lehre,” in 
Hommages à François Daumas, ed. A. Guillaumont, (Montpellier: Université de Montpellier, 1986), 227-
51, quoted in William Kelly Simpson, ed., The Literature of Ancient Egypt: An Anthology of Stories, 
Instructions, Stelae, Autobiographies, and Poetry, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2003), 576. 
8
 “Teachings, Discourses, and Tales from the Middle Kingdom,” in Middle Kingdom Studies, 103-4. 
9
 For a brief overview see Ronald J. Williams, “The Sages of Ancient Egypt in the Light of Recent 
Scolarship,” JARCE 101, (1981): 9. 
10
 The Instruction of Ptahhotep is part of the genre known as “wisdom literature.” It focuses on proper 
conduct in several situations and under several offices or social positions. For an overview and comments 
on specific passages see Richard B. Parkinson, Poetry and Culture in Middle Kingdom Egypt: A Dark 
Side to Perfection (London: Continuum, 2002), 257-66. For the text transcribed into hieroglyphs from the 
hieratic see Zbyněk Žaba, Les Maximes de Ptahhotep (Prague: 1956), 15-65, and Christian Jacq, Jacq, Les 
maximes de Ptah-Hotep: l'enseignement d'un sage au temps des pyramides (Fuveau: La Maison de Vie, 
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 In order to assess the status and conception of free will
11
 I propose to analyse the 
conception of the human agent, on the one hand, and, on the other, to scrutinise the 
opposite of free will, i.e., determinism, which in the Instruction of Ptahhotep is 
expressed above all by divine intervention. 
  
1. AGENT CONCEPTION:  
 
 In our discussion it is paramount to seek a definition, in the Egyptians‟ own 
terms, of the human agent. Such definition must concern to which extent the agent was 
able to choose from the available options, that is, to which point the intellectual 
processes of decision-making allowed him to be in control of his decisions. Neither all 
cultures nor all thinkers need to share the same premises about what is to be an agent in 
what concerns free will. A case in point is Thomas Hobbes‟s theory that humans were 
no different from animals in that they were bound to follow irrational desires and any 
decision was the result of the attempt to fulfil them
12
. 
 How the Egyptian elite understood and depicted the conscience of the human 
agent is then what will be tackled in this chapter. I will attempt to answer the following 
queries: how is the moral conscience characterised, and what is its role in the process of 
decision making? The Instruction of Ptahhotep will be the main source, but 
comparisons with other documents from the Old and Middle Kingdoms will be made 
whenever felt pertinent. 
 Five Egyptian concepts dealing with the human moral conscience are 
particularly prominent in Ptahhotep: the character, heart, belly, kA, and bA, and they will 
be subjected to intensive analysis here.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
2004), 113-217. In the translations of this instruction presented below line numbers are given before the 
verses. 
11
 This study builds on my article “O problema do livre arbítrio e da intervenção divina na instrução de 
Ptah-hotep” [The problem of free will and divine intervention in the instruction of Ptah-hotep], Cadmo 19 
(2009). Most of the inferences and translations presented here update the ones given there. 
12
 For an introduction to Thomas Hobbes‟s theory about free will see Thomas Pink, “Nature,” in Free 
Will, A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 55-72. 
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1.1. Moral Character: 
 
 I qualify character as “moral” after Kevin Timpe‟s article “moral character” on 
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
13
. The concept of character, by itself, “denotes 
the purely factual characteristics of a thing or a person as distinguished from other 
things or persons.”14 But because a human being produces actions with consequences 
that are appraised by others as being positive, negative, or neutral – speaking in general 
terms – the very character that defines each person therefore has an ethical component. 
And since most of the relevant extant Egyptian sources denote ethical concerns, it is 
appropriate to apply to them the category of moral character. 
 Before advancing to a survey of the Egyptians‟ perspectives on moral character 
and whether it was related with free will or not I propose to briefly introduce how 
character is important to understand free will according to some philosophers. 
 As stated just now, character has a moral dimension. And it is precisely in this 
dimension that character plays an important role in the argument between supporters of 
Free Will and proponents of Determinism. Moral agents are expected by their 
community to abide by certain rules and behave appropriately. But those expectations 
rest on the assumption that the agent is able to do otherwise, i.e. that nothing in his 
nature or character prevents him from breaking the rules
15
. A related problematic is 
whether the agent has control over his character, or if it is the product of moral luck
16
. 
This issue stems from what Robert Kane has termed “the condition of Ultimate 
Responsibility,” which requires that an action must originate from the agent himself if 
he is to be responsible for it, i.e. the agent must be the ultimate cause of his actions: 
 
 Compare Aristotle‟s claim cited earlier that if a man is responsible for wicked acts issuing from 
his character, then he must at some time in the past have been responsible for forming this character.
17
 
 
                                                 
13
 http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-ch/ (accessed March 9, 2010). 
14
 W. Arnold, “Character,” in Encyclopedia of Psychology, ed. H. J. Eysenck, W. Arnold, and R. Meili, 
(London: Search Press), 1: 158. 
15
 About the relation of character with free will see Arthur C. Danto and Sidney Morgenbesser, 
“Character and Free Will,” The Journal of Philosophy 54, no. 16 (Aug. 1, 1957): 493-505. 
16
 About moral luck see Kevin Timpe, “Moral Character,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
17
 Robert Kane, “Excerpt from „Responsibility,‟” in Free Will, ed. John Martin Fischer, Critical Concepts 
in Philosophy, vol 2, Determinism (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 147-51 (quotation is in p. 
151). Originally published in The Significance of Free Will, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
32-37. 
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It is here that moral luck or chance comes into play. One may trace the sequence of 
causes and events that led to the agent performing a certain action, but only to find out 
that the agent could not have been responsible by certain elements, namely formative 
circumstances such as family, social customs, etc., that partook in the formation of his 
character. Therefore the moulding of the agent‟s character is subject to luck, and if it is 
luck that underlies the agent‟s actions then the very concepts of moral responsibility and 
free will are endangered
18
. 
 One may gather from the preceding discussion that the analytical definitions of 
character and its connection to the agent will have profound impact on one‟s definition 
of freedom of choice and, consequently, on moral responsibility – thus on the results of 
the present study. Having outlined our modern theoretical perspective, let us now 
analyse the ancient Egyptians‟ thoughts on character to perceive if they considered it 
important to free will. 
 In Old and Middle Egyptian there were several words to convey the sense of 
character:
19
 iwn (“nature, disposition”)20, irw (“shape, form”)21, biA.t (“character, 
qualities”)22, sxr (“nature”)23,  oi (“form, shape”)24, and od (“form, nature, reputation, 
character, disposition”)25. Since some translations overlap we can reduce them to a core 
field of meaning: nature, disposition, shape, form, character, qualities, and reputation. 
As it happens with most translations of ancient languages, the literal meaning often 
gives place to a rendering more tuned with modern sensibilities. The basic root meaning 
underlying most of these concepts is “form,” or “shape.” While it is striking that the 
general ancient Egyptian sensibility seems still to be shared by psychologists today – for 
example, “character is the form of a person, and a stage in the forming, or development 
of personality”26 – modern cogitations about character will of course not necessarily 
match the details of the Egyptians‟ ideas about it. It is important to pin down the details 
through the presentation of the most pertinent excerpts from the Instruction of 
Ptahhotep: 
                                                 
18
 Kevin Timpe, “Moral Character,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
19
 These are the concepts listed by Miriam Lichtheim, Moral Values in Ancient Egypt, Orbis Biblicus et 
Orientalis 155, (Fribourg: University Press, Göttingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht, 1997), 17. 
20
 Raymond O. Faulkner,  A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, (Oxford: Griffith Institute, 1962), 
13. 
21
 Idem, Ibidem, 27. 
22
 Idem, Ibidem, 80. 
23
 Idem, Ibidem, 243. 
24
 Idem, Ibidem, 276. 
25
 Idem, Ibidem, 282. 
26
 W. Arnold, “Character,” in Encyclopedia of Psychology, 158. 
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 (489) Know the ones at your side
27
 and your possessions will endure (rx Sw.tyw=k wnn x.t=k). 
 (490) Do not make your character mean in relation to your friends (m Xs(y) bi(A.)t=k r 
xnms.w=k). 
 (491) It is its
28
 river bank which fills (with the flood); it (the river  bank) is greater than its 
riches ({H}<w>Db=f29 pw mH=f wr sw r Spss.=f), 
 (492) For possessions change from one to another
30
 ({sw}<i>w31 x.t ky n ky). 
 (493) The character of a son of man will be beneficial to him (Ax bi(A.)t n(.i)t zA z(i) n=f). 
 (494) A good character (od) will be a memorial (iw od nfr r sxA.w).32 (Maxim 35). 
 
 (495) Punish chiefly; instruct entirely (xsf Hr(i)-tp sbA Hr(i) od). 
 (496) Supression of wrongdoing will set an example (iw nDr.t xww r mn{.t} bi(A))33. 
 (497) As for a case (of punishment)
34
 indeed not concerning wrong (which was done) (ir zp n is 
Hr ii.t), 
 (498) It will cause the one who complains to turn into an opponent (rDi xpr anay pw m itn.w). 
(Maxim 36). 
 
 (575) As for the fool who does not listen (ir wxA iw.ty sDm=f). 
 [...] 
 (581) He lives from that which one dies (anx=f m mwt=tw Xr=s), 
 (582) A twisted discourse is his nourishment (ao.w=f pw xbn Dd). 
 (584) That is the character in the knowledge of the officials (bi(A.)t=f i(A)m=f m rx n(.i) sr.w), 
 (585) Which is: his life is death every day (Hr mwt anx ra-nb). (Epilogue). 
 
                                                 
27
 As Christian Jacq, Jacq, Les maximes de Ptah-Hotep: l'enseignement d'un sage au temps des 
pyramides, 228 n. 115, notes, the writing for Sw.tyw (also translatable as “neighbours”) can also stand for 
mAa.tyw, “the just ones,” and consequently both meanings may be simultaneously conveyed. The horizon 
of the teaching could thus be extended to relate only with good people. 
28
 The pronoun =f is probably referring back to biA.t. 
29
 The reading wDb is confirmed by the L1 version. 
30
 I aimed to a more literal translation. Christian Jacq‟s although less literal is clearer: “car les biens de 
l‟un peuvent échoir à l‟autre.” See Les maximes de Ptah-Hotep: l'enseignement d'un sage au temps des 
pyramides, 192. 
31
 L1 version corrects sw to i[w]. 
32
 It is worthy of note that od and biA.t are used interchangeably. As Miriam Lichtheim pointed out both 
terms are different but they certainly share a common core of meaning. 
33
 I take this sentence, iw nDr.t xww r mn{.t} bi(A), to be the complex future iw=f r sDm (see Boyo G. 
Ockinga, 2nd rev. ed. (Mainz am Rhein: Verlag von Zabern, 2005), p. 60 §94; an example is line 494 
cited above: iw od nfr r sxA). This interpretation rests on the assumption that the scribe made an error by 
adding a t to mn, because the morphology of mn in the infinitive is mn and not mn.t. Also assuming a 
scribe‟s mistake, one could add an s to mn.t, with no alteration on the translation. Another hypothesis 
would be to render the sentence like Christian Jacq did, iw nDr=t(w) xaw r mn.t bi(A), and understand it as 
a sDm.t=f (an alternative that Zbyněk Žaba, Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 160, however does not consider 
to fit the context) and translate it as “one will suppress wrongdoing until an example is set.” 
34
 In the L1 version lines 496 and 497 are 426 and 427 respectively. In L1 426 the word in lieu of zp is 
xsf, thus suggesting that in Prisse zp is referring back to xsf in line 495. 
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 (593) Every man is taught according to his behaviour
 (lit. “according to what he does”) (z(i) nb 
sbA mi ir=f). 
 [...] 
 (596) Set a good example (lit. “do a good deed”). Do not get reproached (ir bi(A) m rDi 
aD.t=k!35 (Epilogue, 593-596). 
 
 Maxim 35 stresses the social dimension of character. Line 490, which advises 
one not to be weak of character towards friends, is complemented by lines 339 and 343 
of maxim 22: “Satisfy those close to you in whom you can trust, according to the means 
that come your way / [...] what happens in the future is unknown, (even for the one who 
has an intuition about tomorrow.” A person of good character who cares for her friends 
is thus more secure in times of need through the principle of reciprocity, whereas an 
individual more detached from his social network is more liable to suffer from the 
ephemerality of an agriculture based economy. In the Instruction for the King Merikare 
there is a similar aphorism, but instead of a social dimension it pertains to the religious 
relation between the king and god: “more acceptable is the loaf (biA.t36) of the upright of 
heart than the iwA-cattle of the evil-doer. Act for the god, that he might do the like for 
you”. 
 Line 494 of maxim 35 also makes it clear why one of the meanings of od is 
“reputation.” To say that “a good character will be a memorial” is the same as saying 
that it will leave a good impression of a person on others. And reputation is precisely 
                                                 
35
 The latter part of the sentence, after ir bi(A) runs: m rDi aD.t=k. There are doubts as to what aD.t=k means 
and which verb form, if it is one at all, it might be. Raymond Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle 
Egyptian, 51, in the entry aD.t provides as example only the sentence we are now addressing and gives an 
insecure rendering of the word, expressed by an interrogation mark, as “offense,” but opted to emend the 
=k, thus translating the sentence as “do not give offense!” In this case it seems more sensible to adopt the 
attitude advised by James P. Allen, Middle Egyptian: An Introduction to the Language and Culture of 
Hieroglyphs, 389: “Egyptologists are (or should be) wary of labeling something an error rather than an 
exception.” Christian Jacq, The Wisdom of Ptah-hotep: Spiritual Treasures from the Age of the Pyramids, 
146, interprets aD.t as a noun in the sense of “destruction.” Jacq renders the sentence as “do not give free 
rein to your destruction,” but one could also translate it as “do not cause your destruction!” Zbyněk Žaba, 
Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 167, in his turn, inquires about whether one should read aD.t=k or rather 
aD.t(w)=k and proposes the meaning “reproach.” Pascal Vernus, Sagesses de l’Égypte pharaonique, 110, 
translates the verb with the meaning propounded by Žaba: “Sache te comporter [ou: sois un modèle], ne 
te fais pas reprendre.” Although Christian Jacq‟s rendering is appealing, Vernus‟s translation is the one 
that, to me, fits the context better and is hence the interpretation I follow here. 
36
 It has been argued by R. J. Williams, in The Seed of Wisdom: Essays in Honour of T. J. Meek, ed. W. S. 
McCullough, (Toronto, 1994), 19 with n. 29, quoted in David Lorton, “God‟s Beneficent Creation: Coffin 
Texts Spell 1130, the Instructions for Merikare, and the Great Hymn to the Aton,” Studien zur 
Altägyptischen Kultur 20, (1993): 130, with n. 17, that here biA.t means “loaf” instead of “character.” I 
agree with David Lorton (n. 17) that there is a pun intended, the word thus conveying a double meaning. 
About the semantic content involved in the dichotomy between the loaf and the iwA-cattle see David 
Lorton‟s n. 18. For other examples where character and reputation are closely connected see Miram 
Lichtheim, Moral Values in Ancient Egypt, 22-3. 
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that. Therefore to the ancient Egyptians the moral characterisation of an individual was 
inextricably interlinked with the ethical appraisal made about him both by society and 
by the gods
37
. In this sense, the word od is also related to the concept of imakhu which 
will be addressed further below. 
 Maxim 36 addresses formative circumstances under which one‟s character is 
shaped and the risks of unjust punishment. There is also an interesting pun noted by 
Christian Jacq
38
; Hr-tp literally means “on the head” and Hr od “on the character.” 
Therefore, whereas punishment is applied on the body, to teach is also to give a person 
her inner form or shape. 
 Lines 575 through 585 seem to give a fatalistic description of the wxA, the 
“fool.” But, the introductory line 575, by stating “as for the fool who does not listen,” 
allows for the interpretation that had he listened he would have been able to lead a 
different course of life. This passage might also present a causal nexus for a person‟s 
character and life style. The fool‟s present condition, as described by Ptahhotep, would 
then be the result of a decision taken earlier in his life, or at least the product of his 
consent. However, if we connect this passage with line 546, the fool‟s condition was not 
brought about by his own decision or consent but by divine intervention
39
. 
 Line 593 seems to refer to one‟s natural dispositions, especially if we compare 
mi ir=f with the word sxr which means not only “nature” but also “conduct.” And it is 
noteworthy that these innate dispositions may however be shaped by means of teaching. 
 The general picture that emerges from these quoted passages is that character 
has a social dimension; it is reflexive, i.e. how an individual‟s character is perceived by 
others reflects back to him under the notion of reputation; it may be influenced by 
earlier decisions; and it is malleable and receptive to formative circumstances, 
notwithstanding one‟s natural dispositions. 
 Despite maxim 36, Ptahhotep also conveys the notion that the individual himself 
is responsible for keeping his character on the right track. This perspective is also 
shared by Old Kingdom Pepyankhheryib‟s biographical inscription40, as well as by 
                                                 
37
An example concerning the desire to be positively assessed by the gods is the inscription of 
Pepyankhheryib at Meir from the middle reign of Pepy II: “Serving as an official was how I spent all my 
life, doing good things and saying that which was liked, so that my reputation would reach the great god”. 
Translation of Nigel Strudwick, Texts from the Pyramid Age, Writings from the Ancient World (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2005), 369. 
38
 The Wisdom of Ptah-hotep: Spiritual Treasures from the Age of the Pyramids, 167-8 with n. 112. 
39
 See section 2.1. below. 
40
 See n. 37 above. 
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Middle Kingdom Instruction of a Man for His Son: “make character without 
transgressing thereby.”41 
 Having reached this conclusion about Ptahhotep, it is striking that, in contrast, 
tomb inscriptions from at least the Fifth Dynasty onwards seem to put emphasis on 
natural dispositions acquired since birth. The following examples demonstrate it: 
 
 I never let anyone spend the night angry with me about a thing since my birth.
42
 
 
I never did harm (to) anyone, and I never since birth caused that any man spend the night being 
angry with me on any matter.
43
 
 
 Never did I make anyone unhappy since my birth.
44
 
 
 Although by the late Old Kingdom the phrase “since my birth” is omitted from 
the sources,
45
 in the Middle Kingdom it was picked up again and became central in the 
moral profile of elite individuals
46
. Miriam Lichtheim sums up this evolution: 
 
 In the growth of the moral vocabulary during the 11th dynasty the stress was on traits of 
character rather than on actions performed. The men of the 6th dynasty had said „I did‟, those of the 11th 
dynasty said „I am.‟ The 12th dynasty harvested the vocabulary and added generalisations on what it 
meant to be „good.‟47 
 
 The late Eleventh Dynasty stele of the priest Mentuhotep from Abydos is an 
epitome of the claim of innateness of character: 
 
                                                 
41
 Translated with use of transliteration and translation provided at “The Teaching of a Man for his Son” 
in Digital Egypt for Universities: A learning and teaching resource for higher education, managed by 
Stephen Quirke, (University College London, 2000-2003), 
http://www.digitalegypt.ucl.ac.uk/literature/manforson.html (accessed April 13, 2010). 
42
 Inscription of Werkhuu  from the Fifth Dynasty. Miriam Lichtheim, Moral Values in Ancient Egypt, 
Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 155, ( Vandenhoek and Ruprecht Göttingen: University Press Fribourg 
Switzerland, 1997), 13. 
43
 Inscription from the tomb of Khuiwer at Giza, Fifth Dynasty. Nigel Strudwick, Texts from the Pyramid 
Age, 293. 
44
 Sixth Dynasty inscription of Metjetji of unknown origin but perhaps from Saqqara (Nigel Strudwick, 
Ibidem, 297). Translation of Miriam Lichtheim, Moral Values in Ancient Egypt, 13. 
45
 “By the end of the sixth dynasty, the phrase was replaced by the assertion of having a pleasant 
disposition [...]. That was a gain in clarity; but dropping the phrase „since birth‟ also entailed a loss, 
because it was no longer clear that the friendly behaviour was „innate.‟” Miriam Lichtheim, Ibidem, 13. 
46
 Miriam Lichtheim, Ibidem. 
47
 Idem, Ibidem, 22. 
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 A cool one who got bread on time, whose conduct (sxr=f) replaced him a mother at home, a 
father who said, „take note my son.‟ One well disposed (nfr od) and taught by his nature (sbA.n biA.t=f), 
like a child grown up with a father, but behold I had become an orphan.
48
 
 
This passage is particularly interesting as the three concepts sxr, od, and biA.t, 
complement each other. I have reproduced Miriam Lichtheim‟s translation, but it is also 
possible to render sxr as “nature,” od as “form,” and biA.t as “character.” All three 
concepts constitute what we may call natural dispositions: they are qualities innate to 
the individual, not chosen by him. And according to Mentuhotep‟s claim such 
dispositions are positively oriented and lead the individual in the right way. 
Furthermore, they not only guide the individual but also determine his behaviour. This 
claim is in utter disagreement with the Instruction of Ptahhotep, which not only holds 
the individual accountable for his own character but also rejects the determinism of 
good innate dispositions: “there is no one who is born a wise” (Prologue, 41). 
 This discrepancy between views is problematic. Is each account specific to its 
context, or is there any sort of interchange between them, a dialectic relation? In my 
view this query can be answered if we connect this discrepancy, between wisdom 
literature for the living and biographical tomb inscriptions, to another important 
difference arising between the same two genres, that of humbleness against the claim of 
being the best. The Instruction of Ptahhotep, for example, not only advises against the 
feeling of superiority due to knowledge that others may not possess
49
, but also urges one 
not to boast about having offspring
50
, for example. In stark opposition, however, it is 
very often the case that highly placed officials claim, each one, to have performed his 
duty better than anyone else and to have been praised by the king more than any other 
of his servants
51
. In my opinion the claims of good innate natural traits since birth and 
                                                 
48
 Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Autobiographies Chiefly of the Middle Kingdom, 69, plate 4. 
Another good example of innateness of good dispositions is stele Berlin 1204 line 8. Translation and 
references in Idem, Ibidem, 15. 
49
 “Do not make your heart big because of what you know; / take counsel both with the ignorant and the 
wise.” Maxim 1, 52-54. 
50
 “If you should plough, and there is growth in the field, / (because) god gives in abundance into your 
hand, / do not fill your mouth about it to those near you,  / (for) great is the respect the silence one 
inspires.” Maxim 9, 161-166. 
51
 A case in point is Weni‟s claim: “„There was revealed to me (or: I inspected) the number of these 
troops; /it had never been revealed to/inspected by any “servant” (bAk).‟” John Baines, “Restricted 
Knowledge, Hierarchy, and Decorum: Modern Perceptions and Ancient Institutions,” JARCE 27 (1990): 
18. Baines elaborates further on Weni‟s declaration: “This statement might seem almost absurd, because a 
commander needs to know how many troops he is to lead, but it becomes meaningful if the qualifying bAk 
is taken into account. Earlier in the text, classes of officials are listed more than once, apparently 
according to a formula as sr, saH and bAk. The point seems to be that such information would not be 
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of being the best at one‟s tasks are closely associated. They are part of the ideal 
biography genre. One of the main purposes of this discourse probably was to cajole 
visitors to the tomb both to make offerings, and execute the proper rituals in the case of 
priests, and to not damage the tomb in any way
52
. It also seems a strong possibility to 
me that these statements complement the wishes imparted in the Htp-Di-ni-sw.t boons, 
especially the most fundamental one of reaching the desired afterlife with success. This 
enhanced profile of the deceased would be an asset both in the judgment of the dead, 
developed in the Middle Kingdom, and in the desire to be accepted by the gods and 
travel upon the ways the imakhu journeyed during the Old Kingdom
53
. As an asset for 
the judgement of the dead, the attitude conveyed in the idealised moral profile of the 
deceased might not be much different from the use of magic in the mortuary literature
54
. 
                                                                                                                                               
available to a bAk.” Ibidem, 18. In his biography Weni is depicted as someone who started his work on the 
state administration from lower rank. But the fact that his father was a vizier (see Janet Richards, “Text 
and Context in late Old Kingdom Egypt: The Archaeology and Historiography of Weni the Elder,” 
JARCE 39, (2002): 90, and Nigel C. Strudwick, Texts from the Pyramid Age, 18) makes one doubt 
whether Weni really had access to sensitive information and was assigned to duties normally performed 
by higher officials while having the rank of bAk. If Weni indeed benefitted from his father‟s position and 
exaggerated in his biography, then this hyperbole becomes a case in point that illustrates how much 
individualism, i.e. showing that one was more competent than others especially at one‟s job, was for these 
officials. It is interesting to note that this attitude is not exclusive to the Old Kingdom but instead is 
visible throughout most of Egyptian history as we may see in this passage from Tutankhamun‟s 
Restoration Stela, Cairo 34183, from the Eighteenth Dynasty: “He has added to what was in former time, 
he has surp[assed that] done since the time of the ancestors”. John Bennet, “The Restoration Inscription 
of Tut'ankhamūn,” JEA 25, (1939): 10. 
52
 Apart from priests tomb visitors would most probably be family and friends (as suggested in “The 
Immortality of the Writer,” in Digital Egypt for Universities: A learning and teaching resource for higher 
education, managed by Stephen Quirke, (University College London, 2000-2003), 
http://www.digitalegypt.ucl.ac.uk/literature/manforson.html (accessed April 15, 2010)). Even if there 
were other visitors they might not have been able to read (John Baines, “Society, Morality, ad Religious 
Practice,” in Religion in Ancient Egypt: Gods, Myths, and Personal Practice, ed. Byron E. Shafer, (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 140). That the tomb owners felt the need to persuade ka-
servants to execute their tasks is attested in several inscriptions, one of them quite illustrative: “O lector 
priest, imakhu in the sight of Anubis, may your heart be sweet in relation to the king! Do not desist from 
your reading of the transfigurations! I know the royal decree made for an akh.” From the tomb of Ankhi, 
called Intji, at Saqqara, perhaps early sixth dynasty; translation in Nigel C. Strudwick, Texts from the 
Pyramid Age, 218. An example of threats against ka-servants who might vandalise the tomb comes from 
the inscription of Meru called Bebi, originary from Saqqara and dating to the Sixth Dynasty: “[With 
respect to anything bad done to my tomb] by the soul priests of my funerary estate, I shall be judged with 
them by the Great God, lord of the West in the place where Maat is.” Translation of Nigel C. Strudwick, 
Texts from the Pyramid Age, 225. An example of a Middle Kingdom address to potential tomb violators 
is expressed in the stele of the chamberlain Semti the Younger from the reign of Amenemhat II: “People! 
Be kind-hearted to my monument, and kind-handed to my memorial! For I have not done wrong.” In 
Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Autobiographies Chiefly of the Middle  Kingdom: a study and an 
anthology, 97. 
53
 See for example the text from the tomb of Tepemankh at Saqqara, from the late Old Kingdom: “An 
offering which the king gives and an offering which Anubis gives that he may travel on the perfect ways 
of the West upon which the imakhu travel in peace and in the sight of the Great God.” In Nigel C. 
Strudwick, Texts from the Pyramid Age, 215. 
54
 In my interpretation, the usage of magic formulae, like the Htp-Di-ni-sw.t boons for example, in the 
mortuary literature may have been used to counterbalance the highly set ethical expectations by which the 
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 The innateness of a good character seems then as pertaining exclusively to the 
funerary context. But could it also have been a belief of the living rather than a wish of 
the deceased? In other words could there have been two divergent views on the human 
nature within a single context of discourse? I ask this query because it seems that in the 
New Kingdom there was
55
. However there is one major difference between the Middle 
and New Kingdoms. Whereas in the Middle Kingdom the different views are conveyed 
between two separate genres, in the New Kingdom they occur within a single one, 
wisdom literature. 
 
1.1.1. Premises of human nature implied in the creation of mankind through the 
creator’s eye: 
 
 The earliest attested mention to the creation of human beings appears in the 
Middle Kingdom Coffin Texts. In certain spells mankind is said to have been created 
from the tears of the creator god. With the words tears and mankind being homophones 
in Egyptian, rmT.w and rm.wt respectively, some authors have taken the reference as a 
metaphor for humanity‟s flaws and the suffering to which people are inevitably 
subjected. If this is so, can the metaphor have any import on the beliefs regarding 
human nature of the Egyptians from the Middle Kingdom? One may presuppose that 
                                                                                                                                               
individual was supposed to lead his conduct. It would be a way to compensate for one's impossibility to 
reach ethical perfection. This becomes particularly apparent in the spells 30, 30A and 30B of the Book of 
Going Forth by Day. A passage from spell 30B enlighteningly reads: “To be said as a charm: my heart of 
my mother, my heart of my mother, my breast of my being, stand not against me as a witness, oppose me 
not in the Council. Outweigh me not before the keeper of the balance.” Thomas George Allen, The Book 
of the Dead or Going Forth by Day: Ideas of the Ancient Egyptians Concerning the Hereafter as 
Expressed in Their Own Terms, Studies in Ancient Oriental Civilization 37, (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1974), 40. In my view the innateness of a good character expressed in Old and Middle 
Kingdom biographies would be a way to dwarf any negative aspect of the individual's character or/and 
conduct in the ethical appraisal made by the living and, more importantly, by the gods. A similar view, 
regarding the judgment of the dead, is presented in Rogério Ferreira de Sousa, “Os Amuletos do Coração 
no Antigo Egipto: Tipologia e Caracterização” [The heart amulets in ancient Egypt: Typology and 
characterisation], Cadmo 15, (2005): 116. 
55
 Miriam Lichtheim, Moral Values in Ancient Egypt, 31-2, has gathered evidence for the differing 
arguments. I reproduce here her translation on p. 32 of Papyrus Chester Beatty IV, verso 6,5 ff., which is 
a case in point: 
 “Beware of saying: 
 „Everyone is according to his nature (biA.t) 
 Ignorant and learned ones alike. 
 Fate and fortune are graven in the nature 
 In the god‟s own writing. 
 Everyone is as he was made, 
 And his lifetime lasts an hour.‟ 
 It is good to teach unceasingly, till the son replies with words of his father! 
 If I let you know right in your heart, you will do what seems straight to you.” 
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this connection between tears and human beings may have been established earlier, but 
as stated there is no evidence to confirm it. Conversely, there is some evidence from 
later periods to provide a comparative framework of reference. 
 As Geraldine Pinch
56
 notes Coffin Texts spells 80, 714, and 1130 contain 
particularly relevant accounts of the creation of humanity. I shall now cite the passages 
in question: 
 
 It is Geb, it is my
57
 son who will live, whom I begot in my name. He knows how to nourish him 
who is in the egg for <me>, namely the human beings who came forth from my eye which I sent out 
while I was alone with Nu in lassitude, and I could find no place on which to stand or sit, when On had 
not yet been put together that I might dwell on it, when my throne (?) had not yet been put together that I 
may sit on it; before I had made Nut that she might be above me, before the first generation had been 
born, before the Primeval Ennead had come into being that they might dwell with me.
58
 (Spell 80, CT II 
33b-34f). 
 [...] 
 There live falcons, ducks, jackals in movement, pigs in the desert, hippopotami in the marshes, 
people, corn and shoals of fish, fish in the waters which are in the Nile, in accordance with Atum that I
59
 
should govern them and nourish them with this mouth of mine.
60
 (Spell 80, CT II 42b-43b). 
 
 The weeping I
61
 did was because of the uproar
62
 against me; mankind belongs to the blindness 
that is behind me.
63
 (Spell 714, CT VI 344f-g). 
 
 I
64
 created the gods from my sweat, while people are the tears of my eye.
65
 (Spell 1130, CT VII 
464d-465a). 
 In spell 80, human beings are first referred to as having been created by Atum‟s 
eye, and are afterwards listed among other groups of animals. Spell 714 is of difficult 
                                                 
56
 Egyptian Mythology: A Guide to the Gods, Goddesses, and Traditions of Ancient Egypt, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 66-7. 
57
 The deceased, identified with Atum is speaking. 
58
 Translated by R. O. Faulkner, The Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts (Oxford: Aris and Phillips, 1973), 84. 
I have added in gbb, “it is Geb,” from B1L version. 
59
 The deceased identified with Shu is speaking. 
60
 Translated by R. O. Faulkner, The Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 85. 
61
 The speaker is the deceased identified with Nu, the god embodying the primeval waters. 
62
 Raymond O. Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, 7, translates Ad as “anger.” 
63
 Translation in Erik Hornung, Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt: The One and the Many, trans. John 
Baines, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1982), 150. Faulkner‟s translation is somewhat 
different, perhaps because of the damage the spell recovered only from one coffin, designated as B3L, 
presents in CT VI 344f-h. It runs: “What went forth from me was under my supervision; it means that 
tears are what I created in him who was angry with me, and men of the blind ones are my cattle” (CT VI 
344e-g. Raymond O. Faulkner, The Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 270. 
64
 The speaker is the deceased probably identified with Atum. 
65
 David Lorton, “God‟s Beneficent Creation: Coffin Texts Spell 1130, the Instructions for Merikare, and 
the Great Hymn to the Aton,” 127-9. 
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interpretation due to the lacunary state of the passage under analysis; however, 
according to Erik Hornung‟s rendering blindness was involved in the creation of 
mankind. In spell 1130 it is clearly stated that men were created through the creator‟s 
tears. 
 Apart from possibly spell 714 there is no direct relation between creation from 
tears and suffering or flawed nature as a condition inherent to that particular mode of 
creation for the Middle Kingdom. Suffering and lack of insight are indeed realities 
present in the lives of every sentient being and that is not what is at issue here. What is 
being inquired is whether for the ancient Egyptians such suffering is rooted in the way 
they were created, perhaps laying the responsibility for that condition on the creator 
god, or instead is brought about by other causes. 
 Unambiguous evidence that the process of creation of mankind determined it to 
be flawed and to suffer comes from later periods. Papyrus Bremner-Rhind from the 
Graeco-Roman period states that men were created from the tears of the eye of the 
creator god, which were caused by the wrath it felt when it found out that the sun god 
had already replaced it
66
. And the cosmogony of Neith, from the same period, is even 
more explicit; when Re sees her mother, Neith, he makes the gods from his smile, but 
when he is apart from her he cries and from the shed tears the god creates men
67
. 
Bernard Mathieu‟s argument that the identification between men and tears began 
primarily as a pun and only later evolved into a philosophical explanation of human 
suffering
68
 seems partly confirmed by a New Kingdom inscription from the temple of 
Karnak, where the goddess Mut creates the gods from her tears as well
69
. 
 The time span of this pun is exceptionally long
70
, perhaps denoting stronger 
implications than just a simple wordplay. Conversely, the gods are created from varied 
fluids and parts from the creator‟s body, including sweat, saliva, mouth, smile, these last 
three being somewhat synonymic, and, as we have just seen, tears. As Bernard Mathieu 
points out, there was no word sufficiently similar to nTr.w to create a pun, apart from 
                                                 
66
 See Raymond O. Faulkner, “The Bremner-Rhind Papyrus – III.” JEA 23, (1937): 172. 
67
 See translation of passage with hieroglyphic version in Bernard Mathieu, “Les hommes de larmes: A 
propos d‟un jeu de mots mythique dans les textes de l‟ancienne Egypte.” In Hommages à François 
Daumas, ed. Institut d‟Égyptologie-Université Paul Valéry, (Montpellier: Université de Montpellier, 
1986), 2: 503. Note that the signs for rmT.w and rm.wt are the same, a crying eye. 
68
 Idem, Ibidem, 503-4. 
69
 See Harold H. Nelson, “Certain Reliefs at Karnak and Medinet Habu and the Ritual of Amenophis I-
(Concluded).” JNES 8, (1949): 341 (translation) and 342 ll. 14-5. 
70
 Geraldine Pinch, Egyptian Mythology: A Guide to the Gods, Goddesses, and Traditions of Ancient 
Egypt, 66. 
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nt(i.)t, “saliva,” although the connection had not last for long, which may account for 
such diversity
71
. 
 If a deeper meaning rather than just a mere pun was intended in the relation 
between men and tears, could it be one of suffering and flawed nature as some authors 
have argued?
72
 This argument has been subjected to severe criticism from David 
Lorton
73. The author draws attention to other later examples where a god‟s eye creates 
“plants” and “fresh waters”74, and to the statement in the Instruction for the King 
Merikare that men are “his (the sun god‟s) images which have come forth from his 
body”75. To David Lorton the crucial element in the creation of man in Coffin Texts 
spell 1130 is “that this little etiological account is intended to place the origin of deities 
and humans in two kinds of divine fluid, both to be viewed as positive.” However, may 
the myth expounded in a more elaborate way in Bremner-Rhind Papyrus, to which 
mention was made above, be already present in the Coffin Texts‟ mythical statements? I 
believe the answer is yes. 
 In Coffin Texts spell 76 Atum sends his “Sole Eye” (wa.t ir(.t)) to find Shu and 
Tefnut (CT II 5b). When in CT II 33d-e (Coffin Texts spell 80) Atum sends out his eye, 
although Shu and Tefnut had not been created yet, its task might have been to retrieve 
them as in Coffin Texts spell 76. Seemingly anachronisms are not a problem to the 
producers and audience of mythical accounts. Even in Coffin Texts spell 80 an 
anachronism is committed when stating that mankind was in the egg when it had 
already been issued forth from Atum‟s eye; therefore I assume that the existence of Shu 
and Tefnut is already implied when the eye is sent by the creator god in this spell. In the 
account from the Bremner-Rhind Papyrus the eye weeps after finding out about its 
replacement. Still in spell 80, in CT II 41f-g, Shu says: “I knit on his (Atum‟s) head and 
make his uraeus to live”76. Placing the eye on his head as the uraeus cobra is precisely 
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how the god Atum calms its anger. Therefore, my suggestion is that, as proposed by 
Geraldine Pinch, Erik Hornung and John Baines
77
, in the Middle Kingdom humankind 
is already created through the creator‟s eye when this one is experiencing feelings of 
anger and sadness. The fact that in the New Kingdom the gods are also created through 
the goddess Mut‟s tears, certainly without the same motivation, may simply be another 
version of the creation of deities from a creator god‟s bodily fluids without any 
particular implication to it. 
 Two of the basic phenomenological characteristics of tears pointed are that they 
blur vision, and that they are often unwilled and uncontrolled.
78
 Both these 
characteristics are present in the Egyptian myth. This myth is constructed as if 
mankind‟s creation was an accident and not a planned event. But as all myths it has a 
purpose, and this one aims to justify why people lack insight and commit errors and 
make bad choices, as in Ptahhotep 103-107: “If a man says: „I will be wealthy,‟ / he will 
later say: „My perceptions (siA.t=i) trapped me.‟” By being overwhelmed with afflictive 
feelings the eye of the sun god could not control his creation, as in Coffin Texts 714 
assuming that Erik Hornung‟s rendering of the damaged passage is correct. It is also 
noteworthy that the creator god is not made responsible for this faulty creation. In fact, 
the reason for the replacement of his eye is not even clearly stated; it appears to be a 
device to set the wheels in motion. 
 Despite the fact that human beings share a divine element with the rest of the 
gods, it is relevant that when the creation of men and gods is paired together, as in 
Coffin Texts spell 1130, men always come from tears and gods from another bodily 
fluid. Even though the gods are immanent and are not detainers of perfection they are 
still superior to men, especially because they are virtually immortal
79
. The pairing of 
gods and men in the reference to their creation may then reflect this vertical hierarchy. 
 We may now ask: was this version of the myth prevalent among the Egyptian 
intellectuals? Most Coffin Texts spells were collected from the necropolis at el-Bersha, 
and spells 76, 80, 714, and 1130 are no exception; only one example of spell 76 has 
been gathered outside el-Bersha, in Gebelein, and spell 80 was recorded, besides el-
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Bersha, in a coffin also from Gebelein and in another one from Aswan
80
. It is not 
unconceivable that other accounts from several theological centres existed
81
, but the fact 
that this particular account was registered in several Middle Kingdom coffins and was 
maintained for so long a time is significant on its own and suggests wide acceptation 
among the elite. 
 More than determining men, the myth of the creation of mankind acknowledges 
its imperfections and necessity to listen to the teachings of the sages. This view on 
human nature supports the realism and empiricism of the sapiential instructions rather 
than the statements of good innate character traits made in tomb inscriptions
82
. I shall 
therefore take as a premise that at least to the ancient Egyptian elite of the Middle 
Kingdom character was malleable and that the individual was responsible not only for 
moulding it according to ethical expectations but also for keeping it on the right track. 
 
1.2. Heart: 
 
 The heart was a very important element in the Egyptian conception of 
conscience, and it is therefore relevant to our discussion. Since the heart in the Egyptian 
culture has been the subject of intensive studies
83
, I intend to focus mainly on the 
importance that Ptahhotep and sources contemporary with it may have attributed to the 
heart in what concerns free will. But first I should like to briefly introduce the historical 
setting of the heart. 
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1.2.1. Historical setting: the evolution of the officials’ heart from the Old to the 
Middle Kingdom: 
 
  In the Old Kingdom there is a conspicuous absence of the heart, either as HA.ty 
or ib, in the self presentation of the deceased in tomb biographies. The only heart that 
was regularly mentioned was the king‟s ib. And both ib and HA.ty were featured in the 
Pyramid Texts, but then again this corpus was exclusive to the king and certain queens 
of the Sixth Dynasty. According to Jan Assmann, in the Old Kingdom the king‟s heart 
took precedence over his subjects‟: 
 
 The first [stage in the history of the heart] is the ideal of the “king-guided individual.” At this 
stage, which is coeval with the Old Kingdom, there is no explicit mention of the heart. The individual (the 
official; we have no written testimonies of any other groups) sees himself as the executive organ of the 
royal will. The heart of the king thinks and plans for all.
84
 
 
 This interpretation is confirmed by a passage from the tomb inscriptions of 
Ankhi, called Intji, perhaps from the early Sixth Dynasty: 
 
 O lector priest, imakhu in the sight of Anubis, may your heart be sweet in relation to the king!85 
 
 Despite the more limited role of the heart of non-royals, apparently it could 
stand for the persons‟ moral conscience, for in a speech by a god from the temple of 
Sahure at Abusir it is stated: 
 
 [To you have I given] ... all [(enemies or foreigners of some type)] under your sandals. I have 
collected together the hearts of all the rekhyt people for you.
86
 
 
 This text is the written counterpart to the base of a statue of king Djoser where 
he is depicted threading on the Nine Bows and is one foot away from stepping on three 
lapwings, the lapwings symbolising the rekhyt – the king‟s subjects – and the number 
three standing for the plural.
87
 Seemingly the subject‟s heart was not important for its 
own features within each individual; instead it appeared to have been important as the 
                                                 
84
 The Mind of Egypt: History and Meaning in the Time of the Pharaohs (New York: Metropolitan Books, 
1996), 135. The brackets are mine. 
85
 Translation by Nigel C. Strudwick, Texts from the Pyramid Age, 218. 
86
 Ibid., 85-6. Brackets and emphasis by the author. 
87
 A picture is available in Farid Atiya, Abeer El-Shahawy, Mathaf al-Misrī, Farid S. Atiya, The Egyptian 
Museum in Cairo: a walk through the alleys of ancient Egypt (Cairo: Faryd Atiya Press, 2005), 39. 
28 
 
locus of loyalty to the king. Even in the biographies from Upper Egypt the heart of the 
king remained the only important one. Officials deployed in the provinces of Egypt had 
more liberty to develop biographies with a greater focus on their individual action than 
their homologous ones at the capital, but even so they did not explore the role of their 
hearts in their individuality. 
 However, with the collapse of the kingship and state institutions that dictated the 
end of the Old Kingdom the king lost credibility as the central reference and element of 
prestige. Following the civil war and fragmentation of the political power into several 
potentates, rulers became their own element of reference and of their local subjects. 
Filling in the gap left by the king, these rulers and their officials exploited not only their 
self-proclaimed magnanimousness and efficiency but they were also concerned with 
pinpointing where in their conscience did such attitudes originate. This is one of the 
major shifts from the Old Kingdom biographies and was further developed in the 
Middle Kingdom. Assmann terms the stage in the history of the heart in ancient Egypt 
that corresponds to the Middle Kingdom as “heart-guided individual.” According to the 
author‟s interpretation of the loyalist teachings – including the Loyalist Instruction and 
the Story of Sinuhe –, it was now the “heart full of Maat” (stela London BM 14288) that 
prompted the individual to be loyal to the king.
89
 The king was trying to regain his role 
of reference and centrality that was held in the Old Kingdom, but now the heart, as part 
of man‟s conscience, mediated the relation between the individual and monarch. This 
does not mean that the official gained a conscience only in the Middle Kingdom or that 
he could not choose to not follow the king until this period; evidence shows the 
opposite: the character (od) was mentioned in the Old Kingdom, as we have seen, and 
regarding the tombs‟ iconographic programs the officials had some control about them 
– as Nico Staring demonstrated, the degree of personal choice the official was allowed 
to have depended on the distance from the capital and on the king himself, some kings 
exerting a tighter control over the iconographic programs than others
90
. Therefore the 
focus on the heart as the locus of choice to follow the king may be interpreted as a 
search for the origin of one‟s attitude rather than a breakthrough from an automaton-like 
behaviour to conscious decision-making. 
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 It has been suggested that the judgment of the dead, which morally appraises the 
heart, was introduced in the Middle Kingdom as a political strategy to guarantee the 
officials‟ loyalty91. Indeed, at the most advanced stage of the judgment of the dead, in 
chapter 125 of the Book of the Dead, the king is mentioned: “O He-Who-Is-Not-
Abandoned, who has come forth from Busiris, I have not reviled the king”92. But the 
king is not the main focus of the negative confession – a whole range of social and 
private practices and attitudes are. And it should be taken into consideration that one of 
the first texts where an indication of a moral judgment taking place in the hereafter was 
given, the Instruction for King Merikare, was addressed to a king. In my view, this 
ethical judgment was the corollary of the exploration of man‟s inner self. With a deeper 
look into one‟s conscience and an acute sense of morality, it seems only natural that 
with the mixing of both phenomena a general judgment of the dead had come out as a 
result.
93
 
 It should be borne in mind that the Instruction of Ptahhotep was authored in this 
milieu and therefore one expects it to have more to do with the conception of heart in 
the Middle Kingdom, than with the notion of it in the Old Kingdom. 
 
1.2.2. Overview of the heart concept:  
 
 Whereas modern western languages only have the word “heart,” Egyptian had 
two main
94
 words: ib and HA.ty. Because until the New Kingdom the latter was mainly 
used to denote the physical heart, either of people or of animals
95
, and because the 
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former was used metaphorically and in association to intellectual thought, emotions, and 
feelings, Alexandre Piankoff identified the HA.ty as the organ itself and the ib as the 
moral heart
96
. 
 The scarcity of metaphorical uses of HA.ty until the New Kingdom97 could 
account for the near absence of HA.ty in the Instruction of Ptahhotep98, where ib is 
referred to in several lines, in the Lamentations of Khakheperre-Sonbe
99
, a text which 
can be described as “a man addressing a monologue to his heart,” and in the Middle 
Kingdom ex libris, the Story of Sinuhe. Moreover in other literary texts from the Middle 
Kingdom, namely the tale of the Shipwrecked Sailor, the tale of the Eloquent 
Peasant,
100
 and the Instruction for Kagemni
101
, HA.ty makes no appearance whatsoever. 
It is interesting to note that in the extant fragments of the L2 version of the Instruction 
of Ptahhotep, dated from the Eighteenth Dynasty
102
, the absence of a dichotomy 
between ib and HA.ty was maintained. However, according to Pascal Vernus there is a 
quote from the Instruction of Ptahhotep in a biography from the reign of Senusret I 
where HA.ty is introduced to pair with ib103. 
 In the above mentioned texts, where HA.ty occurs a few times, each occurrence of 
this lexeme bears metaphorical value, a pattern that is similar to the one displayed in the 
Coffin Texts where metaphors including ib are more numerous than the ones involving 
HA.ty104. Additionally, in the Pyramid Texts ib is sometimes found where one would 
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expect HA.ty105, i.e., with a physical connotation, and the latter is employed in metaphors 
that, in the Coffin Texts, are more associated with the ib106. 
 Furthermore, in the medical papyri the dichotomy between ib and HA.ty is also 
present. But whereas outside the medical texts the ib might replace the HA.ty and vice 
versa, in the medical papyri such interchange is highly improbable as suggested by 
Bernard Long: 
 
 Les textes médicaux sont des textes techniques. Il est difficile d‟imaginer qu‟un médecin 
emploie un mot pour un autre.
107  
 
 As recognised by Rune Nyord, although ib and HA.ty interchange in the Coffin 
Texts, they also do so only in occurrences where both terms share similar 
characteristics. The exemplification provided by the author is that “whereas both terms 
can be said to be „taken way‟, only the ib, never the HAty, is said to be „given‟ to the 
deceased or others.”108 The same conclusion was reached by Bernard Long109 and the 
author proposes the following differentiation
110
: 
 
Anatomical and metaphorical meanings of HA.ty: 
- The one who is at the fore 
- Physical heart 
- Emotion 
 
Anatomical and metaphorical meanings of ib:  
- Intelligence 
- Conscience 
- Desire 
- Memory 
- Satisfaction 
- Sentiment 
- Taste 
- Stomach entrails 
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- Epigastrium-frenic heart 
- The one who is at the middle 
 
Metaphorical meanings shared by ib and HA.ty: 
- Courage 
- Love 
- (Emotion)111 
 
 It is very significant that both terms refer to anatomical structures as well as to 
the abstract concepts related with these structures, which suggests a close affinity 
between both conceptualisations. In fact, HA.ty was understood to be the physical 
organ
112
 of the heart which powered the body by pumping the mt.w vessels113. By virtue 
of its anatomic role, the HA.ty was an active principle and, according to Rogério Sousa, 
its hieroglyphic sign was not due only to phonetic value. Depicting the forepart of a 
lion, HA.t is related to the sun as the lion of tomorrow. Since HA.t denotes being at the 
fore or vanguard and due to the HA.ty‟s function within the body the same author states 
that HA.ty is particularly connected with discernment and intellective properties114. 
 In stark contrast, the ib is difficult to define in anatomical terms. It does not 
seem to refer to a particular organ but rather to a range of organs inside the torso. The 
closest account to the Egyptians‟ conception of the ib might be the one by Thierry 
Bardinet, who suggests that the ib comprehends all organs within the torso except for 
the HA.ty115. However, Rune Nyord concluded in a survey of occurrences of the heart in 
the Coffin Texts that “no certain indications were found of the ib referring to the entirety 
of internal organs as understood by Bardinet”116. Nonetheless, the ib does refer to more 
than one organ and hence it is “anatomically undefined,” as Rogério Sousa put it117, in 
the sense that it cannot be pinpointed to a single organ or location within the body in the 
same way that the HA.ty can. But despite the comprehensiveness of the term ib, there are 
                                                 
111
 This was not considered by Long as a shared meaning between ib and HA.ty. 
112
 About the notion of organ in ancient Egypt see Rogério Ferreira de Sousa, “A simbólica do coração no 
antigo Egipto: estudo de antropologia religiosa sobre a representação da consciência,” 1:45. 
113
 Ibid., 43-6. 
114
 Ibid., 57. 
115
 Les papyrus medicaux de l’Égypte pharaonique, Penser la Medicine (Paris: Fayard, 1995), 103 quoted 
in Rogério Ferreira de Sousa, “A simbólica do coração no antigo Egipto: estudo de antropologia religiosa 
sobre a representação da consciência,” 1:43 with nn. 10, 12. 
116
 Breathing Flesh: Conceptions of the Body in the Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 112. 
117
 “A simbólica do coração no antigo Egipto: estudo de antropologia religiosa sobre a representação da 
consciência,” 1:45. 
33 
 
several instances in the medical texts where it stands for the stomach
118
. Being the 
recipient of aliments, the stomach displays a passive role, and given that in some 
occurrences in the medical papyri the ib is addressed as the stomach Rogério Sousa 
interprets the ib as being a passive element as against the HA.ty which had, as just said, 
an active role
119
. The relation between the ib and the stomach gave rise to the 
identification of the ib with a vase120, which was extrapolated to the material cultural in 
the form of heart amulets with a hollow inside
121
. In some occurrences of ib in the 
Coffin Texts, it also functions as a “container,” in Nyord‟s terminology, of several 
elements
122
, which according to the Danish Egyptologist is a rare feature of other torso 
organs except for the X.t123. Interestingly it is never said to contain aliments. But it is 
said to contain emotions
124
 and “speech acts”125, for example, which are in consonance 
with the range of mental properties, as it were, attributed to the ib. The 
conceptualisation of the physical ib as the stomach thus led to the formulation of the 
metaphorical ib; as a result, expressions for memory and intellectual understanding – 
“to place something in one‟s ib” –, and for trust in someone – “to fill one‟s ib”126 – were 
rooted in the experience of the ib, while identified with the stomach, as a recipient. 
Nonetheless, it is striking that in CT 26 the HA.ty is said twice to be a container for 
“awe” (SfSf.t)127, which may have more to do with a more suitable connection between 
SfSf.t and HA.ty rather than a de facto conceptualisation of the HA.ty as a container. 
 Although the ancient Egyptian notion of heart consisted fundamentally on the 
unity formed by HA.ty and ib, the latter formed a dialectic relation with X.t both on the 
physical as well as on the metaphorical level. In the Coffin Texts the belly is, as the ib, 
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literal, rendering of mH ib: “and his heart was full of me”. The same expression is also present in the 
Instruction of Amenemhet I: “do not fill your heart with (i.e. do not trust) a brother (m mH ib=k m sn)”. 
Translated from the original text in Alexandre Piankoff, Le “Coeur” ..., 43. 
127
 Ibid., 75. 
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described as a container of some of the elements contained in it as well as others, 
starting with the ib itself128 which is said to be in the right place. Whereas the ib is 
differentiated from the HA.ty, it shares some of its fundamental characteristics, both 
physical and metaphorical, with the X.t. In fact, one may say that the X.t mirrors the ib, 
but while the former has usually a negative connotation, the latter has frequently a 
positive denotation. The exact relation between ib and X.t is at times difficult to 
ascertain, usually because of the polysemy of X.t, which can mean “belly,” womb,” 
body,” and “sole (of foot)”129. In the wisdom literature it usually stands for belly, as in 
the following excerpt from the Instruction for Kagemni: 
 
 If you sit with a crowd, / dislike the food you want; control of the ib130 is for a trifling moment. 
Gluttony is base / and one points the finger at it. A cup of water, it quenches thirst. A mouthful of 
herbs
131
, / it fortifies the ib. What is good replaces the good132; a small quantity replaces a great one. 
Baseness / is greed of one‟s belly when the appropriate time (for the meal) has passed. One must ignore 
the belly that has free reign in others‟ house. (ir Hmsi=k Hna aSA.t / msdi t(A) mrr=k A.t pw kt(.i)t dAr ib 
xw.w pw Afa / iw DbA i(A)m iw ikn n(.i) mw axm=f ib.t mH{.t} r(A) m Sww / smn=f ib iw nfr.t idn bw-nfr iw 
nhy n(.i) kt(.i)t  idn wr Xzy / pw Hnt n(.i) X.t=f swA tr smx.n=f wstn X.t m pr=sn). (I, 3-7).133 
 
 This passage also makes explicit the dialectic between the ib and X.t. Whereas 
the latter stands for hunger and failure to control it, particularly in a social context, the 
former stands for discipline and self-control. 
 
1.2.3. The ib as a mental cause and its dialectic relation with X.t: 
 
                                                 
128
 Rune Nyord, Breathing Flesh: Conceptions of the Body in the Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 68. 
129
 Raymond O. Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, 200. 
130
 _Ar ib is usually translated as “self-control,” but I opted for a literal translation in order to allow for an 
appreciation of the original sense.  
131
 William Kelly Simpson, “The Teaching for the Vizier Kagemni,” in The Literature of Ancient Egypt: 
An Anthology of Stories, Instructions, Stelae, Autobiographies, and Poetry, ed. William Kelly Simpson, 
(2003), 150, suggests “rushes.” 
132
 I take this sentence to mean that what is healthy, at least from the point of view of apropriate social 
behaviour, should be preferred over what tastes good. 
133
 Translated from the original in Alan H. Gardiner, “The Instruction Addressed to Kagemni and His 
Brethren,” JEA 32 (1946), pl. XIV, and with resort to the translation by William Kelly Simpson, “The 
Teaching for the Vizier Kagemni,” in The Literature of Ancient Egypt: An Anthology of Stories, 
Instructions, Stelae, Autobiographies, and Poetry, ed. William Kelly Simpson, (2003), 150. The fact that 
representations from the tombs of officials exhibit some overweight, certainly as an element of prestige, 
suggests that Kagemni‟s exhortations to hold one‟s appetite applied only to eating in a social context 
instead of being the norm. The last sentence may refer to banquet in another‟s official place entailing, 
therefore, a social context. 
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 There are several texts where the ib is said to be at the origin of what the 
individual says or does. In the epilogue of the Instruction of Ptahhotep, for example, it 
is said: 
 
 (528) May his ib match his tongue (mxA ib=f n ns=f),  
 (529) May his lips be precise when he speaks (aoA zp.ty=fy iw=f Hr Dd). 
 
 A similar statement is made in the stela Berlin 1157 erected by Senusret III at 
Semna in Nubia: 
 
 What my ib plans is what takes place through my action (literally „arm‟) (kAA.t ib=i xpr.t m 
a=i)”134. 
   
 It is interesting that centuries later, in the Late Period, the same verb employed 
here, kAi, is used in the Memphite Theology: “It is the tongue that repeats what the HA.ty 
plans (in ns wHm kAA.t HA.t(y))” (line 56)135. The use of HA.ty in place of ib is in 
consonance with the gradual replacement of the latter by the former in later times
136
. 
 In some of the Coffin Texts spells the ib is also at the root of what Rune Nyord 
terms “speech acts”137: 
 
 I speak from
138
 my ib, the strength of my ba protects me [...]. I speak from my ib to the ones in 
the Tribunal in the mansion of the Foremost of Westerners (Dd=i m ib=i xw w(i) nxt.w bA=i [...] Dd=i m 
ib=i n imy.w DA.t m Hw.t xnt(y)-imn.tyw) (CT 149, II, 242b-c, 243c-244a).139 
 
 His utterance is what comes out from his own ib (r(A)=f pr.t m ib=f Ds=f). (CT 321, IV, 147h).140 
 
 See, what he has said will not come out from his lips (sT Dd.n=f m ib=f n pr Hr sp.ty=f(y)). (CT 
673, VI, 301s-t).
141
 
                                                 
134
 Translation by William Kelly Simpson, “The Semna Stela,” in The Literature of Ancient Egypt: An 
Anthology of Stories, Instructions, Stelae, Autobiographies, and Poetry, ed. William Kelly Simpson, 
(2003), 338. Hieroglyphic text in Aegyptische Inschriften aus den Königlichen Museen zu Berlin (Leipzig: 
J. C. Hinrichs‟sche Buchhandlung, 1913), 1:257. For an introduction to the political context of this stela 
see Toby Wilkinson, Rise and Fall of Ancient Egypt: The History of a Civilisation from 3000 BC to 
Cleopatra (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), 174-9. 
135
 Translation from the text in Lorraine Tartasky, “Lioness of the Sun,”  
http://www.lionessofthesun.com/main/glossary/M/MemphiteTheology (accessed 7 September, 2010). 
136
 Bernard Long, “Le ib et le HAty dans les texts médicaux de l‟Égypte ancienne,” 487. 
137
 See Breathing Flesh: Conceptions of the Body in the Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 75-6. 
138
 The preposition m allows for several translations, namely “in,” through,” and “with.” I followed 
Faulkner‟s rendering (Raymond O. Faulkner, The Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 1:127. 
139
 Translated with resort to ibid., 1:127-8. 
140
 Translated with recourse to ibid., 1:249. 
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 And in the Story of Sinuhe the protagonist‟s ib is made responsible for his 
perambulation in Syria-Palestine: 
 
 Foreign land has given you to foreign land under the counsel of your ib for you (DD tw xAs.t n 
xAs.t Xr zH n(.i) ib=f n=k) (B 182).142 
 
 If the speech or action originates in or is planned by the ib, then it may be 
considered the cause of such events as an originator of thoughts that are materialised 
through the body. Given that the production of speech and action pertains to the 
intellective dimension, the ib may also be said to function as what we term “mind.” In 
this quality the ib is a mental cause. And the concept of mental causation is very 
important in the philosophy of mind as pointed out by Julie Yoo: 
 
 The phenomenon of mental causation [...] is absolutely fundamental to our concept of actions 
performed intentionally (as opposed to involuntarily), which, in turn, is central to those of agency, free 
will, and moral responsibility.
143
 
 
 This mental causation is also mirrored by the X.t: 
 
 Do not speak about matters of secret (m Dd md(.w)t n(.i) HAp). 
 The one who is discreet (lit. “hides his belly”), has made his shield (iw HAp X.t=f ir.n=f 
i(k)m=f)144. 
 Do not speak of matters of the activity of the ib (i.e., thoughts) (m Dd md(.w)t n(.i) pr-a-ib), 
 When one sits down with you defiantly (iw Hms=tw Hna=k ksm.w).145 (Instruction of Dua-Khety, 
stanza 25). 
                                                                                                                                               
141
 Translated with resort to ibid., 2: 243. 
142
 Text in María Isabel Toro Rueda, “Das Herz in der ägyptischen Literatur des zweiten Jahrtausends v. 
Chr. Untersuchungen zu Idiomatik und Metaphorik von Ausdrücken mit jb und HAtj,” 286. About the role 
of the heart in the Story of Sinuhe see also “O coração na Aventura de Sinuhe” [The heart in the 
Adventure of Sinuhe], in Rogério Ferreira de Sousa, A simbólica do coração no antigo Egipto: estudo de 
antropologia religiosa sobre a representação da consciência, 1:123-8. See also section 1.2.5. of this 
thesis. 
143
 Julie Yoo, “Mental Causation,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  
http://www.iep.utm.edu/mental-c/ (accessed September 7, 2010). 
144
 Transliteration and translation of this sentence according to James P. Allen, Middle Egyptian: An 
Introduction to the Language and Culture of Hieroglyphs, 2nd ed., 490. 
145
 Transliteration of Papyrus Sallier II from María Isabel Toro Rueda, “Das Herz in der ägyptischen 
Literatur des zweiten Jahrtausends v. Chr. Untersuchungen zu Idiomatik und Metaphorik von Ausdrücken 
mit jb und HAtj,” 172-3. For a variant see ibid., 173. My translation was made with resort to William Kelly 
Simpson, “The Satire on the Trades: The Instruction of Dua-Khety,” in The Literature of Ancient Egypt: 
An Anthology of Stories, Instructions, Stelae, Autobiographies, and Poetry, ed. William Kelly Simpson, 
(2003), 436. 
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 (I am) One who knows what lies in the belly without coming out through the lips, and speaks 
saying in accordance with his ib (rx imy.w-X.t n pr.t Hr sp.ty mdw r Dd xft ib=f). (Biography of Intef, the 
Great Herald of the King, from the Eighteenth Dynasty).
146
 
 
 Despite the polysemy of X.t, the pairing with ib strongly suggests that it refers to 
the belly. And the hiding of the belly in the Instruction of Dua-Khety resembles the 
quoted passage from the biography of Intef. The metaphor of the shield, in the same 
instruction, suggests that the thoughts generating in the belly are irrational or 
inconsiderate, especially when we think on the scenario of the confrontation with the 
disputants (maxims 2-4 in the Instruction of Ptahhotep) – which is also contemplated in 
the Instruction of Dua-Khety: “if a man reproves you, and you do not know how to 
oppose his anger, make your reply very cautiously in the presence of listeners” (section 
23)
147
.  
 In the biography of Intef an interesting compound is used: imy.w-X.t. It literally 
means “what is in the X.t.” And according to Raymond Faulkner, it means “thoughts”148, 
a translation that is suitable to the Egyptian expression since Intef states that what is in 
his belly is not allowed to be verbalised. However, such thoughts have a pejorative 
connotation. The axiological superiority of the ib in relation to the X.t pervades the 
majority of the passages where both elements form a dialectic. To my knowledge only 
in the New Kingdom is the belly conceived as containing good answers – although it 
also contains bad ones: 
 
 A man‟s belly is wider than a granary, 
 And full of all kinds of answers. 
 Choose the good one and say the good 
 While the bad is shut in your belly. (Instruction of Any, VII, 9-10).
149
 
 
                                                 
146
 Translated from the original in Kurth Sethe, Urkunden der 18. Dynastie (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs‟sche 
Buchhandlung, 1909), 971, line  2, and with resort to the translation in “Stela of Intef the Herald,” in 
James Henry Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, vol. 2, The Eighteenth Dynasty (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1906), 299. 
147
 Translation by William Kelly Simpson, “The Satire on the Trades: The Instruction of Dua-Khety,” in 
The Literature of Ancient Egypt: An Anthology of Stories, Instructions, Stelae, Autobiographies, and 
Poetry, ed. William Kelly Simpson, (2003), 435. 
148
 A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, 200. 
149
 Miriam Lichtheim, “Didactic Literature,” in Ancient Egyptian Literature: History and Forms, ed. 
Antonio Loprieno, Probleme der Ägyptologie 10 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 255. 
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 The conceptualisation of the ib and X.t as mental causes may derive from the 
physical experience of them, since both are involved in procreation. In several texts, the 
ib is mentioned as an important element in sexual reproduction150, and a hymn to the 
god Min, from the Thirteenth Dynasty, “shows that the „joining of the interior (ib)‟ of 
the man with the woman is seen as part of the procreative process that takes place after 
intercourse”151. Therefore both the man‟s and woman‟s ib was relevant in reproduction. 
In the Coffin Texts either the belly of a goddess or of the deceased could also be 
mentioned in a procreative role
152
. Both the ib and the belly have, therefore, a creative 
power, and it is possible that the intellective role of both elements in the origination of 
thoughts is owed to their relevance in procreation. 
 Since the ib is said to be inside the X.t, as it was mentioned above, and given that 
both elements play a role in procreation, can there be a procreation-like relation, on the 
metaphorical level, between the two? If so, it is possible that thoughts and feelings are 
generated from the dialectic relation between ib and X.t. The impression given by the 
texts is that one either tunes in with the ib or with the X.t. For example, in the Tale of the 
Eloquent Peasant it is stated that: “there is no one light of ib who is guarded (lit. 
“heavy”) of the counsel of the X.t (nn iz-ib dns sxr-X.t) (B 1, 209)153. Since “light of ib” 
has a similar meaning to the modern “light-minded”154, and that dns has the sense of 
“guarded” in dns mhwt (“guarded of speech”)155, I propose the interpretation that while 
one disregards the ib the X.t comes into play and vice-versa. As for the compound sxr-
X.t it is similar to imy.w-X.t with the main difference of having a specific word for 
“counsel,” or “plan” – it can also mean “conduct,” and “governance” –,156 instead of a 
prepositional nisbe. 
 The dialectic between ib and X.t is also developed in maxim 14 of the Instruction 
of Ptahhotep: 
                                                 
150
 Rune Nyord, Breathing Flesh: Conceptions of the Body in the Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 419 ff. A 
striking example of the ib in a procreative role comes from the Second Stele of Kamose: 
 The women of Avaris shall not conceive (nn iwr Hm.wt Hw.t-war.t), 
 Their ib.w shall not open up (nn sn ib.w=sn) 
 Inside their bellies (m-Xnw X.t=sn). 
Translation and transliteration according to ibid., 421. 
151
 Ibid., 420. 
152
 For references see ibid., 72-3. 
153
 Alan H. Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar: Being an Introduction to the Study of Hieroglyphs, 83. For a 
different interpretation of this passage see Telo Ferreira Canhão, “O conto do camponês eloquente” [The 
tale of the eloquent peasant], Cadmo 16 (2006): 46 n. 136. 
154
 Raymond O. Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, 30. 
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 Ibid., 314. 
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 Ibid., 242. 
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 (232) Should you be with people (ir wnn=k Hna r(m)T.w), 
 (233) Seek for yourself partisans of a trustworthy man (ir n=k mr.w n(.i) kfA-ib)157. 
 (234) The trustworthy one (kfA-ib), 
 (235) Is the one who does not turn to what is said in his belly (iw.ty pXr=f Dd m X.t=f). 
 (237) He will become a commander himself (xpr=f m Tz.w Ds=f), 
 (239) A possessor of goods who acts according to his plan (nb x.t d(.w) m-a m sxr=f)”158. 
 [...] 
 (243) The ib of the one who listens to his159 belly passes by160 (wnn ib sDm n X.t=f), 
 (244) He causes dislike in place of his love (Di=f kn.t m s.t mr.wt=f). 
 (245) The ib will be withered, and his body will not be anointed (ib fAk.w Ha.w=f XsA). 
 (247) The people who are great of ib have been given by god161 (iw wr ib rDi.w nTr), 
 (248) While the one who listens to his belly belongs to the enemy (iw sDm n X.t=f n(.i) sw xft.y). 
 
 As we may observe, two opposing archetypes are presented here: the trustworthy 
man and the one who turns and listens to his belly. The word spelled out as kfA may in 
fact be a variation of kfi. And whereas the former means “be discreet,” the latter means 
“to uncover”162. Thus kfA-ib literally means “discreet of ib,” while the sense of kfi-ib is 
“uncovered of ib.” Both renderings might actually be viewed as synonyms if we 
                                                 
157
 I followed John L. Foster, Thought Couplets and Clause Sequences in a Literary Text: The Maxims of 
Ptah-hotep, 40. Zbyněk Žaba, Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 134, however, considers this rendering 
unsatisfactory. This line is not entirely clear. Christian Jacq translates it as “procure-toi des alliés, en tant 
qu‟homme digne de confiance qui atteint le cœur” (Les maximes de Ptah-Hotep: l'enseignement d'un sage 
au temps des pyramides, 148). This rendering would be better suited to the L2 version which replaces the 
n for an m – which could be construed as an m of identification. Furthermore, Jacq reads the word here 
transliterated as kfA as pH. However, because the L2 version spells out kfA – the word in Prisse may be an 
abbreviation of kfA –, and because the expression kfA-ib is attested at least in another text (Raymond O. 
Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, 285) I take this expression to be kfA-ib and not pH-ib. 
The latter compound is not listed neither in Adolf Erman, Hermann Grapow, Worterbuch der 
Aegyptischen Sprache (Berlim: Akademie-Verlag, 1971), 1:533-5, nor in María Isabel Toro Rueda, “Das 
Herz in der ägyptischen Literatur des zweiten Jahrtausends v. Chr. Untersuchungen zu Idiomatik und 
Metaphorik von Ausdrücken mit jb und HAtj,” 339. 
158
 For the transliteration and translation of this line I followed Christian Jacq, Les maximes de Ptah-
Hotep: l'enseignement d'un sage au temps des pyramides (Fuveau: La Maison de Vie, 2004), 149. 
159
 The third person suffix pronoun in this and the next two lines refers to the person. 
160
 I take wnn to be a gemination of the tertiae infirmae verb wni, “to pass by.” The sense is that the heart 
will take the wrong direction, and is made clear by the L2 version, from the Eighteenth Dynasty, which 
replaces wnn by nnm, “to err,” or “go wrong.” 
161
 The wording of this line would suggest a pseudo-verbal construction, as interpreted by Rune Nyord: 
“he who is great of ib will become one of the god-given people.” In Breathing Flesh: Conceptions of the 
Body in the Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 89. However one would expect the infinitival rDi.t instead of 
rDi.w. Zbyněk Žaba, Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 135, also reads rDi.w in place of r Di.w. Nonetheless, 
both the morphology and syntax do fit a iw=f passive sDm=f complex verb construction (about this 
construction see Boyo G. Ockinga, A Concise Grammar of Middle Egyptian, 2nd rev. ed., 59). In 
translating “people” instead of “one” I followed Christian Jacq, who translates it so because of the 
determinatives for man and woman included in the writing of rDi.w. 
162
 Raymond O. Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, 285. Faulkner does not identify kfi 
as a tertiae infirmae verb; for this see James P. Allen, Middle Egyptian: An Introduction to the Language 
and Culture of Hieroglyphs
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, 471. 
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suppose that the discreet of ib is one who can keep a secret, and that the uncovered of ib 
is someone with nothing to hide. Both expressions favour the translation 
“trustworthy”163. 
 In lines 234 and 235 it is said that the trustworthy man does not follow what is 
said in his belly. The L2 version of line 235 is even clearer: “he is the one who does not 
listen to what his belly says (iw.ty sDm=f n Dd X.t=f).” Lines 237 and 239164 add that 
because of this attitude the trustworthy man will prosper. 
 Lines 243-248 shift from the trustworthy to the one who listens to his belly. It is 
interesting that in line 243 it is the ib and not the person that will err. This implies that 
the ib is still functioning as a mental cause. And the belly is here depicted as the 
element that negatively influences what the ib causes. In contrast to the trustworthy 
man, the one who listens to his belly will be alienated from his social circle
165
. What is 
meant by ib fAk.w is more obscure, but may also be related with antisocialism.  
 Line 248, which ends maxim 14, states that the one who listens to his belly 
belongs to the enemy, without giving any further details about what belonging to the 
enemy exactly means. In the description of the ignorant, the opposite of the silent man, 
in the Epilogue (lines 575-587), no reference is made to the belly – nor to the ib for that 
matter. And in the reproach of the avidity of ib (awn ib), the cause of all kinds of evils 
according to Ptahhotep (lines 298-301), the belly is mentioned but as a neutral element: 
 
 (322) It is a little of avidity about it (in nhy n(.i) awn.t Hr=s) 
 (323) That brings about quarrelsomeness in a cool belly (sxpr Snty m ob X.t). (Maxim 20). 
 
 This last passage from maxim 20 presents another feature of the ib and X.t: the 
emotional state of the individual may be characterised through the temperature of his ib 
and X.t; a cool temperature denotes calmness and pleasantness, whereas a hot 
temperature expresses emotions related to anger
166
. Thus, besides being cool the X.t may 
also be said to be hot: 
 
                                                 
163
 This connotation is reiterated in maxim 30, line 433. 
164
 Lines 236 and 238 are featured in the L2 version alone, and therefore will be taken into consideration 
here. 
165
 See e.g. the biographical inscription of Senedjemib Inti from his tomb at Giza (reign of Izezi): “and his 
majesty saw to it that I was anointed with unguent and that my skin was cleansed in the presence of his 
majesty by an inspector of hairdressers of the Great House, a chief of Nekheb and the keeper of the 
diadem.” Translated by Nigel C. Strudwick, Texts from the Pyramid Age, 311-2. 
166
 About the temperature of the ib see Rogério Ferreira de Sousa, A simbólica do coração no antigo 
Egipto: estudo de antropologia religiosa sobre a representação da consciência, 1:52-3. 
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 (350) May you not repeat a slander (imi=k wHm mski n(.i) md.t);  
 (351) You will not listen to it (n sDm=k sw).  
 (352) It is the utterance of the hot belly (pr.w pw n(.i)t tA X.t). (Maxim 23).167 
 
 And so may the ib: 
 
 (378) The flame of the hot ib is spread (iw ns.wt n(.i)t tA ib sXr=f).168 (Maxim 25). 
 
 Although the expression obb ib does not occur in the Instruction of Ptahhotep, it 
occurs in other Middle Kingdom Texts such as the Coffin Texts and in the tales from the 
Papyrus Westcar
169. Additionally Ptahhotep uses a similar concept, “to wash the ib” (iai 
ib), as in maxim 17: The one who is under an injustice wishes his ib to be washed (mr 
Xr(.y) iw ia.t(w) ib=f) (line 268). It is interesting that in the preceding lines the X.t is 
again paired with the ib: 
 
 (265) Be peaceful when you listen to a speech from the petitioner (hr sDm=k mdw spr.w) 
 (266) Do not rebuff him, until he has wiped out his belly
170
 (m gnf sw r sk.t(=f)171 X.t=f) 
 (267) Of that which he thought he had to say (m kA.t.n=f Dd.n=f st). 
 (268) The one who is under an injustice wishes his ib to be washed (mr Xr(.y) iw ia.t(w) ib=f)172 
 (269) More than the realisation of that which he came for (r ir.t ii.t.n=f Hr=s). (Maxim 17). 
 
 In this maxim both the ib and X.t require cleansing and may therefore be 
construed as synonyms. 
 Returning to the hot temperature of both elements, it is noteworthy that the 
participle tA is common to both passages. It is interesting that the related noun TA.w is 
used in the medical texts, probably to refer to the burning sensation caused by infections 
– as in urinary infections, for example.173 It is also noticeable that, according to 
Herodotus, “the Egyptians were obsessed with their bowels, and much of their 
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 This is the only example from the Instruction of Ptahhotep. For an example from the New Kingdom 
see the Instruction of Amenemope, chapter 9. 
168
 I followed the interpretation of Zbyněk Žaba, Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 151, in rendering this 
sentence as a complex verb form iw=f + Passive sDm=f. 
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 See Rune Nyord, Breathing Flesh: Conceptions of the Body in the Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 90 
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 Raymond O. Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, 251, understands this idiom as 
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Peasant, B1, 310: “I have vented what was in my belly (snf(A).n=i ntt m X.t=i).” In James P. Allen, 
Middle Egyptian: An Introduction to the Language and Culture of Hieroglyphs
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, 150, 482. 
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 I followed Christian Jacq, Les maximes de Ptah-Hotep, 155, in the emendation. 
172
 The L2 variant of this line is formulated in a less dramatic tone: “the one who pleas wishes his speech 
to be considered (mr spr h[nn] Tz.w=f).” 
173
 See John F. Nunn, “Disease,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Egyptology, 1:399. 
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pharmacopeia was devoted to facilitating bowel movements”174. Would the “hot-
temper” – Faulkner‟s translation of both tA ib and tA X.t175 – be considered a 
psychosomatic condition, perhaps in a similar way to the Greek cholera which comes 
from cholon, “liver”176? A direct relation is difficult to prove, but since that in the 
English language, for example, the very adjective “inflammatory” may qualify either an 
infection or something that induces anger, without there being any relation between 
both situations, it may be suggested instead that once more it is the physical experience 
that fuels the metaphorical conceptualisation. About the intensive investment in 
pharmacopeia to the bowels, it is not clear how it would relate to the emotional state 
described by tA X.t or tA ib, particularly because wisdom texts do not establish such a 
relation. 
 
1.2.4. The structuring cause of the ib: 
 
 As we have just seen in the previous section, the ib can be the mental cause of 
one‟s actions. The philosopher F. Dretske177, in attempting to construe the phenomenon 
of mental causation, has proposed to divide mental causation into two types of causes: a 
“triggering cause,” and a “structuring cause.” The author illustrates this theory with a 
thermostat designed to turn on the furnace when a low temperature is detected. This low 
temperature is the triggering cause which leads the thermostat to activate the furnace. 
But this could only happen due to wiring from the thermostat to the furnace which 
constitutes the structuring cause
178
. Applied to the Egyptian notion of conscience, the 
triggering cause is the ib, whereas the structuring cause is made of the person‟s 
formative circumstances and personal history. This is a very similar issue to the 
“condition of Ultimate Responsibility” which we have already addressed in relation to 
character. If the structuring cause is made up of the agent‟s life, then the agent itself is 
the structuring cause. When it is said in the wisdom literature and biographies that one 
should ignore the speech of the X.t179, in those instances the individual is building his 
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own history. Conversely, the individual who listens to his X.t180 hinders his ib as it will 
deviate from the path hoped for in the epilogue to the Instruction of Ptahhotep: 
 
 (628) Act until your lord says in your respect (ir r DD.t181 nb=k r=k): 
 (629) “How good is the teaching of his father (nfr.wy sbA n(.i) if=f). 
 (630) (When) he came forth from him, from his body (pr.n=f i(A)m=f xnt(y) Ha.w=f) 
 (631) He spoke to him when he was entirely in the womb (Dd.n=f n=f iw=f m X.t r-Aw). 
 (632) What he did was greater than what was said to him (wr ir.t.n=f r Dd.t n=f).” 
 (633) See, a good son is a gift of god (mk zA nfr n DD nTr), 
 (634) One who does more than (lit. “puts excess”) what was said to him by his lord (rDi HA.w Hr 
Dd.t n=f xr nb=f). 
 (635) May he do maat (ir=f mAa.t), 
 (636) His ib having acted according to his actions (ir.n ib=f r nmt.wt=f), 
 (637) As you reach me, your body being complete
182
 (mi pH=k wi Ha.w wDA(.w)).183 
  
 Line 636 may be a reference to the structuring cause as it is wished for that the 
individual‟s ib had acted in accordance with his actions, i.e., that ib and individual had 
been synchronised. Still in the epilogue, after stating that the one who listens is loved by 
god and that the one god hates cannot listen, Ptahhotep states that to be a listener or a 
non-listener is a matter controlled by the ib: 
 
 (550) It is the ib that makes its possessor (in ib sxpr nb=f) 
 (551) One who listens, or one who does not listen (sDm m tm sDm). 
 (552) For a man his ib is life, prosperity, and health (anx wDA snb n z(i) ib=f). 
 
 As suggested by Rogério Sousa, this passage may be an acknowledgment that 
the ability to listen may be a natural predisposition outside the individual‟s control184. 
Maulana Karenga, in commenting on this excerpt, states that “[t]his is both rational and 
emotional hearing, in a word, moral responsiveness.”185 In fact the Egyptian sources 
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convey the idea that there was not a sharp distinction between rationality and 
emotionality but instead a complementarity
186
. However, the emotionality entailed by 
this complementary relation is a constructive one, as it were, since the opposition 
between ib and X.t implies an axiological distinction. But then again ib and X.t 
interchange in the Egyptian account of human behaviour. This seeming contradiction 
may actually be understood in light of the philosophical doctrine of paraconsistent 
logic
187
. 
 Even if there is a natural predisposition implied in the passage from the epilogue 
(lines 550-552), it may have still been believed that the individual was responsible for 
the formation and evolution of his ib. Evidence for this is presented not only by the 
above quoted line 636, but also by the conceptualisation of the ib as a vase: 
 
 Tal como um vaso que nada vale por si mesmo, mas sim pelo conteúdo que guarda, o coração 
humano transforma-se em função das emoções e dos pensamentos que o habitam. Ao preencher o seu 
coração com emoções e pensamentos positivos, ou seja, com os preceitos que regem a ordem cósmica, o 
homem purifica-se e regenera-se. Caso contrário, o indivíduo cava a sua própria perdição.
188
 
 [Just as a vase that has no worth for itself, but for the content it houses, the human heart 
transforms itself according to the emotions and thoughts that dwell on him. By filling his heart with 
positive emotions and thoughts, i.e., with the precepts that rule the cosmic order, man purifies and 
regenerates himself. Otherwise, the individual digs his own doom]. 
 
 Therefore the individual might have been held responsible for the formation of 
his ib just as he was responsible for the moulding of his character. When the ib is said to 
act independently from the individual, as in the following passages,  
 
 It was my heart that furthered my rank; it was my character that kept me in front.” (Stela CGG 
20543 of the steward Rediu-Khnum from Dendera, reign of Wahankh Intef II (Eleventh Dynasty).
189
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 It was my heart that advanced my position and I conformed to the deeds of my fathers. [...] 
[W]hose heart conducts his affairs. (Stela of the chief priest Wepwawet-aa, from the reign of Senuseret I-
Amenemhet II (Twelfth Dynasty).
190
 
 
it might be a direct consequence from the way the individual structured his ib as a 
mental cause. The advice given in the Instruction for Kagemni “to control the ib” (dAr 
ib) and “to fortify the ib” (smn=ib)191 also supports this interpretation. 
 
1.2.5. Heart loss: 
 
 There is another topic which is important to understand the heart‟s role in free 
will. It is about what we may call “heart loss,” by way of analogy to the term “soul loss” 
used in anthropology to refer to one of the theories of disease in Shamanism
192
. This 
feature, which is not unique to Egyptian thought
193
, is attested both in medical papyri – 
although in this case the heart is not lost but instead shifts position inside the body – and 
in literary texts. In Egyptian medicine, if the HA.ty was in its place (s.t=f) then the 
person‟s cardiovascular system was working properly as explained in the Ebers 
Papyrus: “[q]uant à l‟expression “le coeur (HAty) est à sa place,” c‟est que la masse du 
Coeur est du cotê gauche; il ne monte ni ne descend étant donné qu‟il demeure à sa 
place” (855p)194. But when the HA.ty was said to leave its place, it created a pathological 
condition which Rogério Sousa has suggested to be an abnormal heartbeat increase
195
. 
And in more extreme cases it could refer to death
196
. 
 In literary texts the heart loss is usually due to feelings of fear, anxiety, and also 
to ignorance or senselessness. Examples of the first case are found both in the Story of 
Sinuhe and in the tale of the Eloquent Peasant: 
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 “My ib grew weak, and as for my HA.ty, it was not even in my body (X.t), and on the ways of 
flight it brought me” (ib=i AD.w HA.ty=i n ntf m X.t=i in.n=f wi Hr wA.t war) (Sinuhe, B 38-40).197 
 
 “My bA fled and my body shook. My HA.ty was not in my (X.t) body: I could <not> tell life from 
death. (bA=i iz.w Ha.w=i Ad.w HA.ty=i n ntf m X.t=i <n> rx=i anx r mw.t). (Sinuhe, B255).198 
 
 Now, my body was full, my ib was heavy-laden, and it came out from my body/belly (?) (X.t) 
due to its condition (iw gr.t X.t=i mH.t(i) ib=i ATp(.w) pr is m X.t=i n a iry). (Peasant, B1, 276).199 
 
 Evidence for the second example is found e.g. in the New Kingdom penitential 
texts such as the one of Neferabu who says of himself: “(I am) an ignorant man who 
does not have his HA.ty (z(i) xm iw.ty HA.ty)”200. 
 It is noteworthy that both the ib and HA.ty are able to come out of the body in 
similar contexts, particularly in the cases of fear or anxiety in the Story of Sinuhe with 
the addition of frustration in the Tale of the Eloquent Peasant. And it is also noticeable 
that both the ib and HA.ty are contained within the X.t. As we have seen above X.t can 
mean both “body” and “belly.” Given the dialectic of ib with the belly, we may deduce 
that in the quoted passage from the Eloquent Peasant this dialectic is maintained. 
Therefore, on a smaller scale the X.t houses the ib, and on a bigger scale it stores the 
HA.ty. £.t is thus the fixed element in the heart loss. 
 If Sousa‟s interpretation of the shifting of the heart as being an increased heart 
rate is correct, then the heart loss in the metaphorical sense may be connected to its 
somatic counterpart as a rapid heart rate is one of the symptoms of the “fight or flight” 
stage which characterises anxiety
201
. Another Egyptian expression that may refer to this 
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condition is Hbs ib202, literally “narrow/constricted ib,” since it may allude to the 
shallow breathing which constitutes another symptom of anxiety. 
 As noticed by Rune Nyord the heart loss is an extreme feeling of narrowness: 
“the experience is one of extreme tightening to the point where the heart is felt as being 
absent.”203 Narrowness is opposed to expansion in a dialectic relation204. The feelings of 
expansion may be characterised by the expressions Aw.t ib205, aAi ib, and wr ib206. 
 We have seen above that one‟s ib should be taken care of, and that such 
investment would be reflected in the ib as the mental causation of one‟s actions. 
Without his heart the agent is deprived of the centre of his conscience which on some 
occasions is guided and on others guides the individual. The individual is therefore not 
responsible for his subsequent actions. This seems to be acknowledged in the Story of 
Sinuhe as the protagonist is not held responsible for his flight by the king. And it is also 
interesting that although Sinuhe lost his HA.ty he indulges himself by saying that “this 
flight which the servant made was not planned, it was not in my ib (is war.t tm ir.t.n bAk 
nn xm.t nn s(y) m ib=i).”207 However, if the individual‟s health depends on the harmony 
between ib and HA.ty, as recognised by Rogério Sousa208, it is possible that the same is 
true on the intellective level, i.e., that both the ib and HA.ty are present within the 
individual so that he can will according to his conscience. It is also noteworthy that, still 
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according to the Portuguese author
209
, the HA.ty stood for the volitional centre, whereas 
the ib represented one‟s interior life, which could account for the seeming discrepancy 
in the Story of Sinuhe. However, although the HA.ty may be endowed with volition and 
assessment of alternative courses of action in the Story of Sinuhe, Ptahhotep focused on 
the ib in detriment of HA.ty possibly because his main concern was for one to be in 
harmony with his ib and thus make it function as a mental cause in a constructive way. 
Therefore Ptahhotep does not deal with the heart as the centre of decision but with the 
choice to care for one‟s ib in order to act properly. 
 As a closing remark of this section, it is interesting to notice that whereas in 
Shamanism soul loss may be healed by carrying out a journey, on the metaphysical 
level, to recover the person‟s soul210, it is uncertain whether such practice was employed 
in ancient Egypt. However, the Story of Sinuhe may suggest otherwise
211
; as we have 
just seen, Sinuhe fled from Egypt due to the emotional turmoil that was metaphorically 
described as heart loss. While exiled in Syria-Palestine and achieving success there, 
Sinuhe realises that in order to heal his feeling of guilt due to his flight abroad and to be 
granted a proper burial – the prospect of being buried in a foreign country was also a 
source of apprehension and anxiety to him – he must return to the courtly life in Egypt. 
It is therefore implied that upon his reintegration in Egyptian society Sinuhe eventually 
gets in harmony with his heart. 
 
1.2.6. ¥ms-ib: 
 
 The expression Sms ib212 is relevant to this discussion since its root meaning is 
“follow the ib.” What is entailed by following the ib is what we shall attempt to define 
here. But before proceeding I should like to remark that the expression *Sms HA.ty is not 
attested
213
. And it is noticeable that, although from the Late Period onwards the use of 
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HA.ty started to increase in detriment of ib214, in the mortuary stele of Taimhotep, from 
the reign of Cleopatra VII
215
, the formulation Sms ib is still used216. 
 The Instruction of Ptahhotep dedicates a whole maxim to the expression Sms ib: 
 
(186) Follow your ib during the time of your existence (Sms ib=k tr n(.i) wnn=k) 
(187) And do not do more than what was said (m ir HA.w Hr mdd.wt). 
(188) Do not neglect the chance to follow the ib (m xb tr{x}217 n(.i) Sms ib), 
(189) Since to waste its moment is what the kA hates (bw.t kA pw HD.t A.t=f). 
(190) Do not turn toward everyday events (m ngb zp Xr(.y)t hrw) 
(191) Beyond setting up your house (m HA.w n(.i) grg pr=k). 
(192) As things happen, follow the ib (xpr x.t Sms ib), 
 (193) For there is no profit when it (the ib) is abused (lit. “there is no completion of a matter 
while it is hated”) (nn km n(.i) x.t iw sfA=f). (Maxim 11).218 
 
 As noticed by David Lorton
219, besides the root meaning “to follow,” Sms may 
additionally mean “to serve” and “to make use of,” and, when forming this expression, 
ib may have two meanings: “conscience” and “desire.” Piankoff has also proposed to 
understand the ib in this specific context as a protective daemon220. 
 As pointed out by Zbyněk Žaba221, the focus of this maxim is not the Sms ib 
alone, but also the advice to “N‟exagérez rien”222. This advice is explicitly conveyed by 
line 187. It is also meaningful that besides being urged to do no more than what was 
prescribed, the individual is also exhorted to not waste his time to follow his ib and to 
not waste time with mundane affairs. Additionally it is said that failure to do so is 
abominated by the ka. This particular instance will be discussed in the next section. On 
the whole the general meaning of this maxim seems to be that working too much is not 
beneficial. This is made explicit in line 193 which literally reads “there is no completion 
of a matter while it is hated.” Furthermore, the L2 variant of line 188 replaces Sms ib for 
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xr.t ib, which means “desire” or “wish”223. Still concerning the L2 version, it is 
interesting that the variant of line 186 replaces Sms ib for Sms kA. To my knowledge the 
latter construction is not attested elsewhere and therefore it might be a scribal error
224
. 
 Despite the maxim‟s tone to not go beyond the call of duty, David Lorton225 
interprets the expression Sms ib in this passage as meaning “follow your conscience,” as 
opposed to “follow your desire” in a hedonistic sense. And the author justifies this 
interpretation with the fact that the Instruction of Ptahhotep is a sapiential text and 
therefore such interpretation would fit the context better
226
. However, the opposite view 
is held by Jan Assmann and Adriaan de Buck.  
 According to Assmann‟s argument, Sms-ib was a synonym to sxmx-ib227, a term 
which can be translated as “distract the heart,” “take recreation,” or “enjoyment”228, and 
which may be found in love songs from the New Kingdom
229
. Therefore Sms-ib refers to 
what the author calls “aristocratic leisure (aristokratische Musse)”230. In this sense it 
was in tune with the Harpist Songs and was a written counterpart to the visual hunting 
scenes depicted in tomb walls.
231
 The interpretation of the above quoted maxim 11 
made by the author is that it exhorted one to enjoy one‟s free time (“Freizeit”).232 
 De Buck holds a similar view, and in commenting on the referred maxim states 
that Sms-ib is a technical term to enjoy life but not in a lawless or frivolous sense.233  
The author also argues that several texts appealed to the Sms-ib because life was too 
short and one‟s existence in the afterlife was liable to be bleak. To support this view the 
author quotes the dialogue between Atum and Osiris in BD 175 which deals with the 
solitude and asceticism Osiris has to face upon entering the “Silent Land”.234 
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 Rogério Sousa favours a mixed interpretation combining “follow your 
conscience” with “follow your desire”235. However, the text does not support the former 
rendering. And since this ib is not the conscience, in a solemn tone, but rather one‟s 
desire, Piankoff‟s hypothesis of a transcendent daemon or genius also does not apply to 
Ptahhotep‟s maxim. But the tendency to regard this expression in this maxim as “follow 
your conscience” is understandable, because the Instruction of Ptahhotep is, after all, a 
moralistic instruction. A hedonistic exhortation would therefore seem out of context. 
And it is here that lies the problem. As stated by de Buck, this exhortation does not need 
to be construed as frivolous or as an invitation to debauchedness. Instead, it seems to be 
an acknowledgment of the importance of time off from work and of leisure, although, as 
pointed out by Assmann, this recognition probably applied firstly to the ruling elite. But 
this does not mean that the Sms ib according to Ptahhotep is irrelevant to our discussion; 
quite on the contrary. Just as the harmony between ib and HA.ty was important, so was, 
according to this maxim, the mental equilibrium generated from the dynamics between 
work and leisure. In this sense the advice to follow desire (ib) is in tune with 
Ptahhotep‟s concern with the way one cares for the ib. 
 
1.3. KA and bA: 
 
 Both the kA (ka) and the bA (ba) are incorporeal elements that are part of the 
person. They are better known from the funerary literature and representations – notice, 
however, that only the kA of the king was pictorially depicted as a separate entity236. The 
division established between the kA of the non-royals and the kA of the king is certainly a 
valid one, since the prerogatives and abilities ascribed to the king were necessarily 
different from the ones attributed to the rest of the population
237
 – including the ruling 
elite. However, some descriptions of the royal kA also apply to the kA of the non-royals, 
meaning that a core field of meaning was shared by royalty and commoners. 
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 A similar distinction concerning the bA occurs in the Old Kingdom, which led 
some scholars to state that in this period only the king possessed a bA and that it only 
became accessible to non-royals with the “democratisation of the afterlife” ensuing the 
First Intermediate Period
238
. However, some texts contradict this claim: 
 
 May he be united with the land, may he cross the heavens, may he ascend to the great god, may 
his kA dwell in the presence of the king, may his bA endure in the presence of the god.239 
 
 It is a fact that the bA was seldom mentioned in non-royals‟ tombs, a feature that 
is akin to the lack of mention of the individual‟s heart in the Old Kingdom, but 
nonetheless it might have been considered a “universal”240 component of human nature 
in the Egyptian worldview.
241
 It is nonetheless uncertain whether the bA was considered 
to be part of a person during her life in the Old Kingdom
242
. But from the Middle 
Kingdom onwards the bA is referred to as being a component of a living person. 
 Apart from their role in the afterlife, both the kA and bA played a role in the 
individual‟s intellective structure. And it is this role that we will exploit here. 
 
1.3.1. KA: 
 
 As argued by Andrey O. Bolshakov
243
, a distinction should be made between the 
internal, or “non-figurative,” kA, and the external, or “figurative,” kA for the sake of 
methodological clarity – such distinction was not clearly made by the Egyptians 
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themselves. The external kA was the one associated with the placenta and which was 
understood as a person‟s “double”244, since it could be represented in murals and 
statues
245
. This feature is one of the overlapping points between the “internal kA” and the 
“external kA,” as noted by Bolshakov about the representations of the kA: “[t]hese images 
were objectified, turned from a part of the psyche into a part of the medium, and 
identified with the external ka”246 Another shared feature between both categories of the 
kA which constitutes one of its core meanings is animation.  
 The kA was one‟s “vital force”247 in the sense that it animated the being to which 
it belonged. This characteristic is best exemplified by the amputation of the foreleg from 
a living bull calf to be offered in sacrifice
248
. A possible reference to such offering from 
the Old Kingdom clearly associates the leg with the kA of the person to whom it was 
offered: “Turn round the head of this ox quickly; let me get this leg off for the ka of 
Zezi, my lord, the imakhu of Anubis.”249 As macabre as this practice may seem to us, it 
was rooted in the distinction between live (anx) and dead (wAD) flesh250. The type of leg 
most suitable to be offered in a religious ritual apparently was the one still animated by 
the kA, and therefore still possessing life. In essence kA was offered to kA, in a somewhat 
similar way to present day medical transplants where the organ to be transplanted has to 
come from a living body – even when the donor has suffered brain death. 
 As suggested by Henry Frankfort, it is possible that the kA, as one‟s vital or 
animating force, was considered to vary in intensity from individual to individual and 
during one‟s life251. Furthermore the kA expressed one‟s individuality and personality in 
the intellective sense
252
. The range of uses of the kA in the intellectual domain is varied. 
Therefore, as Bolshakov points out, depending on the context the kA may mean 
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“character,” “nature,” “temperament,” or “disposition.”253 This variety of meanings is 
expressed in the Instruction of Ptahhotep: 
 
 (119) If you are a man of those who are seated (ir wnn=k m z(i) n(.i) Hms.w) 
 (120) For a banquet of one who is greater than you
254
 (r s.t T.t wr r=k), 
 (121) Accept what he gives you (lit. “his giving (even) a piece against your nose”255) (Ssp Di.t=f 
Di.w r fnD=k). 
 (123) When you look at what is before you (gmH=k r ntt m-bAH=k), 
 (124) Do not pierce him with much staring
256
 (m sti.w sw m gmH aSA) 
 (125) To be bent thereupon
257
 is what the kA abominates (bw.t kA pw wdi.t i(A)m=f) 
 (126) Do not speak until he calls (m mdw n=f r iAS.t=f) 
 (127) As one does not know what is displeasing
258
 (lit. “bad in the ib) (n rx.n=tw bin.t Hr ib) 
 (128) When you speak in response to his addressing you
259
 (mdw=k xft wSd=f Tw) 
 (129) You shall talk according to what is pleasant on the ib260 (iw Dd.t=k r nfr Hr ib). 
 (135)As for the great one who is at the meal (lit. “behind the breads”) (ir wr wnn=f HA tA.w), 
 (136) His conduct (shall be) in accordance to the command of his kA (<ir=f>261 sxr<=f>262 xft 
wD kA=f) 
 (137) He will give to the one he favours (iw=f r rDi.t Hzzy=f). 
 (138) It is the counsel of the night that comes to being (sxr pw n(.i) grH xpr). 
 (139) It is the kA that stretches out his (its?) arms (in kA dwn a.wy=f(y)). 
 (140) The great one, he shall give, (but) one man cannot advance
263
 (wr Di=f n pH.n z(i)). 
(Maxim 7). 
 
 Do not speak against anyone (m mdw <r>264 r(m)T.(wt) nb.(w)t), 
 Great or small, it is the abomination of the kA (wr kt.t bw.t kA pw). (Maxim 8, lines 159-160). 
 
 (341) As for the one who fails in pleasing his friends (ir whh m sHtp aq.w=f) 
 (342) One says: “it is a selfish kA (jw Dd=tw kA pw aAb(.t)). (Maxim 22). 
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(414) See, it is the kA that loves to listen (mk kA pw mrr sDm). (Maxim 27). 
 
 In maxim 7 the kA may be equated with “temperament” or “disposition,” and in 
maxims 8, 22, and 27 both the readings “nature” and “character” are possible. 
Furthermore it becomes apparent from these passages that the kA can be either passive or 
active. The epitome of its passive character is the expression bw.t kA pw, “it is the 
abomination of the kA.” In this quality the kA appears to be an element that appraises 
action. In the case of line 189
265
 the kA is connoted with self-appraisal. The same is true 
for line 160 which condemns calumny. In both cases the translation “well-being”266 
would be suitable. But in the case of the impolite staring mentioned in line 125, another 
translation is required; here “discomfort” would fit the context better.  
 Line 342 which deals with the selfish kA, indicates that the kA was also credited 
with a socialising function. A kA too centred on itself points out the lack of the expected 
pro-social behaviour. 
 As a general rule, the kA in its passive role seems to deal with one‟s mental 
balance or harmony. Consequently when the kA abominates something, the person might 
be said to be upset which in turn might influence her choices. This is what is suggested 
in maxim 7 since a polite behaviour will prompt the host to be beneficent. Furthermore, 
it is the host‟s kA that lies at the origin of his actions – although in kA dwn a.wy=f(y) may 
be construed as “it is the kA that stretches its arms”, in which case the actions would be 
ascribed to the kA itself. 
 In its active role the kA resembles the ib. And just as the latter was involved both 
in the intellectual creation and physical reproduction, so might have been the former. 
According to Andrey Bolshakov the root *kA is shared by the verbs kAi, “think about, 
intend, plan,” kA.t, “thought, plan,” nkA(i), “think about”267, kA.t, “work”268, kA, “bull,” 
and kA.t, “vagina”269. In the same way that bull and vagina relate to fertility and 
reproduction, and work “means creating something new, i.e., augmenting the 
existent”270, so is thinking a form of creation – a perception we still hold today by 
qualifying the emergence of new ideas as “creativity.” Notice that the word kA.t 
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pervades the three dimensions of creation. However, this does not mean that thought 
processing was believed to be rooted in physical creation; instead it tells us that physical 
creation and mental creation were considered to be two pieces of one whole. As pointed 
out by Henri Frankfort, “[t]here is no separation between intention and execution”271. 
 Therefore, when it is said e.g. “„how I wish that this ka of yours, beloved of Re, 
would order that a stone false door be made for that tomb of mine in the 
necropolis!‟”272, it is this relation between thought and creation that was at work. It may 
thus be said that the kA was also considered to be a mental cause. But, contrary to the ib, 
the origination of thoughts or actions within the kA reached back into the past. 
 According to the ancient Egyptians‟ beliefs, the kA was transmissible from 
generation to generation, being “the total of hereditary qualities that an individual 
human has received from the ancestors, his typical personal structure.”273 This 
transmission is attested since the Pyramid Texts: 
 
 Recitation: Atum-Khepri! You became high, as the hill; you rose as the benben in the Benben 
Enclosure in Heliopolis. You sneezed Shu and spat Tefnut. You put your arms around them as ka-arms so 
that your ka might be in them. Atum, put your arms around Pepi Neferkare as ka-arms so that the ka of 
Pepi Neferkare might be in it, firm for the course of eternity. Ho Atum! May you extend protection over 
this Pepi Neferkare [...] like you extended protection over Shu and Tefnut.
274
 
 
And even though this transmission is first attested in a corpus exclusive to the royalty, it 
is also present in the Instruction of Ptahhotep: “he is your son, he belongs to the seed of 
your kA (zA=k pw n(.i) sw sti kA=k)” (maxim 12, line 204). Thus, when in maxim 7 it is 
said “his conduct (shall be) in accordance to the command of his kA,” the command of 
the kA may refer to an ancestral tradition. The same is possible for line 414 (it is the kA 
that loves to listen). In this sense the kA constitutes an acknowledgment of the influence 
of what we call now family “genes” in one‟s behaviour. 
 Although it was related to the creation of thoughts, the kA does not seem to have 
been particularly connected to volition. However, it is still relevant in free will as it was 
associated with a person‟s mental balance and might have been believed to determine, at 
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least to some extent, one‟s actions since it made up an inherited natural predisposition. 
And, interestingly, it conjugated inheritance from the past with creation of the new. 
 Although the internal kA is similar to the ib in the issue of mental causation, and 
although it might have filled in for the role of the ib in the Old Kingdom – but only 
among the elite –, both concepts were conceptually different. Especially from the 
Middle Kingdom onwards the ib assumed a greater preponderance – a phenomenon 
which is well attested in the Instruction of Ptahhotep where the ib occurs significantly 
more often than the kA. And whereas the ib is fundamentally the centre of man‟s 
conscience, the kA, encompassing its internal and external dimensions, above all 
embodied one‟s animation both physical and intellectual. 
 
1.3.2. bA: 
 
 The bA is mentioned as being part of the individual during life275 in the epilogue 
to the Instruction of Ptahhotep: 
 
 (524) It is the wise man (lit. “one who knows”) that helps his bA (in rx sm bA=f) 
 (525) Through what perpetuates his goodness in him on earth  (m smn.t nfr=f i(A)m=f tp tA).276 
 
 As pointed out by Louis Žabkar, the goodness of the individual that is 
perpetuated on earth “will be of advantage to the Ba.”277 Indeed, reputation among the 
living was a concern of the elite at least since the Old Kingdom: 
 
 I carried out Maat which is what the god loves; I propitiated the god in respect of all that which 
he loves; I made invocation offerings for the akhs; I was respectful of my father and kind to my mother. I 
buried him who had no son; I ferried him who had no boat; I rescued the wretched man from (more) 
powerful one; I gave the share of the father to his son. It so happens that men say when I pass them by: 
„Look, he is an imakhu and the beloved one of the god,‟ so they say.278 
 
This becomes more comprehensible when we bear in mind that an individual‟s name 
was paramount to his survival in the hereafter
279
; thus some of the means to annihilate 
                                                 
275
 Louis V. Žabkar, A Study of the Ba Concept in Ancient Egyptian Texts, 120, presents a different view. 
276
 See alternative translations in ibid., 118 n. 16. 
277
 Ibid., 118. 
278
 From the tomb of Mehu at Saqqara, dated from the Sixth Dynasty. Translation by Nigel C. Strudwick, 
Texts from the Pyramid Age, 295. 
279
 See e.g. the Tale of the Eloquent Peasant B1, 310: “his name will never vanish upon the earth, / 
because of his goodness.” Translated by Vincent Arieh Tobin, “The Tale of the Eloquent Peasant,” in The 
58 
 
one‟s existence in the afterlife and punish a criminal consisted on erasing or changing 
one‟s name, respectively280. Ptahhotep‟s exhortation to help the bA aims for the 
opposite, i.e., to a good reputation so that the individual‟s name would be respected and 
not erased – which would render the bA somewhat useless as a successful existence in 
the afterlife was believed to require the reunion of all the components which constitute 
the human nature; the loss of but one would cripple the individual‟s person. 
 The caring for one‟s reputation brings us to one of the most important features of 
the bA both as the personification of the deceased and as a component of one‟s self 
during life. This feature is “manifestation,” a term that could be used to translate bA281. 
This sense was reinforced in the abstract bA.w which may be rendered as 
“impressiveness,” “effect,” and “reputation”282. Consequently the bA of a living person 
was related to the impact and impressions she caused on others. 
 Even though the bA apparently was not directly connected to volition, it was still 
important to free will since the survival of the bA in the hereafter depended on the 
person‟s choices and actions. And as manifestation, the bA was probably understood as 
the manifestation of one‟s personality; in the above cited passage from the Story of 
Sinuhe (B255) the protagonist, before saying that his HA.ty was not in his body, stated 
that “my bA fled (bA=i iz.w)”. As with the heart loss, the bA loss had to do with one‟s 
ability to be oneself, and in the metaphorical absence of the bA – which in this case also 
conveys the feeling of anxiety
283
 – one would lose such ability. 
 
*** 
 
 As we may infer from the foregoing discussion, man‟s moral conscience was 
formed by several components, the most important of which was the ib. In the 
Instruction of Ptahhotep the several elements of human nature – moral character, ib, kA, 
and bA – do not actively participate in volition, i.e., the process of decision making is not 
directly dependent on any of these elements. The process of willing is either attributed 
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to the HA.ty284 or to the agent himself. Miriam Lichtheim refers to the agent who wills as 
the “I”: 
 
 The verse
285
 also makes clear that the Egyptian viewed his “I” as his integrated person, fit to 
make choices among the promptings of heart and belly, and ruling over the constituent parts of his nature. 
Thus, while heart and belly initiated, and character stabilized, it was the “I” that carried out intentions and 
judged their consequences – an “I” that was writ large.286 
 
 But, even though it is the agent who takes his decisions, the constituent elements 
of human nature we have just listed are nonetheless important in the agent‟s volition. 
They form the basis that allows the agent to choose correctly – by “correctly” I mean in 
accordance with the moral precepts current in the Egyptian society, such as the ones 
advised in the Instruction of Ptahhotep. If these components are not watchfully cared 
for by the agent, he will risk what we may call “mental unbalance.” Certainly the ib, X.t, 
and kA constitute a creative mental causation, but they appear to mostly empower the 
agent with the ability to perform an action. Therefore the core feature which is shared 
by all the elements surveyed above is ability. And it is noteworthy that this is one of the 
most important features in free will
287
, since free will entails that the agent has to be 
able to will and perform an action. Thus, whereas it is the Egyptian agent who wills, he 
needs to be in harmony and to take care of the constituents of his nature in order for the 
choice to originate in himself. Loss of the ib or HA.ty, for example, will, as we have seen, 
impair this origination of the decision from the agent. 
 
2. DIVINE INTERVENTION: 
 
 In any community where religion plays an important role, supernatural 
intervention – especially from divine or divine related entities – will be a given. More 
ubiquitous types of intervention include control of natural phenomena – such as the 
proper flooding of the Nile River – as well as intervention in one‟s life. The latter is 
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often requested by the individual, through prayers for example
288
. However, there are 
instances where the gods, or a god, intervene without being summoned. And besides 
intervening in the life of the individual, at certain occurrences they intervene directly on 
him controlling his actions thus rendering him unable to choose for himself. This kind 
of threat to free will is known in philosophical discussions as “Determinism”289. 
 A deterministic intervention by the gods is featured in the Instruction of 
Ptahhotep, as well as in other texts such as the Story of Sinuhe. I propose to analyse 
divine intervention under two categories: “determination,” and “control of fate.” But 
first I should like to address the issue of the anonymity of “god” and “they.” 
 
2.1. The anonymous god: 
 
 In several texts – including literary texts, tomb biographies, and mortuary 
corpora, as well as in personal names, the generic term “god” (nTr) is employed instead 
of the name of a particularly deity and sometimes alongside named deities. The 
Instruction of Ptahhotep, for example, names Osiris and Horus. Based mostly on the 
sapiential texts, several authors have interpreted the use of the anonymous term as a 
reference to a “philosophical monotheism,” as against the “polytheism of the people”290. 
Although in the New Kingdom instructions specific gods are named more often, Joseph 
Vergote argued that: 
 
 Ces passages, de même que ceux mentionnant Osiris, Rē, Thot ou Khnoum, prouvent, selon lui, 
que leurs auteurs professaient sans réticence la religion polythéiste de leur milieu. Tous les autres textes, 
au contraire, où Dieu est nommé sans détermination, sons les témoins de la croyance en un Dieu unique, 
tout-puissant, maître des événements, providence des hommes, juge et rétributeur des bonnes et 
mauvaises actions, en un mot le Dieu de la croyance monothéiste.
291
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 However, current opinion is that the anonymity of god in the instruction texts is 
explicable by context
292
. Given that an official, taught with resort to the instruction texts 
which use the generic term “god,” could be required to work in several areas of Egypt, 
he would face different deities in different locations. Therefore reference to a specific 
god was avoided in order to encompass any god needed at a given location and at a 
given circumstance. Thus, it was the occasion and location that revealed the hitherto 
undisclosed god to the official.
293
 This explanation is also valid for private tombs, since 
they could be visited by people devoted to different gods, as is made explicit in the 
following inscriptions: 
 
 With regard to a man who shall work or quarry in this hill of the lord of the two banks, the 
ancient one
294
, he shall not die if he pours water on the land and cultivates his grain. May his god make 
his ka live. (Graffito from Hindallab, north of Qubbet el-Hawa, probably from the late Old Kingdom).
295
 
 
 O you who live upon earth, servants and peers, he who shall say “a thousand of bread, beer, 
oxen, fowl, alabaster and clothing for Djau, son of Djau” is one whom the king loves and whom their 
local god favors. (i anx.w tp.yw tA bAk.w mi.ty mrr.w n(.i)-sw.t pw H[zz].w nTr=sn niw.ty Dd.t(y)=sn xA tA 
Hno.t kA Apd {Sn} <Ss>  mnx.t n Daw zA n(.i) Daw). (Inscription from the tomb of Djau at Deir el-Gebrawi, 
dated from the reign of Pepy II).
296
 
 
Although the former inscription is a graffito and not a tomb inscription, it is still 
relevant here as it addresses passers-by who worship different gods in a similar way to 
tomb inscriptions; its tenor even suggests some form of private piety. 
 While maintaining the validity of the argument advanced by Erik Hornung and 
other scholars
297
, one may also turn things around and propose that the anonymity of 
god was employed in the instruction texts in order to be accessible to students coming 
from different places of Egypt. This teaching strategy would thus be in consonance with 
the two references from the Old Kingdom just quoted. Furthermore, what is entailed in 
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these interpretations of the undefined term god is that, if this undetermined god alludes 
to any god depending on the context or on the place of origin of the person, then the 
traits ascribed to the anonymous one are shared by all. This would not be an isolated 
feature within the Egyptian religion, since at a given time a god might move from his 
area of influence to other locations and acquire new attributes
298
, and several epithets, 
including nTr aA (possibly “greatest god”299), are shared by different deities, including 
lesser ones
300
. These phenomena imply a fluid concept of divinity and show that the 
“god of the wise men” could not be a monotheistic god. This view is also supported by 
John Baines: 
 
 The tension between the universality of many characteristics of Egyptian deities on the one hand, 
and the particularity of their forms, manifestations, and spheres of efficacy on the other, accentuates the 
issue of unity and multiplicity. Deities in Egypt seem to be less specifically focused on a domain than are 
deities in many polytheisms. There is also relatively frequent reference to a singular “god,” notably in 
instruction texts where it may mean “whichever god you may have in mind,” or in other cases where a 
general deity or the creator is envisaged.
301
 
 
 It should also be noted that in some maxims the use of the term god may refer to 
the king. Such passages would thus constitute “loyalist teachings.” 
  
 A similar problem to the anonymity of god is presented by the suffix pronoun 
=sn, “they,” which is interpreted by some authors as referring to the gods302. The 
identity of “they” is relevant for our discussion, as in the Instruction of Ptahhotep there 
are passages where they seem to intervene directly on the individual and consequently 
impair his ability to will freely. But to which agency the suffix pronoun =sn refers to is 
a matter far from settled. As Frank T. Miosi
303
 pointed out, in the Instruction of 
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Ptahhotep the plural “gods,” nTr.w, occurs only once in line 32 and in the L2 and C 
variants the term nTr.w is replaced by tp.yw-a304, “ancestors.” Nonetheless, if the plural 
form “they” refers to the gods, it can be assumed that it refers to all the gods in the 
sense of any god – which constitutes the counterpart of the singular “god” applying to 
the god most relevant to the person. Conversely, even if “ancestors” or the deceased are 
meant, it does not affect the relevance of the passages we will study, as they 
unequivocally refer to metaphysical interventions which impact on the liberties of the 
individual. 
 There is another important implication stemming from the usage of the 
anonymous terms “god” and “they.” This implication, which has already been admitted 
by acknowledging direct divine intervention, is a direct relation between individual and 
god(s) without any sorts of intermediaries – be it the king, priests, oracles, intermediary 
statues, etc. However, for most sapiential texts this relation does not entail a pious 
relationship like the one characterised by henotheism, which Hornung considers to be 
difficult to identify in these texts
305
, or even some form of private piety, because there is 
only a direct relation between the characters of the instruction and god instead of e.g. an 
interpellation to the reader to address god directly. But there are two exceptions: the 
Story of Sinuhe, and the Instruction for the King Merikare. Whether Sinuhe and 
Merikare developed a sense of private piety will be discussed within this chapter and in 
the conclusion respectively. 
 For now I propose to amplify the analysis of divine determination by addressing 
two texts besides the Instruction of Ptahhotep: the Instruction of Dua-Khety and the 
Story of Sinuhe. 
 
2.1. Divine determination in the Instruction of Ptahhotep: 
 
 In the Instruction of Ptahhotep there are instances where god or “they” intervene 
directly in the individual apparently withdrawing any possibility of choice from him. In 
this section I will attempt to answer the following queries: how does god intervene on 
man and for what reasons? I shall start with the following passages from the Instruction 
of Ptahhotep: 
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 (216) The one who was hostile towards you is one whom they hated (wdi r=k m xbd.n=sn) 
 (217) He is one to whom
306
 ill-will was implanted in the belly (X.t) (wdd sDb n=f pw m X.t). 
 (218) Their guidance does not/cannot err (n nnm.n sSm=sn), 
 (219) The ones whom they leave boatless are not/cannot be able to cross (n gm.n iw.w=sn DA.t). 
(Maxim 12).
307
 
 
 (545) The one who listens is the one whom god loves (mrr.w nTr pw sDm); 
 (546) The one whom god hates does not/cannot listen (n sDm.n msdd.w nTr). 
 (550) It is the ib that makes its possessor (in ib sxpr nb=f) 
 (551) One who listens, or one who does not listen (sDm m tm sDm). 
 (552) For a man his ib is life, prosperity, and health (anx wDA snb n z(i) ib=f).  
 (553) It is the one who listens who listened to the one who spoke
308
 (in sDm.w sDm Dd); 
 (554) The one who does what is said is the one who loves to listen (mrr sDm pw ir Dd.t). 
(Maxim 39, Epilogue). 
 
 Line 217 of maxim 12 presents three grammatical and semantical problems. 
First of all, it is not certain whether wdd is a gemination of wD or wdi. This issue is 
important not only to ascertain the exact meaning of wdd, but also to determine which 
verb form it actually is. Zbyněk Žaba presents a cogent argumentation in favour of wD: 
wD does not interchange with wdi before the New Kingdom; the writing of the verb wdi 
employed in line 216 is carefully distinguished from wdd; the form wdd reappears in 
line 222 clearly being a gemination of wD309; and the context would require a perfective 
passive participle – of the two verbs only wD would geminate in this verb form – instead 
of an imperfective passive participle – in which only wdi would show gemination310. 
However, whereas wdi sDb is attested elsewhere, wD sDb is not311. Furthermore in order 
to eliminate the ambiguity the scribe of the L2 version replaced wdd sDb by Hwi.n nTr 
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sDb.w=f pw m X.t (“he is one whose obstacles god implanted in the X.t”). Despite Žaba‟s 
argumentation, the emendation by the L2 scribe and the fact that wD sDb is not attested, 
strongly suggests that wdd refers to wdi and that it is therefore an imperfective passive 
participle. 
 A further problem is raised by the exact meaning of sDb. It has the additional 
meanings of “obstacle,” “impediment,” “evil,” and, possibly, “guilt”312. This term 
occurs at two more instances in maxim 26 of the Instruction of Ptahhotep; lines 391 and 
397b read “his ill-will will manifest against the one who opposes him (xpr sdb{i}=f r 
Snt sw)”, and “but ill-will comes from an enemy (iw sdb{i} xr xft.y)”313 respectively.  
 A comparison may be drawn between the implanting of ill-will in the Egyptian 
culture and the intrusion of a foreign object in some shamanic tribes. In these latter ones 
it is believed that such object intrusion is responsible for illness and is frequently 
considered to have been implanted by an antisocial sorcerer. As with soul loss, the 
object must be removed by a healer, who may have to contend with the sorcerer, and 
then presented by him under the forms of stones or poisoned arrows, for example314. The 
similarity is that in both cultures, Egyptian and shamanic, an exterior object, concrete or 
abstract, may be placed in a person and affect her either somatically or psychologically. 
But contrarily to the shamanistic tribes‟ belief, in the Instruction of Ptahhotep the 
responsible for implanting ill-will was not a sorcerer but seemingly the gods. 
 Before stating that ill-will was implanted in the rebel son‟s belly, Ptahhotep 
affirmed that he was hated by “them.” Who “they” are is not made clear, but as we have 
just seen, in the L2 variant the agent responsible for the implant is god. One may argue 
that this is a reflection of a closer proximity between god and man in the New Kingdom 
– an example of such proximity is the fact that a person could see her fated time of 
death postponed several years by her personal god
315
. However, the following lines 
clearly refer to supernatural beings which may range from the gods to the deceased 
kings316. But given that god is mentioned in the L2 version, and that god is mentioned in 
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other maxims in the Prisse version, it is probable that Ptahhotep also had the gods in 
mind. 
 Regarding the m X.t part of the sentence, it can have several meanings depending 
on the implications of the two following lines, particularly line 219. In this latter line it 
is said that the ones who are left boatless will not be able to cross. +Ai certainly refers to 
the metaphorical crossing of the deceased from this world to the hereafter which had its 
counterpart in the funerary procession where the deceased was ferried in a coffin from 
the western shore to the eastern shore
317
. Crossing to the afterlife is an expression 
attested since the Old Kingdom
318
, and, at least from the Middle Kingdom onwards, it 
had a moral component
319
, i.e., only through the observance of ethical norms could one 
cross to the afterlife and be able to partake of a comfortable existence there – it is 
uncertain whether the Egyptians ever conceived of the complete destruction of the 
deceased; even the condemned ones (mwt) would still exist as what we call today 
“ghosts”320. The ones who could not cross might have fallen under this category. 
Although Ptahhotep is saying that the rebel son will not lead a happy existence in the 
Beyond, he however does not explicitly state that such fortune is due to the son‟s 
actions; rather, ill-will was implanted in the X.t and he is among the ones left without a 
boat by the gods. The motive for this seems to be provided in line 216 which states that 
the gods hated him. Depending when exactly they hated him – it could have been either 
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before his conception or after his birth – we may be before a case of retribution or of 
predestination. In the first case, due to the son‟s insolence the gods would have 
implanted ill-will in his belly; “belly” would be the most suitable translation for X.t in 
this case since, as we have seen
321
, the belly was the counterpart of the ib in its role of 
producer of thoughts which could then be verbalised or materialised through action. 
Therefore the implanting of ill-will in the belly might have been understood as a 
conditioning on the person‟s conduct imposed by the gods as retribution. Conversely, in 
the second case ill-will would have been implanted on the womb (another possible 
translation for X.t) of the rebel son‟s mother and therefore his inability to cross would 
have been dictated by arbitrariness rather than by his conduct. It might be more sensible 
to go with the interpretation of retribution, because, as John Baines pointed out, 
 
[i]n a context such as Egypt it is [...] inappropriate to speak of a rigid “predestination” comparable with 
that of some forms of Christianity. Notions such as “grace” may circumvent that predestination to some 
extent; Egyptian conceptions are generally still more flexible.
322
 
 
 It is noteworthy that this kind of determination of the individual‟s actions, even 
though being part of a retribution scheme, removes him any opportunity to amend 
himself. What is also entailed is that responsibility for the individual‟s actions is held by 
the gods who determine him. 
 Let us now analyse lines 545-552. These lines are part of maxim 39, within the 
epilogue
323
, which elaborates on the topic initiated in the previous maxim that opens the 
epilogue and which deals with the importance and benefits of listening to the maxims 
which make up the Instruction of Ptahhotep. However, lines 545 and 546 might 
introduce another topic: despite the benefices from listening, one might be unable to 
listen due to divine constraint. But whether god constrains the human individual or not 
depends heavily on how one renders these lines which present several grammatical 
problems. 
 In the translation proposed above I interpreted mrr.w nTr and msdd.w nTr as 
imperfective relative sDm=fs having god as subject of both verbs. A different verb form 
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which suits the morphology of the verbs is the imperfective passive participle
324
, but a 
similar translation would be obtained: “the one who listens is beloved of god; / the one 
who is hated by god does not/cannot listen.” Another alternative, also supported by 
morphology, is the imperfective active participle, and this would in fact alter 
significantly the meaning of the two sentences: “the one who loves god is the one who 
listens; / the one who hates god does not/cannot listen.”  
 Because line 545 is an A pw B nominal sentence the identification of subject and 
predicate dictates how the sentence is rendered; if A is the subject and B the predicate 
then it reads “A is B,” but if the opposite is true then the sentence will read “B is A”325. 
If mrr.w nTr is an imperfective relative sDm=f, then it is the predicate as it is 
commenting on sDm, the subject. However, if mrr.w is either an imperfective active 
participle or an imperfective passive participle, either mrr.w or sDm can be the predicate 
or subject.  
 Although the verbs mri and msDi show alterations to their roots under any of 
these verb forms – which is a clear advantage over verbs that show no alteration at all –, 
the fact that the three forms are closely related causes the endings attached to these 
verbs to be identical
326
. Thus, even though a weak verb is expected to almost always 
show the .w ending when it is used as an imperfective passive participle this is not 
always true in the written record. Conversely, a weak verb which would be expected to 
not show the .w ending when used as an imperfective active participle may do so in a 
given text. This flexibility of Egyptian language makes it difficult to distinguish 
between similar verb forms, and it is precisely that difficulty which we face here. But 
despite this hurdle there are several elements that suggest that mrr.w nTr and msdd.w nTr 
are imperfective relative sDm=fs. 
 First of all, in lines 414
327
 and 554
328
 mrr is clearly an imperfective active 
participle and, notwithstanding, it has no .w ending. An exception to this rule is found in 
maxim 39 with the verb sDm, but the usage of this verb suggests that the forms sDm and 
sDm.w, while probably being imperfective active participles, aim at providing a subtle 
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contrast between different meanings rather than indicating different verb forms
329
. 
Second, in line 182
330
 mrr.w=sn is most probably an imperfective relative sDm=f 331 and 
it displays the same morphology that in line 545. To my knowledge, the verb msDi does 
not occur in the Instruction of Ptahhotep either as msDD.w or msDD outside line 546, 
which provides no direct element of comparison. MsDD.w is attested elsewhere as an 
imperfective active participle
332
, but then again the ending .w is common both to the 
imperfective active participle and to the imperfective relative sDm=f. Therefore the 
comparison made above between mrr.w and mrr may be indirectly applied to msdd.w 
nTr. Furthermore, in line 219 iw.w=sn is clearly an imperfective relative sDm=f333 and is 
used in a sentence similar to the one formulated in line 546, consisting of the 
grammatical construction n sDm.n imperfective relative sDm=f. Additionally, the very 
fact that in line 219 the gods determine who may not successfully cross to the afterlife 
strongly suggests that in line 546 god determines who cannot listen because both 
statements would tally with one another. It is also striking that the formulation of both 
sentences negates “action, ability, or necessity”334; therefore, besides “he does not 
listen,” n sDm.n=f may also mean “he cannot listen”335. As we have seen in the final 
remarks to the first chapter, the several components of human nature mentioned in the 
Instruction of Ptahhotep are mostly related to the agent‟s ability to perform a given 
action, and seemingly it is precisely that ability that is denied in lines 219 and 546, thus 
making both sentences closely related. 
 Lines 545 and 546 thus create a “thought couplet”336; the former line states that 
god is pleased with the one who listens, and the latter line declares that the one god 
hates is unable to listen. Maxim 39 becomes somewhat confusing with what follows 
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these two lines. As we have seen above
337
, in lines 550-552 the ib is said to make his 
possessor a listener of a non-listener. As was argued, this active role of the ib is possibly 
a consequence of the individual‟s investment on it. But lines 553-554 return emphasis to 
the individual as one who listens. Therefore we have three agencies here at work: the 
individual himself, his ib, and god. Since the ib is part of the human conception of the 
individual, we might narrow down the agencies involved to the human person and god. 
What stands out as striking is that there is no apparent dialectic between god and man as 
there is in lines 216-219. Whereas in these latter ones retribution is what justifies divine 
intervention, lines 545-546 do not present a misdeed committed by the individual that 
would bring divine punishment upon him. However, both verbs mri and msDi are 
semantically charged with an axiological hierarchy. In these lines the relation between 
man and god is defined as one of love-hate
338
 – a characterisation we still use today to 
describe our relation to certain people, objects, etc. 
 Another important matter is whether “the one whom god hates” has a passive or 
active role. David Lorton, who renders lines 545-546 as “One who listens is one (i.e., 
the sort) whom the god (customarily) loves, while one
 
(i.e., the sort) whom the god 
(customarily) hates does not listen”339, makes the following interpretation: 
 
 Far from referring to predestination, therefore, the passage states only that practicing the virtue 
of “listening” elicits the reaction of “love” from the nTr (the king or a god), while not practicing the virtue 
causes the nTr to “hate.”340 
 
 This interpretation is also shared by Christian Jacq: “God loves the man who 
listens but detests the one who does not.”341 And by Frank T. Miosi: “This passage 
could also indicate that the god loves (imperfective) a person because that person 
listens, but he hates (imperfective) a person who habitually does not listen.”342 These 
interpretations assume that god‟s hate is a reaction to the individual‟s reluctance in 
hearing. However, other authors interpret it the other way round. Miriam Lichtheim 
commented that: “Once again the note of determinism is sounded; and it is quickly 
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countered by the assertion that it is a man‟s own heart that determines his behaviour.”343 
In discussing the granting of wisdom to man, in the wisdom literature, as an “individual 
endowment”344, Michael V. Fox compares the “fear of God” with the ability to listen in 
Ptahhotep: 
 
 Ben Sira (i 14) says that the fear of God is given to the faithful before birth. To be precise, he 
calls this gift the beginning of wisdom, not wisdom itself. Like Ptahhotep's “hearing”, the fear of God is 
prerequisite to wisdom. The ability to hear is given to those whom the gods love and denied to those they 
hate (U. 545-46; 217).
345
 
 
 This comparison is enlightening since to listen requires being silent
346
, and the 
silent man was extremely valued in the ancient Egyptian wisdom literature. However, if 
he was considered to be a wise man or not is uncertain as pointed out by Miriam 
Lichtheim: 
 
 The equation is, however, at best half valid, only insofar as the “wise man” would possess the 
qualities of the “silent man”: patience, calm, and control over feelings and passions. But the reverse does 
not hold: the “silent man” need not be a “sage”.347 
 
 The connection between wisdom and listening in the ancient Egyptian culture is 
summed up in the following statement by Jan Assmann: “La sagesse en égyptien est le 
silence.”348 It should be noted, notwithstanding, that, according with what one infers 
from the Egyptian wisdom literature and as pointed out by Michael Fox in the quotation 
above, to be silent and to listen were understood only as means of attaining wisdom 
instead of being synonymous with it. To not listen implies being ignorant, a state that 
has a whole maxim dedicated to it in the epilogue to the Instruction of Ptahhotep 
(maxim 41). 
 Returning to the active or passive role of “the one whom god hates,” it is 
important to establish whether god here refers to the king, as a vicarious representative 
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of the gods associated to kingship – namely Horus –, or to another god. According to 
David Lorton, the god in the Instruction of Ptahhotep is the king
349
. The author supports 
this view by evoking the fact that “loyal and competent officials” were rewarded with a 
burial near the royal necropolis and that private individuals were “said to be mry 
„beloved‟ of the king and others as a result of their good conduct and beneficent 
deeds”350, whereas the verb msDi is sometimes used to describe the king‟s reaction to 
someone‟s misdeed351. In short, the authors argument is that the terminology Ptahhotep 
uses in describing the individual‟s relation to god is the same that is used in other texts 
to describe the king‟s reactions towards his subjects. Certainly there are passages in the 
Instruction of Ptahhotep where god is the king. A conspicuous one is present in line 36 
in the prologue: “Then the majesty of this god said (Dd.in Hm n(.i) nTr pn)”, while there 
are more veiled occurrences where the god may also be the king: “it is the god who 
advances/promotes the seat” (maxim 13, line 229) in the court of law (rwy.t). The two 
most ubiquitous terms to refer to the king were Hm and n.i-sw.t. Both terms appear in 
conjunction in line 5: “under the majesty of the king of Upper and Lower Egypt352 Isesi, 
alive forever and ever
353
 (xr Hm n(.i) (n.i-)sw(.t)-bit.t issi anx(.w) D.t r nHH)”. It has been 
argued that Hm refers to the human and physical aspects of the king – in fact it means 
“servant”354 –, whereas ni-sw.t refers to his office of divine origin355. This latter term is 
employed in the epilogue to the Instruction of Ptahhotep (lines 638, 642, and 644), 
where it is determined with the sign of the falcon of Horus on a standard (G7 in 
Gardiner‟s Sign-List). This allows us to conclude that in certain passages god refers de 
facto to the king
356
. But in no way does it make it forceful that god is always the king. 
                                                 
349
 This view is counterposed by the one presented by Richard B. Parkinson: “Ptahhotep refers little to the 
king, drawing more on the biographical theme of an individual‟s self-fashioning rather than that of royal 
advancement.” Poetry and Culture in Middle Kingdom Egypt: A Dark Side to Perfection, 258. 
350
 Review of Der Vorwurf and Gott in den “Mahn – Worten des Ipu-wer” (Pap. Leiden I 344 Recto, 
11,11-13,8; 15,13-17,3): Zur Geistigen Krise der Ersten Zwischenzeit und ihrer bewalti-gung, by 
Gerhard Fecht, 106-7 n. 3. 
351
 Ibid., 107 n. 3. The author gives examples of the verb msDi employed by the king, without mentioning 
its relation to the Instruction of Ptahhotep, in “The Treatment of Criminals in Ancient Egypt: Through the 
New Kingdom,” 8, 30, and 62. 
352
 Literally “The One of the Sedge and the Bee”. 
353
 About D.t and nHH see Jan Assmann, The Search for God in Ancient Egypt, 74-9. 
354
 See Tobias Hofmann, “Majestät und Diener – zur Dialektik des Begriffes Hm,” ZÄS 128 (2001): 116-
32, quoted in Nigel C. Strudwick, Texts from the Pyramid Age, 61 n. 53. 
355
 The argument exposed was proposed by Hans Goedicke, Die Stellung des königs im Alten Reich 
(Wiesbaden: 1960), 89-90, quoted in J. Gwyn Griffiths, Divine Verdict: A Study of Divine Judgement in 
the Ancient Near  East (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), 162. 
356
 For specific examples see Joseph Vergote, “La notion de Dieu dans les livres de sagesse égyptiens,” 
162. 
73 
 
 The terminology argument, proposed by David Lorton, does not necessarily 
entail that the god is always the king either. For example, the expression bw.t kA pw, “it 
is the abomination of the kA,” which Ptahhotep uses in some passages357, is akin to the 
expression bw.t nTr pw, “it is god‟s abomination”358; and in line 552 the ib is said to be 
“life, prosperity, and health”, an expression that is commonly employed in mentions to 
the king and in letters to refer to the recipient
359
. These examples demonstrate that 
formulae often associated with a specific context could in fact be employed in different 
contexts and with different entities. Another feature not considered by Lorton are the 
mentions to “they.” Even if “god” would refer to the living king, “they” could not 
possibly have the same connotation. Due to this fact and to the semblance between lines 
546 and 219, in the Instruction of Ptahhotep, a god distinct from the king must be meant 
in lines 545-546. And thus being it is plausible to infer that the individual in line 546 
plays a passive role. 
 
2.2. Divine determination in the Instruction of Dua-Khety: 
 
 This text may be divided into two parts, the first consisting of the description of 
several trades and the hardships they carry, and the second comprising advices that fall 
under the scope of conventional instructions. This text has been deemed satirical by 
several authors
360
, whereas other authors claim that it is a serious text
361
. As argued by 
John L. Foster, whether one interprets the text as being a satire or instead a way to 
persuade students to make the most of their opportunity to study, impacts on how one 
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translates and understands the text
362
. It is difficult to accurately assess whether the text 
was thought out strictly as either satirical or serious or as a combination of both tones. 
What may seem humorous to modern readers might have not seemed so to ancient 
authors, and vice versa. It is also uncertain whether there was any exaggeration in the 
description of the several trades
363
 – impartial accounts of the conditions of work in 
ancient Egypt would be required, although the state of some skeletons may sometimes 
provide an insight to those conditions –; the dangers faced both by the washerman and 
the fisherman, for example, are quite credible
364
. Even if some of the professions are 
parodied, I share Foster‟s opinion that the text aims primarily at talking the young 
student into giving his best to succeed as a scribe because the alternative could be one of 
the overviewed trades with all the misery they involve. 
 Two of several elements pointed out as satirical by Miriam Lichtheim
365
 are the 
fowler‟s lack of a net and the fisherman‟s fear of crocodiles. But the description of both 
these occupations differs from all the others in the following characteristic: they involve 
god, and in the case of the fowler god interferes directly with his activity. The fowler‟s 
and fisherman‟s lot is described in the following manner: 
 
 The fowler is one who is entirely miserable (wHa Apd.w sfn r-sy), 
 Looking for the guardians of the sky (birds) (Hr gmH iryw p.t). 
 If a flock of birds (lit. “united birds”) passes over him (ir swA Apd.w Xnm.w m Hr=f) 
 He cries, “if only I had a net!”  (xr=f Dd=f HA=n r(A) n=i m iAd.t) 
 God does not allow the coming into existence (of the net (?)) into his hand (nn rDi.n nTr xpr m-
a=f), 
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 And he is miserable because of his condition (sfn=f Hr sxr.w=f). (Stanza 20).366 
 
 I will tell you how it is to be a fisherman (Dd=i n=k mi wHa rm.w) 
 It is more miserable than any trade (sfn=f r iA.t nb.t). 
 His work is on the river (wn bAk.w=f Hr itrw), 
 Mixed with the crocodiles (Sbn.w hna msH.w). 
 If the collection of his dues takes place (ir xpr n=f dmdyt n(.i)t ip.t=f), 
 He gets miserable (xr wnn=f Hr nx.w). 
 He cannot say “crocodiles are surfacing!”367 (nn Dd.n=f iw msH.w aHa), 
 And his fear blinded him (Sp.n sw snd.w=f). 
 The aggressor (sc., the crocodile), if he bursts through the water (i.e., surfaces) (ir pr=f Hr mw 
pw pA Ad.w), 
 He (sc., the fisherman) says: “(it is) like the manifestation of a god!” (xr=f mi bA.w nTr). (Stanza 
21).
368
 
 
 Whereas the fisherman‟s description is plausible, i.e., it is credible that his work 
could be disturbed by crocodiles, the same cannot be said about the fowler. Indeed it 
sounds strange that a fowler would not have a net to catch birds, but it is relevant that 
god is made responsible for his lack of equipment. The question then is why? Is it 
possible that Dua-Khety is voicing a subtle ecological concern akin to the modern 
conception of animal rights? The text does not appear to support this view, as it does not 
explicitly state that to harm animals is morally wrong. Is it then possible that god is 
being used here as part of a joke? Again I believe the answer is negative. In a votive 
stele from Deir el-Medina, the scribe Neferabu leaves a clear warning: “Beware of 
falsely pronouncing the name of Ptah, because the one who pronounces it unjustly will 
experience punishment”369. Although Neferabu‟s interpellation dates from the New 
Kingdom and despite the fact that in the Instruction of Dua-Khety god is not named, it is 
possible that the notion that using a god‟s name in vain would result in punishment 
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might have been present not only in this instruction but also throughout the whole 
Egyptian history. 
 I propose to seek the answer to god‟s presence in the description of the fowler 
and of the fisherman through another point of view. The close connection between the 
fowler and the fisherman in this instruction – expressed by the fact that both trades are 
termed wHa370 and that the description of the fowler is immediately followed by the 
description of the fisherman – seems far from random. In fact, fowl and fish are often 
referred in conjunction
371
, and their hunting is part of the fishing and fowling motif 
present in several tombs and is epitomised by the literary pieces known as the Sporting 
King and Fishing and Fowling
372
. According to some authors
373
, from the New 
Kingdom onwards this motif, which was present in the iconographic programs of elite 
tombs since the Old Kingdom
374
, acquired a symbolism of the defeat of chaos elements, 
but in the tomb of Nakht (TT 52) a more pragmatic purpose is still present in the caption 
to the fishing scene: “Travelling across the marshes, / traversing the marshlands, / 
distracting the ib375, spearing / the fish (xns SA.w / hbhb sx.wt / sxmx ib st.t / mHy.t)376. 
 Although the professions of fowler and fisherman are attested for ancient 
Egypt
377, the activities underlying them were also part of the elite‟s entertainment. It is 
therefore plausible that Dua-Khety is not satirising these two trades but, instead, is 
warning the young aspirant to scribe that should he fail in his studies and wind up either 
as a fowler or a fisherman he will not be able to enjoy these occupations as leisure, in 
the same way that scribes are, but will instead face constant adversity. The intervention 
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of god in the activity of the fowler may thus be construed as a metaphor for that 
adversity. And this metaphor also has theodic implications. 
 A theodic comment in the stanza dealing with the fowler was noticed by Richard 
B. Parkinson. However, his interpretation is different from the one I will present here 
because his translation is also different – as John Foster remarked, given that there is 
not a copy of this instruction that can be considered closer to the original and that there 
is a considerable level of corruptness in several copies, any translation proposed is 
tentative
378. Parkinson‟s translation of the last thought couplet reads: “God does not let 
this happen to him, / so that he is made feeble by his own plans.”379 According to this 
rendering, despite god‟s intervention the fowler is responsible for his lot because he has 
so planned
380. My rendering differs from Parkinson‟s in understanding sxr.w not as a 
plural but as an abstract noun (And he is miserable because of his condition (sfn=f Hr 
sxr.w=f)); hence I propose to understand the passage as a divine sanction of the social 
hierarchy. Moreover, since god is said to keep a net away from the fowler, he does not 
only endorse social differentiation as he also foments it – an attitude that is juxtaposed 
with the creator‟s apology in CT 1130381. 
 The stanza about the fisherman introduces us to a concept that is best known 
from the New Kingdom community of Deir el-Medina. This concept is the bA.w (nTr) 
xpr.w, “the manifestation (of a god) has occurred”382. In most references to this kind of 
theophany the bA.w nTr xpr.w is said to cause fear and awe among the ones who 
experienced the divine manifestation
383
. This is clearly the case in the description of the 
fisherman; he is frightened with a surfacing crocodile and compares it to a bA.w nTr. 
Since the description of the fisherman‟s plight appears particularly realistic, it is 
possible that mi bA.w nTr was a phrase uttered when a person would experience extreme 
fear, perhaps similarly to our catch-phrase “Oh my God!” But the usage of the phrase 
bA.w nTr xpr.w in the Deir el-Medina confessional texts suggests that the phrase mi bA.w 
nTr was not merely a cliché, but a deliberately used phrase. What the fisherman‟s 
comparison of the menacing crocodiles to a divine manifestation implies is that a bA.w 
nTr xpr.w would be characterised by a similar frightening situation. The insight yielded 
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by the material from Deir el-Medina is also significant: the bA.w nTr xpr.w usually 
occurred after some sort of infraction was committed and not assumed
384
; as inferred by 
Joris Borghouts, it is god‟s manifestation that prompts the person to tell others about her 
infraction
385
. This is very significant, as the expression bA.w nTr xpr.w is not used in a 
context of reward but is instead employed in contexts of punishment and retribution. 
 Regarding the fisherman in the Instruction of Dua-Khety, it is not apparent that 
he has committed any infraction, unless fishing in the Nile River was considered to be a 
trespassing of Sobek‟s territory; in the Book of the Heavenly Cow the crocodile is said 
to be the bA (i.e., manifestation) of the god Sobek386. But if in the account of the 
fisherman mi bA.w nTr refers to the manifestation of Sobek, why keeping the god‟s 
identity unveiled? Perhaps the expression bA.w nTr was already fixed as an idiom. And 
the fact that the fisherman only compares his situation to a bA.w nTr, instead of saying 
that it is de facto a bA.w nTr indicates that he might not be committing an infraction but 
rtahter just being stalked by crocodiles as part of routine. 
 Although it is uncertain whether officials would in fact risk themselves in the 
river to fish for sport or instead watch their servants doing it, what was said above about 
the social differentiation still stands; and it is possible that there is another innuendo that 
Dua-Khety was trying to convey to future scribes: should they indeed become scribes 
they would have tombs as props to fish and fowl as they would please in the afterlife, 
whereas the real professionals of these activities would not have that chance but instead 
would have to face the difficulties of this life. 
 The main contribution of the foregoing for our discussion is that god is said to 
impact negatively on the life of the fowler, on the hand, and, on the other, that god 
could become manifest in a terrifying situation
387
. This is similar to divine intervention 
in Ptahhotep which, as we have seen, also has negative effects on one‟s life. 
 
2.3. Divine determination in the Story of Sinuhe: 
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 In the Story of Sinuhe
388
 god is mentioned several times, either as referring to the 
king or to the god who Sinuhe makes accountable for his roaming in Syria-Palestine. It 
has been suggested that the “god of the flight,” as he may be called, is to be identified 
with the king
389
. Although at the second climax
390
 of the narrative the royal children 
indeed state that Sinuhe had fled due to his fear of Senusret I, earlier at B 156-157 
Sinuhe had made a plea to the gods: “O gods who ordained this flight, may you be 
satisfied (with me) and send me home! (nTr.w nb(.w) SA war.t tn Htp=k Di=k wi r Xnw)” 
(B 156-157)
391
. Therefore, even though the king is also called a god in this text
392
, he is 
not the god of the flight. But this text is especially difficult to interpret because its 
author has given rise to several and important questions while not providing 
unequivocal answers to them. 
 One of these not clearly answered questions, and perhaps the most important of 
all, is why did Sinuhe flee. Apparently Sinuhe was in Lybia accompanying the king in a 
military campaign when messengers from the Egyptian capital arrived to inform the 
successor of the death of Amenemhat I
393
. Faced with this news Senusret hurried to the 
capital, but without letting his army know. This reaction by Senusret is another mystery. 
Although it could be proposed that the army logistics would have slowed him down, it 
is also true that if he was hasting because he was suspicious of a conspiracy, having the 
might of his army with him would only have been an asset
394
. Another possible reason 
for leaving his army in the dark might have been that Senusret believed that it was 
involved in the conspiracy
395
. The exact relation between the future king and his army 
may also impact on what the royal messenger and a prince (ms.w-n.i-sw.t) conversed 
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about and which Sinuhe overheard or eavesdropped
396
. The content of the conversation 
is not disclosed by the author, but whatever it was that the messenger or the prince
397
 
said it threw Sinuhe into a blind panic. This is another important feature of the story. 
Sinuhe is portrayed as a fearful character throughout; in fact the verb snD (“to fear, be 
fearful”) is one of the most used words in the text398. An early justification given by 
Sinuhe to flee is that “I did not plan to approach this Residence, having reasoned that a 
political disturbance would occur. I did not think I would survive him!” (B 7)399. 
However, when later enquired by Amunenshi, the ruler of Upper Retjenu who took him 
in, about his reason to abandon Egypt he answered with an “untruth” (iw-ms)400. It is 
thus left unknown whether Sinuhe fled because he overheard a conspiracy plot to 
murder Senusret and was afraid to be killed as well, or because he was actually involved 
in a conspiracy and suspected he would soon be discovered. David Lorton
401
 has made 
the interesting suggestion that perhaps Sinuhe was unaware of Senusret‟s departure to 
the royal palace and, if there were indeed conspirators among the leaders of the army, 
he might have become convinced that Senusret would be killed in the military camp 
alongside with his supporters – among which was Sinuhe. The several paeans exalting 
the might of the new king uttered by Sinuhe throughout the text suggest that his loyalty 
to Senusret was not compromised. The most probable explanation for Sinuhe‟s 
desertion of his master and the royal family is thus his fear of being eliminated due to 
his association with the successor to the throne. 
 In describing his flight, Sinuhe focuses at first on the physiological symptoms of 
the extreme anxiety that made him desert his post
402
, but as the plot develops he 
ascribes the responsibility for his running away to the god of the flight. In my view it is 
very important to ascertain at exactly what point the deity controls Sinuhe‟s escape to 
Syria-Palestine. Did the god trigger his flight? Or rather did he only take control of 
Sinuhe‟s path of flight as a punishment for his failure in keeping himself collected and 
in fighting for his king if necessary? It should be noted that Sinuhe not only abandoned 
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his master but also his queen and princes
403
, since his duty was related to the royal 
harem. 
 As David Lorton remarks, the first association between the flight and the god 
was tentative. According to Sinuhe at B 43, “it was like the plan of a god (iw(=s) mi sxr 
nTr)”404. The word sxr has the further meanings of “counsel” and “determination.” The 
rendering “counsel” entails that it would be up to Sinuhe to accept it, whereas 
“determination,” as well as “plan,” involve a total passivity on Sinuhe‟s part. The latter 
attitude is what is described in his flight, for in the Nile River he sails on a rudderless 
boat and is carried off by “a west wind, the „wrong‟ quarter for a wind in Egypt.”405 
Sinuhe later proceeds to connect his complete lack of control in his runaway with the 
control of fate by the deities: “O gods who ordained this flight (nTr.w nb(.w) SA war.t tn)” 
(B 156). The verb SA appears other five times in this text406. In B 126, 156, and 229, the 
subject of this verb is god or the gods; in B 121 SA is used as a noun, and in B 51 and 
262 it is employed as a participle
407
. In this latter occurrence Sinuhe refers to his flight 
simply as something that was fated: “Fear (lit. “terror”) is in my body just as the 
ordained flight was made to happen (Hr(i.)t wnn=s m X.t=i mi sxpr war.t SAA.t)”408. We 
may thus see how Sinuhe shifts the responsibility for his flight completely away from 
him. John Baines describes this phenomenon in the following terms: 
 
 The hypostatization of “god”, or, in other versions within Sinuhe, of the “heart”, is a 
dramatization of guilt and an exculpation of the guilty party. The problem of motivation is treated in 
terms too inconsistent for the ascription to outside agencies to be interpreted as conceptual realism or 
reification; it is certainly a literary device.
409
 
 
But two alternative views may be proposed: first, the heart is part of the human nature 
and, even though it may be described as an alter ego, it may be viewed as an aspect of 
the individual which is being given particular attention rather than an outside agency; 
second, the ascription of responsibility for Sinuhe‟s flight to a god does not need to be 
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seen as an hypostatisation of his motivations, or even as a plea for “temporary 
insanity”410. By making the god responsible for his roaming about, Sinuhe was most 
probably engaged in looking for answers to his present condition rather than attempting 
to exteriorise his guilt to a divine agency, as David Lorton suggests
411
. This search for 
an answer is very similar to the conduct adopted before affliction in practical religion: 
“Response to affliction should ideally include discovering its cause – in the broadest 
terms, divination – and suitable action to overcome it.”412 And both these elements seem 
to be present in the Story of Sinuhe. John Baines argues that:  
 
 His [Sinuhe‟s] recourse to a god is [...] relevant here because of the assumption it implies about 
the role of the gods in human affairs and the difficulty of knowing who the god was and what he did. [...] 
Sinuhe‟s motivation may have been direct inspiration – if one thinks his narrative is presented as being in 
good faith – but the putative search for its meaning and source belongs better in a context of divination.413 
 
Although Sinuhe is not said to resort to the typical means of divination – 
communication with the dead, divine oracles, or seers/mediums
414
 –, it is possible that 
Amunenshi is acting as a substitute for a “wise woman” (rx.t), for example; the Syrian 
ruler inquires about his moral past, namely his reason for leaving Egypt, which, as Joris 
Borghouts suggested, might have been one of the steps in the process of identifying the 
agent responsible for the affliction
415
. And it is precisely in the reply to this inquiry that 
Sinuhe declares that his flight was “like the plan of a god.” It is interesting that this god 
is not specifically identified, which matches the anonymity of god in the wisdom 
literature and other sources.   
 Regarding the action to reconcile himself with the agent of his affliction, sc. the 
god(s), it is obviously the fight to the death with the powerful one (nx.t) of Retjenu. 
This nx.t plays a similar role to Judas in the New Testament and Seth in Egyptian 
mythology; they and their reputation must be sacrificed so that the hero‟s purpose might 
be fulfilled. The victory of Sinuhe over this nx.t redeems him before the king416 and 
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reconciles him with god: “Thus does the god act in order to be satisfied with the one 
with whom he had been angry, the one whom he led astray to another land: today his ib 
is clean (lit. “washed”) ((i)xr ir nTr r Htp n Tz.n=f i(A)m=f th.n=f r k.t xAs.t iw min ib=f 
ia)” (B 147-149)417. This passage strongly suggests that Sinuhe‟s affliction, i.e., his exile 
in a foreign land while longing for his life at the palace and facing the prospect of dying 
without a proper burial, was a divine punishment for his reckless flight.  
 Even though Sinuhe states that his flight was ordained by god, it is possible that 
he is referring only to the course he took and not to the action of deserting. This 
inference is supported by the statement at B 229-230, “the god who ordained this flight 
was dragging me away (nTr SA war.t tn Hr stA=i)”418, and by the fact that Sinuhe first 
announced that he was going south and then, through the rudderless boat and the 
atypical west wind that were mentioned above, wound up going north to Syria-
Palestine. It is thus interesting that although the flight was rooted on Sinuhe‟s inability 
to choose otherwise, sc. to face adversity, he was punished notwithstanding. Still, 
Sinuhe was indeed at fault; being an attendant of Senusret‟s wife and their children at 
the royal harem, Sinuhe deserted them by fleeing to Syria-Palestine
419
. Furthermore, 
leaving the new king might also have been understood as not recognising him as the 
rightful heir.
420
 It is uncertain whether Senusret considered Sinuhe‟s flight to be a crime 
worthy of punishment or not. Although in the exchange of correspondence between the 
king and Sinuhe the former implies that the latter will suffer no punishment, upon his 
return Sinuhe is clearly fearful of an extreme punishment – the declaration “to you 
belongs life (ntk anx)” (B 263) suggests the death penalty – which is apparently only 
thwarted by the intervention of the royal children, who ascribe Sinuhe‟s flight to fear of 
the king, implying that Sinuhe deserted his functions because of his loyalty since the 
king is expected to provoke fear in his subjects. 
                                                                                                                                               
with the possibility of being ambushed by conspirators (“Physical Coward,” in Harold M. Hays, “Sinuhe 
the Coward”). And the parallel is found e.g. on Sinuhe‟s description after defeating the powerful one of 
Retjenu which resembles the description of Senusret throughout the paeans (David Lorton, “Reading the 
Story of Sinuhe”). It is certainly not by chance that Sinuhe only coincides with the king after a victorious 
fight and after having become a powerful leader abroad. This probably conveyed a message to the elite, 
that fearful officials would not be welcomed whereas the brave ones would be valued. In this sense the 
propaganda of the Story of Sinuhe is similar to the idea communicated by Senusret III to his soldiers 
stationed at the fortress of Semna; in the Semna stele the king states that: “Valorous it is to attack, vile to 
retreat” (Toby Wilkinson, Rise and Fall of Ancient Egypt: The History of a Civilisation from 3000 BC to 
Cleopatra, 179). 
417
 Translation and transliteration by Harold M. Hays, “Sinuhe the Coward.” 
418
 Translation and transliteration according to ibid. 
419
 See “Dereliction of Duty,” in Harold M. Hays, “Sinuhe the Coward.” 
420
 About further implications of exile see John Baines, “Interpreting Sinuhe,” 40-42. 
84 
 
 It is also noteworthy that Senusret does not give any credit to Sinuhe‟s claims 
that his exile in Syria-Palestine was the working of a god
421
. But then again, the king 
focused on Sinuhe‟s flight and his motivations, not on the specific route he took. 
Therefore, and resuming the idea sketched above, it is conceivable that god intervened 
only to punish Sinuhe. But if Sinuhe was at fault particularly with the royal family, why 
would a deity intervene? Paula D. Zwicker suggests an interesting possibility: 
 
 This remark [i.e., god‟s intervention] may be intended to recall the connection between the 
kingship and the divine, i.e., as punishment for Sinuhe‟s supposed crime, the gods, who were historically 
associated with the figure of the monarch, intervened and drove him away from Egypt.
422
 
 
This hypothesis of Sinuhe‟s divine punishment for a transgression is not alien to 
Egyptian thought. In another text from the Middle Kingdom, the Instruction for King 
Merikare, king Khety mentions the apparently unauthorised plundering of Abydos and 
This by his army and remarks that: “Affliction will be requited in kind, / and every deed 
committed has its consequence.”423 The conceptualisation of the direct relation between 
transgression and punishment is also expressed in a stele of Neferabu from the New 
Kingdom: “I committed a sin against the goddess of the Western peak, and she taught 
me a lesson.”424 
 One may also pose the question: was the god of the flight Sinuhe‟s personal 
god? This is uncertain, primarily because private piety is a phenomenon better attested 
from the New Kingdom onwards. It is possible that evidence for this religious 
manifestation was irreversibly lost, not yet recovered by archaeologists, or severely 
limited by decorum
425
. But while it is tempting to posit complex ideas attested in later 
periods on earlier periods, thus attributing a greater, and more prestigious, complexity to 
these earlier periods, one must also accept that the lack of evidence for a particular 
phenomenon in a given period may very well express its scarcity, or even non-
existence, in such period; after all if one ascribes major New Kingdom phenomena not 
attested frequently in previous periods to those periods, one risks concluding that in the 
New Kingdom and later stages of Egyptian history there were no cultural developments 
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whatsoever. This is not to say that such phenomena may not have been inchoate, or 
simply less exploited, in earlier periods. And this might very well be the case with 
private piety.
426
 In the Story of Sinuhe there appears to be no strong evidence to support 
pietism. In the only occurrence when Sinuhe makes a plea that would resemble pietistic 
prayers from the New Kingdom
427
, he addresses the gods (B 156-157). This is the only 
instance where the god of the flight gives place to “gods,” and it is possible that this 
sudden shift is intentional; the author‟s purpose might have been to eschew a too 
personal relation between Sinuhe and a single god – the reasons for this are unclear, but 
given that after the appeal to the gods Sinuhe addresses the king, the author might have 
intended to shift a closer relationship between Sinuhe and the god of the flight to the 
relationship between Sinuhe and the king who is after all the ideological referential of 
the story. 
 So far I have been developing only the hypothesis that the god punished Sinuhe 
after his inability to remain in his duty. But it is equally possible that when Sinuhe states 
that the gods ordained his flight, he is referring to the crucial moment where fear 
overwhelmed him and made him flee, rather than to the direction his flight took. The 
former possibility deals only with the outer aspects of Sinuhe‟s life – namely to where 
he flew, the circumstances of his exile, and his confrontation with the powerful one of 
Retjenu –, whereas the latter concerns the inner dispositions of Sinuhe. The former 
entails that Sinuhe was fearful by nature, whereas the latter does not necessarily entail 
it. The most prominent element in Sinuhe‟s flight, and which is recurrent throughout the 
story, is his fear. And if Sinuhe was fated by god to flee, this is an indication that under 
normal circumstances Sinuhe would not have felt a panic so deep to the point that he 
was urged to extract himself from that situation. Therefore, this abnormal behaviour 
triggered by god entails that Sinuhe‟s moral character was tampered with by the god. 
The same applies to the two cases in the Instruction of Ptahhotep that we analysed 
above. These situations where a god intervenes directly on the individual, rather than 
just influencing his surrounding environment – as in the description of the fowler in the 
Instruction of Dua-Khety –, are akin to beliefs in spirit possession in traditional cultures, 
as well as in present day mainstream religions and new religious movements. Once 
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more I will use shamanism as an element of comparison, since spirit possession is an 
integral feature of several shamanic groups. Brian Morris describes this phenomenon in 
the following way: 
 
 The term spirit-possession generally denotes the incarnation or possession of an individual by 
some spiritual being and not by some vague “external forces”. According to the culture, the spirit may 
“possess” or control the individual person in a number of different ways – it may reside in the head, 
“ride” the individual as a horse, or a spirit might fully incarnate the person, taking full control of his or 
her body – and the person is “seized” by the divinity or spirit. He or she then becomes a “vessel” or 
“temple” or the embodiment of the spirit.428 
 
Spirit possessions properly said are attested for ancient Egyptian religion. The most 
notorious case is probably the possession of princess Bentresh by an Ax which is 
described in a stele from the Ptolemaic period recovered from a chapel located near 
Khonsu‟s temple at Karnak. The text focuses more on Khonsu‟s ability as an exorcist 
god, giving very meagre details of the possession itself. Furthermore, its late date of 
composition might imply that it uses concepts not available at the time of the Old and 
Middle Kingdoms. Additional evidence for Ax possessions comes from the New 
Kingdom worker town of Deir el-Medina. Geraldine Pinch mentions that: “One text 
implies that akhu might be the cause of discord in the home by possessing people and 
making them bad-tempered and quarrelsome.”429 Old Kingdom threats to potential tomb 
robbers also suggest some kind of influence on living persons: 
 
 [I will seize] him like a bird, and I will place fear in him so that the Ax.w and those who are on 
earth see and are fearful of an excellent Ax ([iw(=i) r iTi].t=f mi Apd dy(=i) snD i(A)m=f r mAA Ax.w tp(i)w tA 
snD=sn n Ax ior). (Inscription from the Sixth Dynasty tomb of Ankhmahor at Saqqara).430 
 
It is relevant that the deceased is threatening to place fear in a living person, because 
that might be how Sinuhe believes his flight was fated by god, i.e., that god has placed 
fear in him. In ancient Egypt the relation between the living persons and metaphysical 
agencies, including the king as the upholder of a divine office, is often marked by fear – 
as we have seen with the bA.w nTr431. Another possible meaning for snD in this context is 
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respect. As regards Sinuhe, however, fear is still the most appropriate rendering since it 
is fear that triggers his flight. 
 There is another feature of spirit possession in shamanic cultures that might also 
be present in the Story of Sinuhe: 
 
 Soul loss too may or may not be linked with spirit-possession. Among members of the vodou 
cult in Haiti [...], it is believed that the loa spirits incarnate a person only after first displacing the gros 
bon ange (the big good angel), one of the two souls a person is said to possess.
432
 
 
As Joris Borghouts remarks, there are no explicit statements about a god entering 
someone‟s body433. But it is noteworthy that at the moment of his flight, Sinuhe claims 
that his HA.ty was not in his body (B 38)434. It is uncertain which constituent element of 
the human nature would be required to leave the person‟s body in order for a god 
(possibly through his bA, i.e., his manifestation) to enter435 it, but it is possible that the 
absence of the HA.ty would be enough. However, there is a major caveat: the heart loss 
described at B 38 is again repeated at B 255 with the addition that, when Sinuhe meets 
the king after his long exile, he also loses his bA; taking the speculation further to 
suggest that in this case too Sinuhe was “possessed” in some form by the god of the 
flight one is prompted to ask: if HA.ty loss was enough for the god to enter, why would 
he later also suffer bA loss? Moreover, why would the god of the flight still be involved 
if Sinuhe had already redeemed himself before this god? These questions render the 
connection between HA.ty loss and divine possession improbable. If there was any kind 
of divine intervention on Sinuhe‟s nature, it is preferable to describe it simply as some 
kind of influence. And it is reasonable to assume that this influence ended with Sinuhe‟s 
victory against the powerful one of Retjenu, for Sinuhe claims that: “Thus does the god 
act in order to be satisfied with the one with whom he had been angry” (B 147-148). It 
is interesting that in the hypothesis of divine punishment as well as in the possibility of 
divine influence on Sinuhe‟s moral character, Sinuhe‟s redemption is also the work of 
the god of the flight. This use of the powerful one of Retjenu by god resembles the 
resort to foreign nations by God to punish the Hebrew people in the Bible. 
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 Since there is evidence to support both the possibility of Sinuhe being punished 
by the god of the flight and the hypothesis of the same god influencing Sinuhe by 
interfering with his nature, it is difficult to tell which interpretation, if any, the author of 
the Story of Sinuhe had in mind – notice however that the semblance between Sinuhe‟s 
search for the cause of his flight and the quest for the cause of affliction in practical 
religion is valid for both interpretations. But then again, this text presents more riddles 
than answers. 
 As a final comment to this section I point out an interesting similarity between 
lines 546-552 of the Instruction of Ptahhotep and the Story of Sinuhe. Ptahhotep states, 
on the one hand, that the one whom god hates does not or cannot listen and, on the 
other, that it is the ib who makes his possessor someone who listens or someone who 
does not. Similarly, in the Story of Sinuhe Senusret identifies Sinuhe‟s ib as the origin of 
his flight (B 182), whereas the protagonist later pinpoints god as the responsible
436
 – the 
fact that the king does not adhere to Sinuhe‟s ascription of responsibility for his flight to 
god is even more relevant as it juxtaposes both explanations. This semblance between 
both texts epitomises the intertextuality of the “dilemma of human responsibility” as 
Richard Parkinson put it
437
. 
 
2.4. Fate: 
 
 In modern academic discussions the concepts of fate and fatalism are generally 
distinguished from determinism, because whereas the latter concerns all events, the 
former ones involve only specific events
438
. But, as Richard Taylor suggested, such an 
acute differentiation may not be necessary
439
. This suggestion appears to hold true to the 
Egyptian material, as is observable in the Story of Sinuhe
440
 where divine determination 
and divine control of fate coincide – conversely the gods‟ determination in the 
Instruction of Ptahhotep of the son who is among the ones who cannot cross because ill-
will was implanted in him, and of the one who cannot listen (lines 217-219 and 546 
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respectively) may also be understood as a feature of fate
441
. What then justifies my 
separate treatment of divine determination and fate? Whereas in ancient Egyptian there 
appears to be no specific word to refer to the former phenomenon, there are a few words 
for the latter. The criterion for my differentiation is thus a linguistic one. For the 
purposes of the present discussion on free will I do not intend to conduct a thorough 
study on the concept of fate in the Old and Middle Kingdoms
442
, but solely to address 
passages from different texts in order to answer the following query: in which way 
could one‟s actions be fated by a divine agency443? 
 The primary connotation of fate seems to be one‟s time of death. This is perhaps 
most visible from the New Kingdom onwards
444
. But Hans Goedicke advanced material 
from the Old Kingdom which might also support this view, even though none of the 
vocabulary later associated with the idea of fate is employed. Goedicke cites two 
biographical inscriptions that read: 
 
 I have appointed an heir for the day on which I go to the West – may it be delayed. (ink ir iwa.w r 
hr xpi.w m {r} imn.t wdf.t). (Fifth Dynasty inscription of Nykaiankh from Tehna).445 
 
 I shall cause that all living upon earth are afraid of the spirits (= dead ones) who are in the West 
– may it be far. (iw(=i) r rDi.t snD anx.w nb(.w) tp(iw) tA n Ax.w imy.w imn.t Hri.t). (From the tomb of 
Nenki at Saqqara dating from the reign of Pepy II)
446
. 
 
These references do not necessarily imply a notion of fate; but then again, such notion 
may be implicit in them. What they tell us for sure is that the authors of these texts 
shared a pessimism regarding death
447
, an attitude which will be further developed in 
the New Kingdom and is epitomised in chapter 175 of the Book of the Dead. 
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 A possible reference to fate as the time of death appears in the maxim 33 of the 
Instruction of Ptahhotep: 
 
 (463) Should you probe the character of a friend (ir Dar=k od n(.i) xnms), 
 (463) Do not inquire one who is close to him (m Snn r=k tkn i(A)m=f). 
 (465) Deal with him alone (ir zp Hna=f wa.w) 
 (466) Until you are finished with troubling about his affairs (r tm.t=k mn xr.t=f). 
 (467) Argue with him after some time (DAis Hna=f m-xt aHa.w), 
 (470) And test (?)
448
 his ib in an occasion of speech (wSm ib=f m zp n(.i) md.t). 
 (471) If what he has seen comes out from him (i.e., if he tells you what he has seen) (ir pri 
mAA.t.n=f m-a=f) 
 (472) And should he commit a fault (omit something?) over which you get angered (ir=f zp 
Sp.t=k Hr=f), 
 (473) Befriend him, or (xnms sw r-pw) 
 (474) Do not turn the face (m itw Hr)! 
 (475) Pull yourself together and do not reveal a matter
449
 to him (sAo.w m wbA n=f md.t). 
 (476) Do not answer through an act of hostility (m wSb m zp n(.i) zhA), 
 (477) Do not separate yourself from him
450
; do not humiliate (?) him
451
 (m wi(A) tw r=f m hb.w 
sw). 
 (479) His time has never failed to come
452
 (n pA zp=f tm iw), 
 (480) One cannot escape from the one who ordained it (n wh.n=tw m SA sw). 
 
This passage introduces us to one of the principal words that refer to fate: SA. As 
remarked by Jan Quaegebeur it can be translated into several modern words: 
 
 Quelle que soit la traduction adoptée: déterminer, prédestiner, ordonner, décider, fixer, imposer, 
attribuer, le sens profond est toujours celui d‟une idée, d‟un projet, d‟une dé cision qui es prise dans 
l‟esprit et s‟exprime dans un ordre ou sous la forme d‟une loi. 453 
 
The reference to death occurs in line 479. Although there may be doubts concerning the 
exact meaning of zp in this case, the L1 version of this line makes it clear by replacing 
                                                 
448
 Raymond O. Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, 70, is hesitant about the meaning of 
this word. Zbyněk Žaba, Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 156, is also uncertain about its meaning. 
449
 The L1 version replaces md.t by ib. See Zbyněk Žaba, ibid., 53. 
450
 Here I follow ibid., 157, who identifies the verb spelled out only as wi as being the verb wiA. 
451
 Because of what follows next, tn the reading of hb.w I opted for the bilateral hb (of whose meaning 
Raymond O. Faulkner, A Concise Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, 158, is not completely certain), as 
opposed to the tertiae infirmae hbi, “to tread,” favoured by Zbyněk Žaba, Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 
157. 
452
 About this sentence see Alan H. Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar: Being an Introduction to the Study of 
Hieroglyphs, 3rd ed. rev., 266. 
453
 Le dieu égyptien Shaï dans la religion et l’onomastique, 45. 
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zp=f with pH(.wy)=fy454, “his end,” the same word used in maxim 5: “The end comes, 
Maat remains (wn pH.wy mAa.t wAH=s) (line 97). In both cases pH.wy clearly refers to the 
moment of death
455
. However, it does not seem entirely clear which one is the referent 
of sw. As I remarked elsewhere456, if it is =tw then the sense would be “one cannot 
escape from one who ordained him
457”; conversely, if it is zp=f then “the one who 
ordained,” ordained the death of the crooked friend458. The proximity of =tw in relation 
to sw suggests that sw refers to it. Consequently this passage would not employ SA as a 
reference to death, but rather as a reference to the control of one‟s actions by a deity – 
although there is no indication of the subject of SA, it probably is a god as was pointed 
out by Zbyněk Žaba and Jan Quaegebeur459. Support for this interpretation is found in 
the Story of Sinuhe where Sinuhe‟s actions are ordained by the gods as in e.g. “O gods 
who ordained this flight (nTr.w nb(.w) SA war.t tn)” (B 156).  
 The retributive tenor of line 479 is similar to the one of lines 217-219; even 
though the individual may not be entirely responsible for his actions, he is still punished 
on account of them. Contrarily to lines 217-219 and 546, where the time of the 
determination was not rendered explicit, in line 479 the verb pA indicates action in the 
past, and its negated perfective denotes “not once,” or “never”460. The construction n pA 
suggests a predetermination that took place in a distant past. It is conceivable that this 
distant past is the moment of birth. 
 Associated to birth are two deified concepts: Meskhenet and Renenutet. The role 
of Meskhenet, whose name may be translated “birth brick,” is to assign one‟s profession 
and, therefore, one‟s social position461. Renenutet‟s function, on the other hand, appears 
                                                 
454
 See Zbyněk Žaba, Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 54. 
455
 For the first case see ibid., 120, and for the second see Frank T. Miosi, “God, Fate and Free Will in 
Egyptian Wisdom Literature,” 81. 
456
 “O problema do livre arbítrio e da intervenção divina na instrução de Ptah-hotep,” 23. 
457
 This is the sense favoured by Frank T. Miosi, “God, Fate and Free Will in Egyptian Wisdom 
Literature,” 81. 
458
 What his fault is the text does not render clear. Apparently he either lies or omits something in a 
report. 
459
 Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 157, and Le dieu égyptien Shaï dans la religion et l’onomastique, 44, 
respectively. 
460
 See James P. Allen, Middle Egyptian: An Introduction to the Language and Culture of Hieroglyphs, 
2nd ed., 270. 
461
 Ann Macy Roth and Catharine H. Roehrig, “Magical Bricks and the Bricks of Birth,” JEA 88 (2002): 
88. Meskhenet features in a story of the West Car Papyrus where the goddess assigns the office of king to 
Ruddedet‟s three children. For an interpretation of its ideological propaganda see José das Candeias 
Sales, A ideologia real Acádica e Egípcia: representações do poder político pré-clássico [The Egyptian 
and Akkadian royal ideology: representations of the pré-classical political power] (Lisboa: Estampa, 
1997), 133-9. 
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to be particularly connected with one‟s physical development and material wealth462. 
The two deities appear together in the Instruction of Dua-Khety: 
 
 Look, Renenutet is on the path of the god (mk rnn.t Hr wA.t nTr) 
 And Renenutet is written on his shoulder (rnn.t sS Hr oaH=f) 
 On the day of his birth (hrw n(.i) ms.t=f). 
 He reaches the palace portal (spr=f aryt), 
 And that court of officials is the one allotting people to him (tA onb.t ir n=f rmT). 
 Look, no scribe will ever be lacking in food (mk nn wn sS Sw m wnm) 
 Or the things of the House of the King, may he live, prosper and be well (Axt n(.i)t pr nswt anx 
wDA snb)! 
 Meskhenet is the prosperity of the scribe (msxn.t wADt n(.i)t sS), 
 The one placed before the court of officials (ddy Xr-HAt onb.t). (Stanza 30).463 
 
 In this passage both Renenutet and Meskhenet are associated with social position 
and material prosperity. Evidence that connects at least Meskhenet, and therefore social 
position, with moral responsibility may come from the Eighteenth Dynasty vignettes to 
the chapter 125 of the Book of the Dead that show birth bricks over the balance
464
. Their 
meaning is not entirely clear, but Ann Macy Roth and Catharine H. Roehrig related the 
presence of these bricks with the demotic story of Setne II
465
 where one is judged after 
death not only with basis on one‟s actions but also on one‟s fate; in two other demotic 
texts one‟s fate is inscribed by Thoth on a meskhenet (the “birth brick,” as it may be 
translated, that was deified as Meskhenet)
466
. The authors‟ conclusion is that the social 
position allotted to a person was taken into account at the judgment of the dead
467
, 
implying that individuals with a higher status among society and with more wealth were 
held to higher standards of moral expectations. The idea that the wealthier are in a more 
suitable position to will more freely is also present in Middle Kingdom texts: 
 
 (483) It is the bread for the sharing out that one is greedy about (in t(A) n psS.t Hnty Hr=f). 
                                                 
462
 See Frank T. Miosi, “God, Fate and Free Will in Egyptian Wisdom Literature,” 75-6. 
463
 Translation and transliteration from “Teaching of Khety - the „Satire of Trades,‟” in Digital Egypt for 
Universities: A learning and teaching resource for higher education, 
http://www.digitalegypt.ucl.ac.uk/literature/satiretransl.html. 
464
 For an example see Ann Macy Roth and Catharine H. Roehrig, “Magical Bricks and the Bricks of 
Birth,” 137. 
465
 For an introduction and translation of this text see Robert Kriech Ritner, “The Adventures of Setna and 
Si-Osire (Setna II),” in The Literature of Ancient Egypt: An Anthology of Stories, Instructions, Stelae, 
Autobiographies, and Poetry, ed. William Kelly Simpson, (2003), 470-89. 
466
 Ann Macy Roth and Catharine H. Roehrig, “Magical Bricks and the Bricks of Birth,” 137 with nn. 85-
7. 
467
 Ibid., 137. 
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 (484) The one who is empty in his belly is the one who plots (sxr.y pw Sw m X.t=f), 
 (485) While the opponent becomes a grumbler (xpr itn.w m sAhhw). (Instruction of Ptahhotep, 
maxim 34). 
 
 The one who possesses bread should be merciful (sf nb t(A)), 
 Whereas strength belongs to the criminal (nxt(.w) n(.i) xnr). 
 Theft is natural for the one who has no possessions (twt TAw.t n iw.ty x.t=f). 
 Things are robbed by a criminal (xnb x.t in xnr), 
 An evil act of the one who has nothing (zp bin iw.ty Swiw). 
 Thus one is not angry with him (nn r=f Tsi=tw i(A)m=f), 
 (Because) he is seeking (something) for himself (HHy n=f pw). 
 But you are sated with your bread, (iw=k sw.t sA.t(y) m t(A)=k), 
 And drunk with your beer (tx(.ty) m H(n)ot=k) 
 You are rich in all kind of clothing (iw=k xwd.t(y) m sSrw nb.w). (Eloquent Peasant B1, 120-
125).
468
 
 
 Promote your officials that they may fulfil your decrees, 
 For he whose house is wealthy will not take sides, 
 And he who wants for nothing is a wealthy man. 
 A poor man does not speak honestly, 
 And he who says “Would that I had!” cannot be upright. 
 He will be partial towards the one who pays him. (Instruction for the King Merikare, 40).
469
 
 
It is interesting that in all these three passages the poor is exculpated from not abiding to 
moral expectations. But, in stark contrast, the wealthier man has the obligation to abide 
by these expectations because he can. This difference is particularly emphasised in the 
Eloquent Peasant through the use of the enclitic particle sw.t, which means “but, 
however”470. This “but” entails that because the wealthier man, who in the story is the 
Chief Steward Rensi, has access to food, drink, and clothes
471
, he has no excuse to 
                                                 
468
 Translated from the hieroglyphic version available at “The Eloquent Peasant,” Ancient Egyptian 
Language Discussion List, http://www.rostau.org.uk/ep/ep13.html, lines 152-156 (accessed 02 
September, 2010), and with resort to the translation in Vincent Arieh Tobin, “The Tale of the Eloquent 
Peasant,” in The Literature of Ancient Egypt: An Anthology of Stories, Instructions, Stelae, 
Autobiographies, and Poetry, ed. William Kelly Simpson, (2003), 32-3. 
469
 Translation of Vincent Arieh Tobin, “The Teaching for King Merikare,” in The Literature of Ancient 
Egypt: An Anthology of Stories, Instructions, Stelae, Autobiographies, and Poetry, ed. William Kelly 
Simpson, (2003), 156. 
470
 See for example Boyo G. Ockinga, A Concise Grammar of Middle Egyptian: An Outline of Middle 
Egyptian Grammar, 2nd rev. ed., 21. 
471
 Notice that in some tomb biographies these are part of the items provided to the poor. In the biography 
of Neferseshemre, from his tomb at Saqqara and dating from the reign of Teti (Nigel C. Strudwick, Texts 
from the Pyramid Age, 300), these basic goods are listed: “I gave bread and beer to the hungry and clothes 
[to the naked] (rDi.n(=i) t(A) H(n)q.t n Hqr Hbs [n HAy]).” Urk I, 198, line 3. 
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deviate from what is expected from him. In other words the one who has material 
comfort appropriate for his office and hierarchical position may choose to be corrupt or 
to abide to moral expectations, whereas the one who lacks this comfort has no choice 
but to steal or to be corrupt. In modern Law this would correspond to extenuating 
circumstances. Whether Egyptian Law would also condone a petty robber as in the tale 
of The Eloquent Peasant or not is difficult to ascertain. Small thefts would usually be 
punished with the obligation to give back the stolen items and in addition provide the 
double or triple of what had been stolen, or its equivalent
472
. It is thus probable that the 
genre of sapiential texts express only a tolerant understanding of the motivations of 
desperate thieves instead of mirroring Egyptian legal attitudes towards such thieves. 
 According to Roth and Roehrig the connection between one‟s social position 
assigned at birth and one‟s ethical judgment afterlife could not be earlier than the 
Eighteenth Dynasty. But, nonetheless, the relation between social position determined 
by Meskhenet and one‟s freedom of action certainly goes back to the Middle Kingdom 
as it is suggested by these three texts and by the passage of the Instruction of Dua-Khety 
quoted in this section. And once again, this conceptualisation seems to conflict with the 
Coffin Texts spell 1130 where the creator god claims to have created all people alike 
without social stratification. 
 Answering the question posed at the beginning of this section, a divine agency 
could fate one‟s actions either by acting directly on the individual‟s nature or by 
influencing him somehow – this ambiguity is present not only in the Story of Sinuhe, 
but also in maxim 33 of the Instruction of Ptahhotep – and by assigning one‟s social 
position; according to the sapiential texts, individuals in higher strata were believed to 
be able to choose to pursue an ethical conduct, as well as its opposite, whereas persons 
in lower strata or feeling unrewarded by their superiors could not have such option. 
 
 
 
                                                 
472
 David Lorton, “The Treatment of Criminals in Ancient Egypt: Through the New Kingdom,” Journal 
of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 20 (1977), 47. An exception to this rule appears to be 
indicated in Papyrus BM 10335 from the Ramesside period which
472
 records an oracle concerning five 
mss-shirts stolen from the servant Amenemwia by a thief identified as Petjauemdiamun. According to 
Jaroslav Černý‟s interpretation of bn Sd(=i) TAw.t m Di=f, Amenemwia said “I will not exact a penalty 
from him,” implying that she would have been satisfied with the restitution of the shirts alone. See 
Jaroslav Černý, “Restitution of, and Penalty Attaching to, Stolen Property in Ramesside Times,” JEA 23 
(1937), 188-9. But cf. David Lorton, “The Treatment of Criminals in Ancient Egypt: Through the New 
Kingdom,” 48. 
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CONCLUSION: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
 
 In the previous chapter I have focused mainly in the negative divine 
intervention. But in the relation between man and god the former was not always 
subject to harm. There are also instances where divine intervention is positive. In fact, 
the very maintenance of the created world by the gods is an example of a beneficial 
intervention. And maxim 6 of the Instruction of Ptahhotep may refer to this type of 
intervention: 
 
 (99) May you not practice terror among the people (imi=k ir Hr m r(m)T.w). 
 (100) God will punish accordingly (xsf nTr m mi.tt). 
 (101) A man says: “I will live thus” (iw zi Dd=f anx(=i)
473
 i(A)m), 
 (102) And he will be lacking breads because of an utterance (iw=f Sw=f m tA.w n tp(y)-r(A)). 
 (103) A man says: “I will be wealthy (iw zi Dd=f wsr(=i)
474
), 
 (107) And he will say: “I snared for me what I saw” (iw=f Dd=f sxt=i r=i siA.t=i). 
 (111) A man says: “I will rob another” (iw zi Dd=f Hwtf(=i) ky), 
 (112) And will end up giving to someone he does not know (iw=f pH=f rDi.t=f n xm.n=f). 
 (115) Never people‟s terror
475
 came into being (n pA Hr n(.i) r(m)T.w xpr(.w)); 
 (116) It is that which god commanded
476
 that comes into being (wD.t nTr pw xpr.t). 
 (117) Think of living amidst peace (kA anx m-Xnw hr.t), 
 (118) And that which they give comes by itself (ii DD.t=sn Ds iry). 
 
 Here there is an opposition between man‟s intentions and god‟s command. The 
thought couplets
477
 introduced by iw zi Dd=f and iw=f are an unfolding of what is said 
in the first two lines and in lines 115-116. The practice of evil will inevitably fail; lines 
103 and 107 are not entirely clear but, in my view, the meaning is that one thinks he 
will be rich only to find out that he will need to forage. This maxim is indeed a 
condemnation of evil performed by man and of easy solutions. The general meaning of 
this maxim is that there is no point in engaging in theft or any other easy way because 
god will not allow it and in addition, if the individual refrains from such activities, god 
                                                 
473
 Alteration proposed by Zbyněk Žaba, Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 121. 
474
 See previous note. 
475
 @r can also be translated by “intention” as noted by Zbyněk Žaba, Les Maximes de PtaHHotep, 120. 
However, the meaning “terror” seems to fit the context better. 
476
 WD may also be translated as “to ordain,” or “to decree.” See Raymond O. Faulkner, A Concise 
Dictionary of Middle Egyptian, 73-4. 
477
 See n. 337. 
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will provide for him
478
. The god mentioned here does not raise any particular question, 
as it certainly is not the king.  
 However the pronoun “they” definitely raises doubts regarding their identity as 
we have two possible referents. As noted by Zbyněk Žaba479, its grammatical referent is 
r(m)T.w, the “people,” or “men.” And it is with basis on this referent that Faulkner 
translates this line: “what men give will come of its own accord”480. However, god is 
mentioned twice; it is god that punishes evil, and it is god that commands what comes 
into being. It would thus make sense to understand “they” as being the gods. This view 
appears to be supported by the L2 variant which reads: “that which they commanded 
comes by itself (iw wDdd.wt=sn Dd=sn iry)”481, since the verb wD, “to command,” is 
used in line 116 of the Prisse Papyrus: “that which the god commanded (wD.t nTr).” 
 The theme of evil being destined to failure is also raised in maxim 5 of the 
Instruction of Ptahhotep: 
 
 (84) If you are a leader (ir wnn=k m sSmy) 
 (85) With command of the affairs of the multitude
482
 (Hr wD n(.i) sxr n(.i) aSA.t) 
 (86) Seek for yourself every occasion to be excellent (HHy n=k zp nb mnx) 
 (87) Until your governance is without injustice
483
 (r wn.t sxr=k nn iw i(A)m=f). 
 (88) Maat is great
484
, its effectiveness is enduring (wr mAa.t wAH spd.t(=s)). 
 (89) It was not disturbed since the time of Osiris (n Xnn.t(w) s(t) Dr rk wsir). 
 (90) One punishes the one who transgresses the laws (iw xsf=tw n swA Hr hp.w), 
 (91) That is what escapes the sight of the one who is avid of ib
485
 (swA.t pw m Hr n(.i) awn-ib). 
 (92) It is baseness that takes hold of wealth (in nDy.t iTi.t aHa.w), 
 (93) (But) never did wrongdoing moor its venture (n pA DAy.t mni zp=s). 
 (95) A man says:
486
 “I will snare for me myself” (iw=f Dd=f sxt=i r=i Ds=i), 
 (96) He does not say: “I will snare for my office” (n Dd.n=f sxt=i Hr Hn.t=i) 
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 See also Pascal Vernus, Sagesses de l’Égypte pharaonique, 119 n. 84. 
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 Raymond O. Faulkner, Maxims of Ptahhotpe,” in The Literature of Ancient Egypt: An Anthology of 
Stories, Instructions and Poetry, ed. William Kelly Simpson (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1972), 162. 
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 (97) The end comes, Maat remains (wn pH.wy mAa.t wAH=s). 
 
 In this maxim Ptahhotep emphasises the proper working of justice – expressed 
through the concepts of Maat and hp, “law”. Although god is not mentioned here, the 
end result is the same: there is no point in choosing to perform evil or to be selfish 
because such attitudes will inevitably fail. This faith in temporal and spiritual 
institutions, indicated by “one punishes” (line 90) and Maat respectively, prompted 
Miriam Lichtheim
487
 to date this instruction from the Old Kingdom since the Egyptian 
author was apparently unaware that official order could collapse. However, this 
conviction is on par with the loyalist teachings, such as the Story of Sinuhe which 
proclaims how well Egypt is ruled by Senusret I
488
. Even the tale of the Eloquent 
Peasant acknowledges the existence of corruption in the Egyptian administration, but it 
too has an ending favourable to the peasant thereby reasserting that evil will profit no 
one
489
. In fact, there is a very similar passage to Ptahhotep‟s maxim 5 in the Eloquent 
Peasant: 
 
 Maet is the final end of falsehood, 
 And (falsehood) will diminish and be seen no more. 
 If falsehood walks, it goes astray; 
 It does not cross in the ferry, and it makes no headway. 
 As for him who prospers through it, 
 He will have no children, he will have no heirs upon earth. 
 As for him who sails with it, he does not reach land, 
 And his boat does not arrive at its mooring-place.
490
 
 
 It is interesting that both texts make reference to the afterlife. The evildoer is not 
punished only in this world; he will not have access to the desired life in the hereafter as 
well. Whereas Ptahhotep states that “the end comes, Maat remains,” the author of the 
Eloquent Peasant claims that “his (the evildoer‟s) boat does not arrive at its mooring-
place.” Ptahhotep‟s statement may be understood as a reference to the judgement of the 
dead
491
. According to Siegfried Morenz
492
, Ptahhotep is ambiguous because he 
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 AEL, 1:62. 
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 See B2 120-135. 
490
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 Siegfried Morenz, Egyptian Religion, 127 and 130, argues that the idea of universal judgment of the 
dead emerged from a reinterpretation of the fifth maxim of the Instruction of Ptahhotep. 
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concomitantly speaks of earthly and divine justice. However, both views do not need to 
exclude one another. In fact, given that the king was the vicar of the gods it makes sense 
that temporal institutions work alongside spiritual ones. But Morenz
493
 is certainly right 
in assuming that a universal judgment of the dead takes justice to a much deeper level 
of significance because if earthly justice fails, divine justice will hopefully make it right. 
 These passages just quoted are marked by a deterministic tone. One may choose 
to pursue wrongdoing, but the result will always be the same: punishment in this world 
and condemnation in the other. This is what we may indeed call positive determination 
and, since it deals with divine justice, positive theodicy. And it is interesting that the 
verb wD employed in maxim 6 of the Instruction of Ptahhotep is also used in the Coffin 
Texts spell 1130. Thus, whereas Ptahhotep says that “it is that which god commanded 
that comes into being,” the creator god claims that: 
 
 I created every man like his equal. I have not commanded
494
 that they make izf.t; it was their 
ib.w
495
 that disobeyed what I have said (iw ir.n=i z(i) nb mi sn.nw=f n wD=i ir=sn izf.t in ib.w=sn HD 
Dd.t.n=i).
496
 
 
 This passage has been cited within the categories of theodicy
497
 and free will
498
, 
as it states that responsibility for evil among men belongs to the human beings 
themselves and not to the creator god. In fact it is ascribed to their ib.w through the 
same grammatical construction that is used in line 550 of the Instruction of Ptahhotep: 
“it is the ib that makes its possessor (in ib sxpr nb=f) one who listens, or one who does 
not listen.”499 As with Ptahhotep‟s passage, a natural disposition outside the individual 
control might have been implied in spell 1130, but then again the action originating in 
the ib might have been a direct consequence of how the person formed and structured 
her ib. Whereas in the former case the persons would not be accountable for their 
disobedience, in the latter case they would. The responsibility for disobedience is also 
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stressed in Ptahhotep‟s maxim 6, as we have seen which suggests that in spell 1130 free 
will was indeed at work. 
 The Coffin Texts spell 1130 introduces an interesting subject: the ib, as one‟s 
moral conscience, was considered to be the upholder of moral responsibility. The 
prominence of the heart in moral responsibility may be due to the fact that it houses 
memory – a feature that may also be related to the structuring cause of the ib inasmuch 
as the heart “remembers” the actions of the individual. The connection between memory 
and heart is particularly explicit in the Book of the Dead spell 30B which reads: 
 
 My ib of my mother, my ib of my mother, my HA.ty of my being 
 Stand not against me as witness. Oppose me not in the council. 
 Outweigh me not before the keeper of the balance.
500
 
 
 The earliest inscription of this spell is attested on a heart scarab pertaining to the 
Thirteenth Dynasty official Nebankh
501
, who served under the king Sobekhotep IV
502
, 
which means it may be included in a time period close to the Instruction of Ptahhotep. It 
is significant that the heart scarab was required to replace the mummy‟s HA.ty-heart, but 
“in practice the heart scarabs appear to have been placed at random anywhere on or 
within the mummy‟s torso.”503 It is also noteworthy that, in the spell 30B of the Papyrus 
of Ani, Thoth states “I have judged the ib of Osiris (iw wDa.n(=i) ib n(.i) Wsir)”,504 
which might account for the apparent randomness in the scarab‟s placement. 
 Spell 30B characterise the heart as the witness of man‟s actions. In fact this spell 
has been interpreted as an attempt to silence the heart and keep it from revealing any of 
                                                 
500
 Translation from Thomas George Allen, The Book of the Dead or Going Forth by Day: Ideas of the 
Ancient Egyptians Concerning the Hereafter as Expressed in Their Own Terms, Studies in Ancient 
Oriental Civilization 37 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974), 40. Cf. Spell 30A: 
 Formula for not allowing the ib of N to be removed from him: 
 My ib of my mother, my ib of my mother, my HA.ty of my earthly being 
 Do not stand against me as witness beside the lords of the ritual 
 Do not say against me, he did it, about my actions 
 Do not make a case against me beside the great god. 
 Hail to my ib, hail to my HA.ty, hail to my entrails (bsk.w). 
 Translation from “Book of the Dead Chapter 30A,” in Digital Egypt for Universities: A learning and 
teaching resource for higher education, managed by Stephen Quirke, (University College London, 2000-
2003), http://www.digitalegypt.ucl.ac.uk/literature/manforson.html (accessed August 31, 2010). 
Transliteration is provided in ibid. 
501
 But see Rogério Ferreira de Sousa, “A simbólica do coração no antigo Egipto: estudo de antropologia 
religiosa sobre a representação da consciência,” 250 with n. 250. 
502
 Carol A. R. Andrews, “Amulets,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Egyptology, ed. Donald B. Redford, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1:80. 
503
 Robert Steven Bianchi, “Scarabs,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of Egyptology, 3:180. 
504
 See hieroglyphic text in Raymond O. Faulkner, The Egyptian Book of the Dead: The Book of Going 
Forth by Day, 2
nd
 rev. ed. (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1998), pl. 3. 
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his possessor‟s misdeeds on earth505. The titles of spells 30A and B translated by 
Thomas George Allen
506, “Spell for not letting N.‟s ib oppose him in the god‟s domain,” 
support this interpretation. However, spell 30 translated by the same author presents a 
different title: “Spell for not letting a man‟s HA.ty be kept away from him in the god‟s 
domain”507 – spell 30A from the papyrus in Kestner Museum designated as 1970.37508 
bears the same title but replaces HA.ty for ib. CT 113 is also titled “Not to let a man‟s 
HA.ty cause opposition against him in the necropolis”509, but its content is different from 
BD 30B. Nonetheless CT 715, which is titled “[Not to let the HA.ty of a man be taken 
from] him in the necropolis” presents a version which may be considered a counterpart 
to BD 30B: 
 
 O you who [take away] ib.w, 
 Who accuse HA.tyw 
 [...] 
 Do not turn away my ib, 
 Do not accuse the HA.ty, 
 You who cause [this my ib] to create a bad [accusation] against me!
510
 
 
 As noted by Rune Nyord
511
 what is important here is control of the heart, which 
is re-established through identification of the deceased‟s ib with the one of the 
demiurge
512
. Both in CT 715 and BD 30B the ib functions as an alter ego outside the 
individual‟s sphere of influence. Especially in the latter text it is made explicit that the 
heart will witness every action of the individual. This view may be illustrated with 
                                                 
505
 Proponents of this interpretation are e.g. Carol A. R. Andrews, “Amulets,” in The Oxford 
Encyclopedia of Egyptology, 1: 80, and Rogério Ferreira de Sousa, “A Noção de Coração no Egipto 
Faraónico: Uma Síntese Evolutiva” [The notion of heart in pharaonic Egypt: An evolutionary synthesis], 
in Percursos do Oriente Antigo: Estudos de Homenagem a José Nunes Carreira na Sua Jubilação 
Académica, comps. José Augusto Ramos, Luís Manuel de Araújo, and António Ramos dos Santos 
(Lisboa: Instituto Oriental, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, 2004), 543. 
506
 The Book of the Dead or Going Forth by Day: Ideas of the Ancient Egyptians Concerning the 
Hereafter as Expressed in Their Own Terms, 40. 
507
 Ibid., 39. 
508
 For text and reference see n. 501. 
509
 Translation and transliteration in Rune Nyord, Breathing Flesh: Conceptions of the Body in the 
Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 121. 
510
 Translation and transliteration in ibid., 124. 
511
 Ibid., 126. 
512
 Ibid. 
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Polybius‟s famous statement that “there is no more terrible witness, or more formidable 
accuser, than the conscience which resides in each man‟s breast”513. 
 As mentioned by Rogério Sousa
514
, the heart amulet may have served as a token 
of the conscience to remind its owner to abide by moral precepts because his moral 
conscience was permanently watching his actions and would, after death, been 
scrutinised in the judgment of the dead. Furthermore, when others hold an agent to 
moral expectations, failure to comply with those expectations will probably trigger 
“reactive attitudes,” in Peter F. Strawson‟s terminology515, such as resentment. But 
when the agent holds himself to moral expectations and fails to them he might feel 
guilty. Another purpose of the heart amulet, worn in life, might have been precisely to 
induce this feeling should its carrier commit a misdeed. 
 Another agency before whom man is held responsible is god. The dynamics 
ruling the relation between man and deity within the scope of moral responsibility are 
perhaps best attested in the Instruction for the King Merikare, for it is said: 
 
 Act for the god that he may do the like for you, with offerings that enrich the offering-table and 
with carving: that is the proclamation of your name, and the god is aware of the one who acts for him.
516
 
 
Thus, while there is a theodic aporia on the one hand, created by the ruthless control of 
the individual, on the other man is free to exert his anthropodicy and respond with an 
ethical conduct that will be appraised not by the gods but by the justice principles 
embodied in the goddess Maat
517
. One may therefore conclude that, except in the cases 
                                                 
513
 Histories, 18, 43. Translation in Polybius, Histories, trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London, New York: 
Macmillan, 1989; reprint: Bloomington, 1962), quoted in Gregory R. Crane (ed.), “Perseus Digital 
Library,” Tufts University, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0234: 
book=18:chapter=43&highlight=conscience (accessed September 1, 2010). 
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 “Os Amuletos do Coração no Antigo Egipto: Tipologia e Caracterização,” 129 n. 49. 
515
 “Freedom and Resentment,” in Free Will, ed. John Martin Fischer, Critical Concepts in Philosophy, 
vol. 1, Concepts and Challenges (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 39 ff. Previously published 
in Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962): 1-25. 
516
 Translation by David Lorton, “God‟s Beneficent Creation: Coffin Texts Spell 1130, the Instructions 
for Merikare, and the Great Hymn to the Aton,” 130. For an interpretation of this passage see ibid., 130 
nn. 20-22. 
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 As J. Sainte Fare Garnot remarked, [u]ne seconde tendance, non plus spéculative mais très conforme à 
la psychologie humaine, s‟efforce d‟assurer aux créatures de Dieu la plus large initiative possible, et de 
leur donner confiance en leur propres forces. Ce n‟est pas une tendance purement “laïque”. Bien au 
contraire, car elle implique et favorise la liberté humaine; et les croyances religieuses, en faisant une 
grande part au Jugement des Morts, admettent et encouragent cette liberté. N‟est responsable, en effet, 
que celui dont les actes son libres.” In “Discussion de la communication de M. H. Brunner,” in Les 
Sagesses du Proche Orient ancient, 118. 
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where god interfered or one‟s nature was deviated or not properly looked after, one was 
able to will freely. 
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